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ABSTRACT (EN)     
     
Understanding Success and Failure In Mergers and Acquisitions: Questing for 
the Holy Grail of Economics, Finance, and Strategic Management 
 
Ten billion dollars a day were spent on mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings between 2003 and 2008. And yet between sixty and eighty percent of 
all mergers will eventually be classified as failures. The aim of this research is to 
study which mergers work and why, and to profile the successful merger, in a quest 
for the holy grail of economics, finance and strategic management. We do so using 
data on approximately 35,000 mergers, which were concluded within or between the 
periods of both the fifth (1992-2001) and sixth (2003-2008) merger waves. We 
employ a number of methodological tools – both empirical and theoretical – to 
consider the performance of these mergers, and the factors affecting them. After first 
introducing, characterising and evaluating the sixth merger wave, we present five 
individual studies, which consider five specific performance moderators, namely: 
regulation and market structure, merger purpose, liquidity, managerial power, and 
firm size. In the conclusion we show that, given the opportunity, managers will 
pursue efficient acquisitions, but that in absence of obvious choices, ‘hubris’, or over-
confidence, will lead managers to make unsound decisions. We thus place the 
responsibility for failure squarely on the shoulders of the manager. The results, we 
suggest, provides an extension to theory of mergers and acquisitions, and makes for a 
valuable contribution, not only to researchers, attempting to understand the nature of 
mergers and acquisitions, but to regulators and practitioners, attempting to avoid the 





ABSTRACT (NL)     
     
Succes en falen van fusies en overnames nader verklaard: De zoektocht naar de 
heilige graal van de economie, financiën en strategisch management.  
 
Per dag ging 10 miljard dollar op aan fusies, overnames en bedrijfsreorganisaties 
tussen 2003 en 2008. Toch zal tussen de zestig en tachtig procent van alle fusies 
uiteindelijk als mislukking te boek staan. Het doel van dit onderzoek is te bestuderen 
welke fusies wel werken en waarom, en om de succesvolle fusie te profileren, in een 
zoektocht naar de heilige graal van de economie, financiën en strategisch 
management. Hiervoor gebruiken we gegevens over ongeveer 35,000 fusies, welke 
plaatsvonden tijdens of tussen de vijfde (1992-2001) en zesde (2003-2008) fusiegolf. 
We gebruiken een aantal onderzoeksmethodes – zowel empirisch als theoretisch – om 
de prestaties van deze fusies te beschrijven, net als de factoren die hierop van invloed 
zijn. Na het introduceren, karakteriseren, en evalueren van de zesde fusiegolf, 
presenteren we vijf verschillende studies, met vijf specifieke prestatiemoderatoren: 
regulering en marktstructuur, het doel van de fusie, liquiditeit, bestuurlijke macht en 
grootte van het bedrijf. In de conclusie beschrijven we dat managers, mits ze de kans 
krijgen, efficiënte overnames aangaan, maar dat bij het ontbreken van makkelijke 
keuzes, ‘hybris’, oftewel overmoed, ertoe leidt dat managers verkeerde keuzes maken. 
De verantwoordelijkheid voor een mislukte fusie schrijven wij dus volledig aan de 
manager toe. Onze resultaten zijn een uitbreiding van de theorie van fusies en 
overnames uit, en leveren een zinvolle bijdrage aan de poging de totstandkoming van 
fusies en overnames te begrijpen, niet alleen voor onderzoekers, maar ook voor 
wetgevers en beleidsmakers, bij het ontwijken van de valkuilen van 
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UNDERSTANDING SUCCESS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
SECTION ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
“After decades of research the overwhelming conclusion  
must be that M&A activity, on average, does not  
positively contribute to […] performance” 
 






CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. The M&A Industry   
Between 1995 and 1999 nine thousand billion dollars was spent by North 
American and Western European firms on mergers and acquisitions (M&A’s); a near 
incomprehensible figure which, by way of comparison, was about seven times the 
UK’s GDP, and more then twenty times that of the Netherlands (Schenk, 2003) in the 
same period. So large was the expenditure that, as a percentage of US GDP, mergers 
and acquisitions soared from 1.6% in the 1960, to 3.4% in the 1980s, to a staggering 
15.4% of at the height of the ‘fifth merger wave’ in 1999 (Mergerstat, 2006)1. And as 
a ‘sixth merger wave’ unfolded (2003-2008), records were again broken, when “the 
value of M&A averaged $10 billion a day” (The Economist, April 8, 2006).   
But positive as this may at first appear, the fact that the impact of M&A activity 
on the performance of the firm is thought to be, at best, “inconclusive” (Roll, 1988; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Sirower, 1997), and at worst “systematic[ally] 
detrimental” (Dickerson et al., 1997), is troubling. Some studies have reported that the 
combined average returns (CAR) – that is, the average net change in value, accrued to 
the shareholders of both the acquiring and target company, caused by the M&A event 
– are positive but small (Campa & Hernando, 2004). And others still occasionally find 
no significant effects on performance (Stulz et al., 1990). The “overwhelming 
majority”, however, find that “M&A activity does not positively contribute to the 
acquiring firm’s performance” (King et al. 2004), or its profitability, as variously 
measured (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; B!hner, 1991; Simon et al., 1996; Berger & 
Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1998). A consensus of estimates, in fact, places the M&A 
failure rate somewhere in the range of 60 to 80% (Puranam & Singh, 1999); a figure 
that Moeller et al (2005) translates into annual losses in the range of $60 billion. 
Many commentators see these sorts of failure rates as evidence that mergers are 
nothing more than outgrowths of agency, driven by self-serving managers (Roll, 
1986; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Others see the exuberance of the M&A industry 
as an example of ‘irrational’ and ‘uneconomic behaviour’ (Schenk, 2003). Others still 
suggest the persistent popularity of the M&A option is evidence that the academic 
community may simply be missing the point. They call for a disaggregation of the 
data (Andrade et al., 2001), and for a systematic study of what works, why and when.  
In this research we aim to do just that. We put mergers and acquisitions under 
the microscope, to investigate: (1) why mergers occur, and where the realisable gains 
to mergers and acquisitions are located. Because even if 60-80% fail some mergers, 
clearly, do succeed, and it is important to understand which, when and under what 
conditions. (2) Next, we consider what (firm- and deal-specific) factors affect the 
levels of these gains, and thus (3) what characteristics best predict a successful merger 
(or warn against a failure). In doing so, we quest for the holy grail of economics, 
finance and strategic management, and attempt to profile the successful merger.  
                                                
1 Although clearly these figures are related, because GDP is a measure of value-creation, we follow Weston 
et al., 2004, and Andrade et al., 2001, and make the comparision for merely illustrative purposes.  
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1.2. Research Scope    
There are few universal rules in economics, and a study of mergers and 
acquisitions is likely to be no exception. Mergers – and in particular the objectives 
that motivate them and the factors that affect their success – vary from period to 
period, and region to region (Martynova & Renneboog, 2009). European mergers in 
the 1970s, for example, are different to both European mergers in the 1990s and US 
mergers in the 1970s. Our first task in this project will therefore be to identify what 
mergers we include in our research, from what regions and which time frames. 
Because the market for mergers is global, we argue that it is necessary in this – 
and indeed in any study of the factors effecting M&A gains – to focus on the ‘bigger 
picture’. When and where possible, we will therefore attempt to make international 
comparisons between mergers in North America, Europe and Asia. Data limitations, 
however, mean that the wider the geographical lens, the narrower the temporal one, 
within which the data will be rich enough to allow like-with-like comparisons across 
regions. For some specific studies even stricter temporal limitations will apply, but for 
the most part this means that the study will consider only North America, European 
and Asian mergers, within the twenty-year period Jan 1990 – Jan 2010. 
This period contains two ‘merger waves’, two ‘run-ups’ and ‘slow-downs’, and 
one inter-wave ‘lull in activity’. Because these waves – generally described in 
American terms as the ‘fifth’ (ca. 1991 –2001) and ‘sixth’ (ca. 2003 –2008) waves – 
are thought to be the first truly global waves (Sundarsanam, 2003), the period is, we 
argue, appropriate to our analysis. A panel of mergers, spanning nearly twenty-years 
and three continents, allows for comparisons to be made across time and space.  
Merger waves are special events, however, which differ substantially from each 
other, and from the inter-wave lull in activity that separates them (Motta, 2004; 
Gaughan, 2007). The period of 1991 to 2001 – the fifth wave – has already been 
extensively described by the literature (see e.g., Andrade et al. 2001 for an overview), 
and we are aware of which factors played a role in its performance. The period of the 
sixth wave (2003 –2008), however, remains largely uncharacterized (de Pamphilis, 
2008), and so provides us with additional incentives to study mergers in the period. 
1.3. Project Design 
We begin, therefore, in Section Two, by ‘setting the scene’. We introduce the 
‘sixth wave’ (2003-2008), as a justification for our interest in mergers and 
acquisitions in general, and as an illustration of which factors affect performance.  
We profile the period of the sixth wave, first by comparing it to mergers in the 
fifth wave (1992-2001), and then by contrasting it with the inter-wave lull in merger 
activity. In doing so, describe trends within the industry over a near twenty-year 
period (1992-2008), and set the scene for our study of M&A. In the process, we not 
only evidence the existence of a global sixth wave, which for the first time, we 
suggest, centered in Europe and Asia and not North America, but find that while 
certain characteristics run common across regions – such as the preferred method of 
payment – different regions experienced the wave differently. We show, for example, 
that North American mergers were driven by large and friendly acquirers, using 
externally sourced cash to domestically diversify. European mergers, meanwhile, 
were about integration, and were financed with internally generated cash, while Asian 
mergers used the sixth wave to focus on core competence building, and were 
increasingly hostile and increasingly expensive. We suggest that the rise of hostility, 
and of the levels of premiums paid in Asia runs contrary to the experience of Europe 
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and North America, just as the rising popularity of a diversification strategy in North 
America runs contrary to the strategies employed in Europe and Asia. This finding, 
we suggest, not only points to which factors might affect performance, and 
demonstrates that regional variance must also be considered, but also identifies trends 
within the industry with some important business and regulatory implications.  
Cognisant of this, we therefore move in Section Three to consider a number of 
specific factors which might moderator or otherwise explain the M&A success rate.  
Much research has already been done in this area, however, and a number of 
firm- and deal-specific explanations have been put forward to explain why mergers 
fail. Chatterjee (1986) and Gugler et al. (2003), for example, show that the ‘degree of 
relatedness’ between the target and the acquirer is a significant explanatory variable 
in predicting post-merger performance. Moeller et al. (2004) shows that size matters, 
and finds that larger acquirers underperform, while Officer (2007) and Chang (1998) 
provide evidence that acquirer returns in publicly listed targets differ significantly 
from private targets. Jensen (1986; 2003) shows that the presence of ‘free cash’ (or 
excess liquidity) affects performance, because it liberates the firm from the so-called 
‘discipline of debt’; a conclusion confirmed by Hitt et al. (1998) from the perspective 
of leverage. Carline et al. (2002) finds significance in deal values, suggesting that the 
bigger the deal the poorer the performance, and Moeller et al (2005) finds that merger 
waves significantly impact average deal value. Haunschild (1994), Hayward & 
Hambrick (1997), and Hitt & Pisano (2003) all find evidence that the payment of 
‘premiums’ – that is, the payment of a sum on top of the firm’s market value – 
predicts poor performance. While Betton & Eckbo (2000), and Jensen & Ruback 
(1983), find that hostility also plays an important role in predicting success.  
The list of explanatory variables currently considered by the literature, however, 
is far from complete. It is illustrative of the high quality of research that typifies this 
field but, given the nature of the complex and dynamic M&A industry, it is widely 
recognised that much work still needs to be done. King et al. (2004), for example, 
suggests that the current models are still “too nebulous”. And Andrade et al. (2001) 
has called for a disaggregation, to better understand performance moderation.  
In this section we answer these calls by: first, disaggregating mergers on the 
basis of (a) time (b) geographical region, and (c) purpose; and second, by extending 
and applying the list of firm- and deal-specific moderators studied in each. We begin 
by isolating the role of (1) market structure, and study the role of regulation on the 
levels of competition and concentration within an industry, as well as the numbers 
and types of mergers that occur. Contrary to expectation, we find that even as the 
number of competition drop in the banking industry during the fifth wave, the levels 
of competition remain the same. We conclude therefore that efficiency, and not 
market power, was the underlying motive. Building on this discussion, we then move 
to more explicitly consider (2) merger purpose, and disaggregate a large set of 
mergers along a relatively unexplored dimension. We identify expansionary mergers 
into new products and regions, cutting costs and market consolidating mergers, and in 
the process not only weigh-in again on the debate over whether it is the attainment of 
market power or efficiency that drives the industry, but specifically consider which 
motives create the greatest gains. Next, and because the evidence suggests that 
mergers which should create value actually destroy it, we move to consider the 
moderating role of (3) liquidity in the realisation of gains. In a study of technological 
acquisitions, we find – contrary to the expectations created by Jensen’s (1986) work 
on the role of excess liquidity – deep pockets are a necessary condition for firms 
looking to expand into new technologies. In so doing, we discover an important 
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qualification the free-cash hypothesis. Next, and after considering at length the 
important of purpose and strategy, and the financial resources necessary to realise 
these gains, we consider (4) the role of managerial power. Here we investigate the 
long neglected suggestion that intangible, human characteristics – such as a 
susceptibility to the behaviour moderating factors – can explain value destruction, and 
put the manager under the microscope. In a conceptual contribution, we make clear 
the role of managerial power, and put forward a number of suggestions on how to 
harness its positive aspects, while at the same time minimising the potential for 
danger that it creates in future projects. Finally, and because we show that the 
manager can influence the success of the merger, we finish our discussion of firm 
characteristics with an exploration of (5) firm size. We argue that small firms have 
less of a hierarchical gap between owners and managers, and suffer less in terms of 
agency costs. We prove this by considering the performance of mergers and 
acquisitions between small and medium sized enterprise (SME), and in doing so 
deepen our knowledge of a field typically dominated by the analysis of larger deals by 
larger firms (Moeller, 2005). We show that smaller firms do indeed perform better 
than larger deals, and rewrite the theory of merger motives in the process.  
In Section Four we summarise the most important findings of our study, discuss 
their implications – from the academic, business and regulatory perspectives – 
consider the limitations of our research, and discuss some avenues for future research 
in the field of mergers and acquisition. We then conclude the study in Section Six.  
1.4. Data & Methodology  
In Section Two we ‘set the scene’ with a discussion of the ‘Sixth Wave’. We use 
date on US, European and Asian (inluding Australasia and Asiapacific) mergers – for 
the period January 01, 1990 to June 30, 2008 – and employ both probit and logit 
models in the study. In the process, we: (1) prove the existence of a sixth merger 
wave; (2) profile it in terms of its (performance impacting) characteristics, first by 
comparing it to the fifth wave, and then by contrasting it with the inter-wave lull; and 
finally we (3) consider its performance, and evaluate it in terms of its outcomes. 
Performance – and more specifically the moderation of performance – is the 
central theme of the studies included in Section Three. Performance and the gains to 
mergers is typically measured one of two ways (see Berger et al., 1999, for an 
overview). The first, the so-called event study methodology, examines the stock price 
performance of the bidder and the target firm around the announcement of an 
acquisition (see, e.g., DeLong, 1998). A merger is assumed to create value if the 
combined value of the bidder and the target increases on the announcement of the 
merger. The second examines changes in the merged firms post-merger accounting 
profits, or operating costs, measured by operating costs per employee or the bank's 
efficiency ratio relative to the pre-merger pro forma performance of the merging firm 
(Houston et al., 2001). In this way, the merger is assumed to generate improved 
performance if the changes in accounting-based performance are superior to the 
changes in the performance of comparable banks. To ensure robust and well-rounded 
results, we utilise both measures in this section. Because the event study methodology 
dominants the analysis of mergers and acquisitions (MacKinlay, 1997; Zollo and 
Miere, 2008), however, and have been shown to generate similar results to other 
performance measures (Healy et al., 1992; Kale et al., 2002), the lion’s share of our 
studies measure performance in terms of cumulative abnormal shareholder returns.  
In Section Three we present five studies, which consider five performance 
moderators: regulation, merger purpose, liquidity, managerial power, and firm size.  
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In the first paper in Section Three – ‘On Concentration, Competition and the 
Regulation of Mergers’ – the performance of mergers and acquisitions in the US 
banking industry is considered. The 1990s was a period of major deregulation, which 
makes for a natural experiment on the role of regulation in mergers and acquisitions.  
We employ data made available by US Federal Reserve, which includes the details of 
some 1,144 banks, over the ten year period of the ‘fifth wave’; that is, Jan 1992 to 
Dec 2001. We use the so-called ‘accounting approach’, according to which a merger 
is assumed to generate improved performance if the changes in accounting-based 
performance are superior to the changes in the performance of comparable banks. In 
this paper we examine changes in the merged banks’ post-merger accounting profits 
(ROA or ROE), or operating costs, measured by operating costs per employee or the 
bank's efficiency ratio (where the efficiency ratio is non-interest expense divided by 
the sum of net interest income and non-interest income) relative to the pre- merger 
pro forma performance of the merging banks (Houston et al., 2001). With it we: (1) 
illustrate the effects of the fifth wave on the numbers of competitors in the banking 
industry; and show that (2) banking mergers are motivated by the creation of 
operating synergies, and not by the attainment of market power gains. 
The second and third papers of Section Three deepen the discussion on merger 
purpose. And, in contrast to the first study, both use an ‘event study’ methodology – 
which estimates the economic value of a strategic move by considering the markets 
response to its announcement – to evaluate the performance of the merger.  
In both we employ previously untapped – Thompson Reuter – data on the 
officially announced merger motive, and use a content coding methodology that first 
analyzes the text of the announcement, and identifies each merger with a specific 
purpose. In the second paper, we investigates the relationship between ‘Merger 
Motives and Acquirer Returns’, and contrast the gains to mergers aimed at expanding 
the firms operations into new regions, diversifying into new products, cutting costs, or 
consolidating markets. Centrally, we claim that the gains to these will differ, and 
argue that mergers motivated by the acquisition of new products, or new markets, are 
not comparable to those aiming to cut-cost. Using a dataset of 3,333 US mergers, 
announced in the period Jan 1, 2000 to Dec 31, 2008, we show that the market does 
not receive expansionary mergers with much enthusiasm, that mergers which aim to 
consolidate market share are typically preferred, and that cost-cutting exercises are 
the only mergers are the only mergers guaranteed to produce gains.  
In the third paper – ‘Unlocking the Gains to Technological Mergers and 
Acquisitions’ – we extend this discussion, moving from the static to the dynamic, and 
introduce technological acquisitions as a dynamic merger motive. Using the same 
combination of content-coding and event study methodologies, we show that the 
market reacts with caution to the announcement of a technological acquisition, but 
contrary to the suggestions of Jensen (1986), we find that financial slack, or excess 
liquidity, can have a positive effect on the realisation of gains. Financial slack, we 
find, is interpreted as a safety net within which experimentation can occur, and is can 
be a necessary condition for the successful realisation of technological gains In doing 
so, we uncover an important extensions to Jensen’s (1986) FCF hypothesis.  
In the next paper – ‘Power and the Destruction of Value in Mergers and 
Acquisitions’ – we present a conceptual, and inter-disciplinary piece, which 
introduces that manager as an imperfect actor in the equation for merger value 
creation/destruction. In it we argue that the extant literature adopts what is a 
predominately finance- orientated perspective in attempting to understand success and 
failure in mergers and acquisitions, which assumes that mergers and acquisitions are a 
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‘closed system’, with little room for human influence or interference. Alternatively, 
we suggest that managers have a number of unique opportunities to create or destroy 
value in the conclusion of a merger, owing to their special position of power, and we 
develop a model to understanding and predicting the financial and organizational 
outcomes of mergers, by synthesizing new research on the impact of power on 
judgment and decision making with existing research on mergers and acquisitions.  
Finally, and in the last paper in the Section – ‘On Mergers and Acquisitions by 
Entrepreneurial Firms’ – we hypothesise that smaller mergers – typically ignored by 
the literature, despite accounting for 99% of all firms and between 40-50% of world 
GDP (European Commission, 2005) – perform better. Smaller firms, we argue, suffer 
less from the managerial costs considered in the previous paper, and benefit from an 
alignment of interests. We employ data from the Thomson Reuters’ SDC merger 
database to test the hypothesis, and exploit a range of econometric tools – including 
logit and probit modeling, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis – to 
study the 17,137 US and European SME M&As announced between January 1, 1996 
and December 31, 2007. We present evidence which suggests not only that the 
behaviour and financial success of mergers by SMEs may significantly differ from 
larger public firms, but also that the underlying merger theories which are thought to 
motivate these ventures might need to be revisited to account for this discrepancy.  
1.5. Contribution  
We attempt, in this project, to profile the successful merger, and to understand 
performance as a factor of time, location, and purpose, as moderated by liquidity, 
size, and managerial influence. We ask: (1) if there are realizable gains to mergers 
and acquisitions; (2) what (firm- and deal-specific) factors affect the levels and 
direction of these gains; and thus (3) what characteristics, from a business and policy 
point of view, best predict a successful merger (or warn against a likely failure).  
Our ‘innovation’, and the contribution of this research, is to be found in the fact 
that: (1) we study real-world mergers and acquisitions, in the here and now; (2) we 
study the difference across regions, and compare merger waves; (3) we consider a 
richer framework of firm- and deal-specific characteristics than has previously been 
the norm, and add to this a number of variables which have received little or no 
attention; (4) we take a systematic approach to the question of relevance, and look, for 
example, at firms using a variety of performance measures; and (5) we introduce a 
new and more realistic method for managing mergers for success in the future.  
In doing so, we advance our understanding of the field, and provide insights for: 
(1) researchers, attempting to understand the nature of mergers and acquisitions; (2) 
practitioners, attempting to avoid the value-destroying pit-falls; and (3) regulators, 









































UNDERSTANDING SUCCESS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
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CHAPTER TWO –THE SIXTH GREAT WAVE 
THE SIXTH MERGER WAVE: EVIDENCE OF GLOBAL  
SIGNIFICANCE AND LOCAL DIFFERENCE*1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Since the late 19th century, the US has experienced five large takeover waves; that 
is, five periods of intense merger activity followed by intervals of lower activity.2  
The first (ca. 1895 to 1904) and second (ca. 1918 to 1929) of these were driven by 
changes in the physical operating environment of the firm (Weston et al., 2004; Gaughan 
(2007). The third (ca. 1960 to 1969) was driven, amongst other factors, by the rise of 
modern management theory (Weston and Mansinghka, 1971), and the fourth, the first and 
only ‘bust-up’ or ‘anti-merger’ wave (ca. 1981 to 1989), occurred when corporate raiders 
discovered that many of the conglomerates created in the 1960s were worth less then the 
sum of their parts (Allen et al., 1995; Bhide, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). The fifth 
and most recently documented wave (ca. 1991 to 2001) was driven by deregulation, 
market liberalisation and globalisation (Andrade et al., 2001). All five were American: 
the first two waves were uniquely so, but the third included the UK, the fourth spread to 
Europe, and the fifth was a global event, with records broken in the US, Europe and Asia. 
There is now emerging evidence of a new and as yet largely uncharacterised global 
‘sixth wave’3. As we will show, this wave began in mid-2003 when “credit [became] 
cheap” (The Economist, Sept 3, 2005), peaked in 2006/7 when “the value of M&A 
averaged $10 billion a day” (The Economist, April 8, 2006), and ended in 2008 when the 
‘credit crisis’ hit, and the subsequent widespread withdrawal of finance caused M&A 
activity to “slump significantly” after the years of growth (Thomson Financial, 2008). 
The purpose of this paper is: (1) to prove the existence of a sixth wave; (2) to 
profile it in terms of its (performance impacting) characteristics, first by comparing it to 
the fifth wave, and then by contrasting it with the inter-wave lull; and (3) to evaluate it.  
In the process we show that there was indeed a sixth merger wave, which globally 
impacted all regions, but find that the logic underlying this wave differed substantially at 
the local level. We find that while there are certain characteristics that run common 
across all regions, such as, for example, the rise of cash as the preferred method of 
payment, the driving logic behind the merger wave differed from region to region. North 
American mergers, for example, we find were driven by large and friendly acquirers, 
using externally sourced cash, for the purposes of domestic diversifications. By contrast, 
                                                
1* By Killian J McCarthy, Utz Weitzel and Wilfred A Dolfsma (March, 2010). A version of this paper was 
presented at the 70th Academy of Management (AOM) Annual Meeting, Montreal (Aug, 2010) 
2 For surveys: Jensen & Ruback (1983) on M&A’s prior to 1980; Jarrell et al., (1988), on merger activity in 
the 1980’s; Brunner (2003), on the 1990’s; as well as Sudarsanam (2003), Hartford (2005), Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008), Gaughan (2007) and DePamphilis (2008).   
3 To the best of our knowledge, DePamphilis (2008) was the first to discuss this wave.  
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European mergers are found to be more about integration and consolidation, were more 
hostile than their predecessors, domestically orientated and typically financed with cash 
generated from internal sources. And Asian mergers focused on core competencies, were 
increasingly hostile and increasingly expensive. The rise of both hostility and the level of 
premiums paid in Asia runs contrary to the trends in Europe and America, just as the 
rising popularity of a diversification strategy in North America runs contrary, we find, to 
the largely ‘competency building’ strategies employed in a European and Asian setting.  
In doing so, the contribution that we make is two-fold: first, we make an academic 
contribution, by identifying, profiling and characterizing the most recent merger wave. 
And secondly, we contribute to our understanding of mergers and acquisitions in general, 
and identify trends, which benefit managers and shareholders in their quest for gains.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two presents an 
overview of the literature, building a number of hypotheses. Section Three discusses data 
and methods, Section Four presents findings and Section Five discusses and concludes. 
2. M&A RESEARCH 
2.1 Identifying The Sixth Wave  
The existence of merger waves is well-established in the empirical literature: early 
work by Town (1992), Golbe & White (1993), and more recently by Bouwman et al. 
(2007), finds evidence to suggest the existence of five distinct waves (Figure 1).  
Figure 1 – The Six Mergers Waves 
 
 
Source: For the US (solid black line) for the period 1895 – 1918: Nelson (1959); for the period 1919 – 1968: 
Federal Trade Commission (1979); for the period 1963 – 1995: Gaughan (2007); and Mergerstat Review for 
1996 – 2008. Each of the five US waves is denoted by the grey shaded periods. Figures for Europe (dotted 
line) and Asia-Pacific (dashed line): Wilmerhale (2006). 
 
There is an emerging consensus, however, that there may have been an as yet 
largely unidentified ‘sixth merger wave’ (DePamphilis, 2009). This started, it is 
suggested, “in mid-2003”, when the “economic and financial markets [in the US, Europe, 
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and Asia first started to recover] after the downturn that began in 2000” (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). Falling interest rates are thought to have provided the exogenous 
motivation for the wave4, because as “credit [became] cheap”, acquisition became an 
option, and shareholders once again became “keen on takeovers” (The Economist, Sept 3, 
2005). As a result, deal activity increased “by about 50%” in Europe – making 2004/2005 
one of the “best year[s] for European M&A since the internet-bubble years of the late 
1990s” (The Economist, Sept 3, 2005) – and similar results were seen elsewhere. 
In August of 2007, however, stock markets dropped sharply when the world first 
learned of the ‘sub-prime mortgage crisis’, and M&A activity “slumped significantly” in 
the aftermath, in 2008 (Thomson Financial Proprietary Research, 2008). As the ‘credit 
crunch’ took hold, and as uncertainty spread across countries and industries, 1,307 deals 
– with a combined value of $911bn – were withdrawn (DePamphilis, 2009). Rising costs, 
a crashing stock market, the widespread withdrawal of credit in the face of waning 
confidence, and an enfolding global economic recession, are thus considered to be the 
‘exogenous shocks’, which ended, in 2008, the wave that ‘cheap money’ began in 2003.  
Given the anecdotal evidence for existence of a sixth wave, we expect that:  
Hyp 1: A sixth merger wave can be identified in the period 2003 to 2008. 
2.2 Characterising the Sixth Wave  
One of the most commonly agreed upon characteristics of the recent merger wave 
is the fact that it coincided with the rise of cheap credit in mid-2003, and ended with its 
withdrawal in 2008, as the global economic slowdown took hold (DePamphilis, 2009). 
Mergers waves are, however, typically characterized along a number of dimensions, and 
in this section we draw on prior research – specifically that on the theory of merger 
waves – to profile the Sixth Wave. The variables that we discuss are clearly variables that 
have a strongly strategic nature, and thus have a significant impact on performance.  
2.2.1 Methods of Payment  
The methods of payment have been shown to significantly impact merger performance, 
with studies showing that cash and/or debt out perform stock deals (Andrade et al., 2001).  
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), this is due to the cost of capital. Debt is a 
cheaper than equity, because it costs less to convince one bank to invest than it does to 
convince a group of shareholders to dilute their stock (Carpenter, 1995). And internally 
generated cash – in the form of free cash (FCF) or retained earnings – is cheaper still, 
because internal capital is free from adverse selection and transaction costs. 
                                                
4 Merger waves are typically found to be embedded in the economic, political or regulatory shocks of their 
time, and are generally seen to coincide either with periods of economic recovery – following a market 
crash, for example, an economic depression, a war or energy crisis – or with periods of rapid credit 
expansion – resulting from burgeoning external capital markets or booming stock markets (Dong et al., 
2003). Many, however, are also often fuelled by deregulation or other changes in the legal environment 
(Motta, 2004; Gaughan, 2007), by industrial and technological innovations, supply shock – such as oil-
price shocks – or by changes in the rates of foreign competition. Almost all end, however, with stock 
market crashes and the withdrawal of credit.   
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Equity finance dominated the fifth wave, however, because then an overvalued 
stock market lowered the relative price of equity.
5
 And as equity became cheap, the 
managers of overvalued companies took advantage of a short-term market inefficiency to 
acquire real assets. A huge number of all-equity bids were thus made and accepted 
because, in the face of a soaring market, the managers of target firms overvalued the 
potential synergies that could be created (Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanatan, 2004).  
A bursting stock bubble ended the fifth wave, however, and with it the dominance 
of equity finance. In the aftermath, companies went through a long period of cost-cutting, 
and huge amounts of cash was generated in the process. Because firms with large cash 
reserves are more likely to indulge in mergers and acquisitions (Hardford, 1999), the rise 
of a predominantly cash-financed sixth wave was therefore all but inevitable. 
The falling cost of debt also played a part, however, as Private Equity (PE) firms 
took advantage of historically low interest rates to provide even more capital. Because the 
likelihood of an acquisition also increases with access to relatively inexpensive external 
finance (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001), this allowed even more firms to participate in 
the Sixth Wave. In doing so, and in relying on cash and then debt to fund their 
acquisitions, Myers and Mailuf’s (1984) ‘pecking order’ hypothesis may have been re-
established. At any rate, and because of this line of reasoning, we suspect that:  
Hyp 2: The sixth wave was a largely cash-finance merger wave  
2.2.2 Hostility  
The level of hostility has been shown to significantly impact merger performance, with 
studies showing that hostile mergers perform less well on average (Gaughan, 2007).  
Jensen (1988) describes hostility as a ‘market for corporate control’, wherein one 
management teams compete with another for the right to manage the shareholder’s assets. 
The team that offers shareholders the highest value takes control, it is suggested, until it is 
replaced by another team that discovers an even higher value. Hostile takeovers are, as a 
result, expected to occur when the target firm performs poorly, or when its internal 
corporate governance mechanisms fail to discipline managers (cf. Hasbrouck, 1985; 
Palepu, 1986; Morck et al., 1989; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). Hostile takeovers are 
therefore also considered to be an alternative corporate governance mechanism, which 
correct for the opportunistic (or incompetent) behaviour of managers.  
The fourth merger wave is typically described as being a hostile, ‘bust-up’, anti-
merger wave. Bhide (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1991) suggest that the rise of 
hostility at this time was in response to the diversifying wave of the 1960s, which 
produced inefficient conglomerates, and entrenched managers. When companies failed to 
recognize the flawed nature of their diversifications, or were not fast enough to refocus 
their operations, hostile raiders emerged, ready to do the restructuring job for them.  
The number of hostile bids in the UK and US significantly fell in the 1990s 
(Andrade et al., 2001), however, and a number of explanations have been put forward for 
why this was the case. Firstly, it is suggested that because shareholders are more likely to 
accept a takeover bid when their shares are overpriced, the decline in hostility can be 
                                                
5
 Fifth wave mergers were “overwhelmingly” financed with stock. “About 70% of all deals involved stock 
compensation… [and] 58% were entirely financed with stock”. This is “approximately 50% more then in 
the 1980s”, which is generally thought to have coincided with the rise of cheap debt (Andrade et al., 2001).  
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attributed to the rise of the 1990s bull market. Secondly, it is suggested that the increasing 
use of anti-takeover measures (particularly in the US) made hostile acquisitions 
increasingly difficult during this time, if not all but impossible. And, finally it is 
suggested that an increase in the number of alternative governance mechanisms (such as, 
for example, stock options, shareholder activism, non-executive director monitoring) 
encouraged management to focus more on shareholder value in the fifth wave, and to 
voluntarily restructure when necessary (Gaughan, 2008). As a result, hostility became an 
increasingly redundant corporate governance device (Holmström and Kaplan, 2001). And 
because each of these factors remained true of the sixth wave, we suspect that the decline 
in hostility observed for North America in the fifth wave will continue with the sixth.  
We suspect, however, that Europe and Asia are likely to be somewhat different. 
Because, contrary to the experience of North America, a large and increasing level of 
hostility was observed in both Continental Europe and Asia during the period of the fifth 
wave. Political transformations, regulatory reforms, and changes to the business 
environment are generally thought to have prompted the shift, in both regions, and – for 
the first time – to have had made possible the emergence of a market for corporate 
control. In particular, a change towards more dispersed ownership, reduced complexity in 
ownership structures, weakened institutional barriers to takeovers (such as the emergence 
of new equity markets, higher IPO activity, privatization and deregulation, binding 
disclosure requirements, and tax reforms), and a gradual shift of corporate priority from a 
stakeholder consensus model to a model based on shareholder value (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2003) are said to have made hostility increasingly possible.  
Consequently, and contrary to the experience of North America, we suspect that 
hostility will have played an increasingly significant part in European and Asian mergers 
during the period of the Sixth Wave. Hostility, we suspect, will be a characteristic of the 
Sixth Wave for which we document a divergent experience across regions:  
Hyp 3: The sixth wave was ‘friendly’ in America, but ‘hostile’ in Europe and Asia  
2.2.3 Internationalisation   
The levels of ‘internationalisation’ have also been found to effect performance, with 
studies showing that cross-border mergers perform less well (Gozzi et al., 2008).  
Of the first five merger waves, the first two were uniquely American events, driven 
by uniquely American changes in the operating environment. Cross-border activity was 
therefore negligible. The third was more international, although still a largely Anglo-
Saxon affair (US and UK), and the fourth broadened to include continental Europe 
(Gaughan, 2007). The fifth, however, was a global event (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008), a significant levels of cross-border mergers and acquisitons (Sundarsanam, 2003) 
Given that the Sixth Wave occurred within the context of deregulation in Asia, 
integration in Europe, increased globalisation, low interest rates and a historically weak 
dollar, we suspect that Sixth Wave will be an even more international wave still.   
There is a literature to explain why internationalisation and cross-border activity is 
increasing, and should be welcomed. Some researcher suggests, for example, that 
geographic expansion allows for the realisation of efficiencies in scale economies, and for 
a reduction in purchasing, management, finance, R&D, marketing and production costs 
(e.g., Markides & Oyon, 1991; Morck & Yeung, 1992; Markides & Ittner, 1994).  
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Often, however, the costs of geographical expansion are thought to outweigh the 
benefits. Gozzi et al. (2008), for example, finds that the Tobin’s Q of a firm decreases 
significantly after a cross-border expansion. And a number of studies show that any gains 
are, at best, transitory (e.g., Sarkissian and Schill, 2008; Levine and Schmukler, 2006).  
Child et al. (2001) explains this finding by suggesting that cross-border mergers are 
more likely to encounter ‘unforeseen and insurmountable challenges’. Roll (1986) 
suggests, however, that managers pursuing cross-border deals may be fully aware of the 
challenges but, because of ‘hubris’ or over-confidence, may simply ‘feel’ that ‘their deal’ 
will be different. Others are less forgiving. And proponents of the ‘managerial theories of 
the firm’ (Marris, 1963) suggest that cross-border mergers are often little more than 
agency driven attempts to grow the firm beyond its optimal size, designed to maximize 
managerial gain, power or prestige, or to build empires (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). 
Synergies and the achievement of scale-efficiencies, ignorance, naivety or ego may 
therefore explain the rise of internationalization. And from a performance perspective this 
raises concerns. Taken together, the suggestion is that the Sixth Wave will not only 
continue the rising tide of internationalization, but will be the most international. Thus: 
Hyp 4: The sixth wave was an ‘internationalizing’ wave 
2.2.4 Relatedness 
Related mergers are often found to be significantly more profitable than non-related 
diversifications (see e.g., Gaughan, 2007, Chatterjee, 1986, Gugler, et al., 2003).  
The third wave is generally described as being a diversifying wave. Because at this 
time diversification allowed the firm : (1) to sidestep imperfections in the external capital 
markets, which could not be relied upon to allocate resources efficiently (Williamson, 
1970; Bhide, 1990; Hubbard and Palia, 1999). Because access to external funds was often 
severely limited, companies tried to overcome fund-raising problems by developing 
internal capital markets, which were thought to provide better monitoring, informational 
advantages, a reduction in the costs of capital, and an improvement in resource allocation. 
In addition, conglomerate structures were said to: (2) reduce earnings variability 
(Lewellen, 1971); (3) reduce the risk of bankruptcy (Higgins and Schall, 1975; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1992); and (4) to allow for a higher level of leverage to be sustained.  
Improved efficiency in the external capital markets in the 1980s, however, reduced 
the cost of external finance, and with it internal capital markets soon became both costly 
and unnecessary. The conglomerate structure was also recognized to be associated with a 
number of disadvantages, such as, for example, rent-seeking behavior by divisional 
managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), bargaining problems within the firm (Rajan et 
al., 2000), or bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998). And as the costs of 
diversification were seen to outweigh its benefits, the attractiveness of diversification 
declined in the 1980s (Lichtenberg, 1992, Liebeskind and Opler, 1993; and Montgomery, 
1994). And since then managers have, on average, preferred to focus on expanding the 
firm’s ‘core competencies’ (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), as opposed to its product range.  
This was certainly true of the fifth wave. And because the literature evidences the 
suggestion that diversification destroys value (Mukherjee et al., 2004; Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1988), whereas firms which focus on their ‘competencies’ enjoy positive abnormal 
returns (Rumelt, 1974; Montgomery, 1979; Bettis, 1981), we suspect that the Sixth Wave 
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will continue the “trend, begun in the 1970s, of an ever increasing percentage of mergers 
where both parties are in the same industry” (Andrade et al., 2001). Consequently:  
Hyp 5: The sixth wave occurred between related firms in related industries.  
2.3 Evaluating the Sixth Wave 
Assuming the existence of a Sixth Wave, the next question of interest relates to the 
impact of the variable mix discussed above, on the average performance of the wave.    
Merger performance – typically measured with a short-term event study 
methodology (Zollo and Meier, 2008)
6
 – can be influenced by a number of factors (King 
et al., 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Gaughan, 2008). It has been suggested, for 
example, that ‘merger wave-mergers’, by definition, perform less well than ‘non-merger 
wave-mergers’ because during merger waves ‘cascades’ and ‘herd behaviour’ trumps 
rational choice and strategic decision making (Schenk, 2003). This is particularly true of 
the latter half of the merger wave, it is said; an observation that has led some to describe 
merger waves as periods of ‘wealth destruction on a massive scale’ (Moeller et al., 2005). 
Because Sixth Wave mergers belong, by definition, to a merger-wave, we can thus 
suggest that the performance of sixth wave mergers will be poor, relative at least to non-
merger wave mergers that were concluded between the fifth and the sixth waves.  
Relative to the fifth and earlier waves, however, the Sixth Wave has a number of 
factors in its favour, which lead us to make positive performance expectations.  
Firstly, the Sixth Wave is thought to be a primarily cash-financed merger wave. 
And the evidence suggests that cash-financed deals are more beneficial to the bidder’s 
shareholders (Carow et al., 2004; Huand and Walking, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
Travlos, 1987; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Franks et al., 1991). Because managers 
finance acquisitions with cash when they believe their firms are undervalued, and with 
stock when they are overvalued (King et al., 2004; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Haleblian et 
al., 2009), the rise of cash creates positive performance expectations.  
Secondly, a decline in hostility suggests that sixth wave mergers might exhibit 
better than average performance. In a hostile acquisition, target shareholders are offered 
higher premiums than those in a friendly acquisition. And while hostility predicts positive 
wealth effects for the target’s shareholders (Servaes, 1991), higher premiums predict 
poorer performance for both the acquirer and the newly merged entity (Dong et al., 2006; 
Cosh and Guest, 2001; Croci, 2007; Gaughan, 2008). A decline in hostility is thus to be 
welcomed from the acquirers’ perspective, and from the performance perspective. 
Thirdly, the expectation that the Sixth Wave is one of increased relatedness 
suggests too that, relative to earlier waves, the Sixth Wave will demonstrate superior 
performance. Diversifications generally include a ‘discount factor’ (Lang and Stulz, 
1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lamont and Polk, 2002), arising from the fact that 
diversification increases: (a) coordination and control costs (Jones and Hill, 1988); (b) 
information asymmetries between central and divisional managers (Williamson, 1967); 
(c) production inefficiencies, due to diseconomies of scope (Lancaster, 1990); and (d) 
management strains (Grant et al., 1988). This – and the fact that diversifying mergers are 
                                                
6
 Zollo and Meier (2008) find that 41% of the studies used short-term event studies. Long term accounting 
measures came in second place with a 28% share.  
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also more likely to be pursued by managers looking to: (a) reduce their personal risk 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981); (b) increase their levels of discretion; (c) entrench themselves 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989); (d) build empires; (e) or add to their power and prestige 
(Williamson 1964; Mueller, 1969; and Rhoades, 1983) – leads to the expectation that 
diversification destroys value (Hitt et al., 1994). Consequently, a ‘rise in relatedness’, 
from the fifth to the sixth merger waves suggests, ceteris paribus, better performance.  
Finally, however, the suspicion that the sixth wave may be more 
‘internationalising’ then its predecessors is less assuring. Overseas expansions are (a): 
risky, given the potential of new markets to present ‘unforeseen and insurmountable 
challenges’ (Child et al., 2001); (b) likely to be subject to hubris, or of being motivated 
by self-interested, empire-building managers (Rhoades, 1983; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1987); and to (c) typically produce gains which are transitory at best (Sarkissian and 
Schill, 2008; Levine and Schukler, 2006; Gozzi et al., 2008). Thus, the rise of 
internationalization creates a negative performance expectation (Gaughan, 2008).  
This factor will off-set the previous ones. Nevertheless, we expect that:  
Hyp 6: Sixth wave mergers will perform better than fifth wave mergers, but will 
perform worse than the non-merger wave mergers.  
3. DATA & METHOD   
Data. The data against which these hypotheses are tested was obtained from the well-
known Thomson Reuters. In full accordance with the practices of the empirical literature, 
this was refined to include acquisitions: (1) announced between Jan 01, 1990 and June 
30, 2008, so as to capture both the fifth and sixth waves; (2) completed or withdrawn 
before June 30, 2008; (3) where acquirers sought to buy 100% of target shares at 
announcement; (4) where the acquirer and target are of U.S, European, or Asian (inluding 
Australasia) origin; (5) where acquirers are publicly listed; (6) where acquisitions have a 
deal value greater than 50 million US$; (7) where transaction values are at least 1% of the 
market value of the acquirer (4 weeks prior to the announcement); (8) which do not 
involve recapitalization, repurchase of own shares, or a spin-off to existing shareholders; 
(9) where neither the acquirer nor the target is fully or partially owned by the U.S. 
government; and, finally, acquisitions (10) where neither the target nor the acquirer are 
part of the same group. The data-set which we create includes 12,840 observations. 
 
Models. We analyze the data using two models. First, a multinomial logit model is 
estimated, using ‘monthly merger’ data, to examine the characteristics of the sixth wave, 
as compared to the ‘no wave’ period. It employs a dummy dependent variable, which 
takes on the value ‘0’ when the period is not considered a merger wave and ‘1’ when it is. 
Models using ‘half-yearly’ merger waves, and models containing a quarterly time trend 
variable are also estimated, to check for robustness. Each of the three regions – that is, 
North America, Europe and Asia – are considered in this way, in isolation, and then 
together as a group.   Secondly, a maximum likelihood probit model is estimated, using 
the same ‘monthly merger’ data, but is used this time to examine the characteristics of the 
sixth merger wave, as compared to the characteristics of the fifth wave. The maximum 
likelihood probit model is estimated with a dummy dependent variable, which takes on 
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the value ‘0’ when the period falls within the fifth merger wave, and ‘1’ when the period 
falls within the sixth. The probit model, again, is estimated for each region separately, 
and then for all regions together. In both the logit and probit models we first consider the 
singular effect of the key variables – such as, for example, hostility – in each region, and 
then across all regions. Then we consider that same variable, with controls, in each 
region, and across all regions. Not all key variables are estimated for Europe and Asia in 
the case of the multinominal probit, however, because of the number of observations. 
And none of the models are estimated with a time trend, because the quarterly trend 
predicts the data perfectly above a certain level. 
 
Wave Variables. Following Bowman et al. (2009), we define merger waves in terms of 
real total deal value. If the total deal value in a given month is above the average deal 
value of all months, then that month is defined as being a ‘merger wave’ month. If not, 
and if the total deal value is below the average, then it is defined as a ‘no merger wave’ 
month. Because deal value is not a ratio, however, inflation must be controlled for. 
Inflation correction is done by using the real total deal values instead of the nominal total 
deal values, which are calculated by dividing the total deal values by the inflation 
correction factor per month
7
. The annual rates are decompounded into equal monthly 
inflation rates, by taking the yearly inflation rate to the power 1/12 for the first month, the 
yearly inflation rate to the power 2/12 for the second month, and so forth. The US 
inflation rates are used for all regions, because the total deal values for all regions are 
reported in US Dollars. Further, it is assumed that these inflation rates reflect changes in 
exchange rates and interest rates. Following Bowman et al (2007), the data is then 
detrended. However, instead of removing the line of best fit from the real total deal value 
of a month and the previous five years, we remove the line of best fit from the real total 
deal value of a month, and the previous three years, to minimize data loss. ‘Half-yearly’ 
merger wave variables – wherein, again, a ‘half-year’ is defined as being a merger period 
if its total deal value is above the average – are also constructed, and in a similar way.  
 
Key Variables. We construct a number of variables that the discussion in Section 2 
found to influence the probability and shape of merger waves. For example, we include a 
dummy for mergers that are 100 percent cash financed, and another when a merger is 100 
percent stock financed, to consider the methods of payment. Next, and to consider the 
levels of hostility, we include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target’s board 
officially rejects the bid. Internationalisation is also described using data on the target and 
acquirers regions, and to indicate relatedness, we compute an indicator variable equal to 1 
if both the target and acquirer share the same primary two-digit SIC code.  
 
Firm and Deal Specific Controls. A number of firm- and deal-specific characteristics 
are known to impact performance, have been found to vary from wave to wave (e.g., 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2008), and so need to be controlled for to properly characterise 
                                                
7
 These inflation correction factors are calculated from the annual inflation rates of the US (obtained from 
http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx).The annual rates are 
decompounded into equal monthly inflation rates, by taking the yearly inflation rate to the power 1/12 for 
the first month, the yearly inflation rate to the power 2/12 for the second month etc. The US inflation rates 
are used for all regions, because the total deal values for all regions are reported in US Dollars.  
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and evaluate the sixth merger wave. We control for: (1) Firm Type because Rau & 
Vermaelen (1998) show that firms with a low book-to-market ratio (that is, ‘glamour 
firms’) perform less well then firms with high book-to-market ratios (or ‘value firms’). 
The acquirers’ market to book-ratios is calculated by dividing the acquirer’s market value 
four weeks prior to the announcement of the merger by it total assets over the last twelve 
months. (2) The Payment of Premiums, because premiums are known to substantially 
increases the probability of failure (Schlingemann, 2004; Dong et al., 2006). Premium are 
calculated by dividing the price paid over the target’s stock price four weeks prior to the 
announcement of the deal – to avoid the effects of rumours etc – by the total offer price. 
(3) Free Cash Flow (FCF), because Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis suggests 
that excess liquidity predicts poor performance. This we calculate by dividing the 
acquirer’s EBITDA over the last twelve months by the acquirer’s market value four 
weeks prior to the announcement. (4) The number of bids, because the literature reports 
that multiple bids predict superior performance (e.g., Temple & Peck, 1999). And (5) 
Relative (Target and Acquirer) Size, because Moeller et al. (2004; 2005) shows that large 
firms often underperform. Relative target size is calculated as the target’s market value, 
divided by its market value, calculated four weeks prior to the announcement. Acquirer 
size meanwhile is controlled for by including acquirer’s total assets over the last twelve 
months; by taking the logarithm we control for sheer firm size. 
 
Performance. Merger performance is typically measured in terms of Cumulative 
Abnormal acquirer Returns (CARs; Brown and Warner, 1985). Following Fuller et al. 
(2002) and Dong et al. (2006), we use the following modified market adjusted model: 
 
        (1) 
 
Here, ARi is the acquirer i’s abnormal return, ri is the stock return on acquirer i, and rm is 
the return of the S&P 500 market index. The acquirer i’s CAR, from one day before to 
one week after the merger, is calculated by subtracting the relative change in the S&P500 
over this time period from the relative change in the stock price of the acquirer. A number 
of different measures – such as the 1 day before to 1 day after, 4 weeks before to 1 day 
after, and 1 day before to 1 day cumulated CAR periods  – are also estimated for 
robustness. Data limitations restrict performance estimation to North American M&As. 
 














4.1 The Sixth Merger Wave 
Merger waves are identified in each of the regions, and on the basis of monthly 
total deal values. Figure 2 illustrates these monthly merger waves – whereby a vertical 
black line indicates a ‘merger wave month’ – and gives prima facie evidence for the 
existence for a Fifth Wave, from 1996 and 2001, and a Sixth, in the period 2003 to 2008.  
Inflation corrected total deal values per region (Figure 3) shows that: (1) the Fifth 
Wave peaked in North America in Feb 1998, in Asia in June 1999, and Europe in Sept 
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1999. And that: (2) the Sixth Wave peaked in North American in Oct 2004, in Europe in 
Dec 2005, and in Asia in Sept 2007. Taken together, this suggests that an independent 
and distinguishable Sixth Wave can be identified, and supports Hypothesis 1.  
Finally, Figure 4 reports the total deal values per region for the period of the sixth 
wave. From this, we see that deal values in Europe and Asia began to outstrip those of 
North America within the period. This suggests that the significance of North American 
mergers declined in relative terms, and that the sixth became a truly international wave.  
4.2 Characterising the Sixth Wave  
We characterize the sixth wave using a multinomial logit model, which contrasts 
the sixth wave to the inter-wave, relative lull in activity (Table 1), and then a maximum 
likelihood probit model, which compares the fifth and sixth merger waves (Table 2). In 
doing so, we come to a number of conclusions on both the features of the wave.  
4.2.1 Methods of Payment 
First, and using the multinominal logit to compare the sixth wave with the ‘no wave’, we 
find that the sixth wave was characterized by more all-cash and less fewer all-stock deals.  
In North America, for example, the ‘all-cash’ variable is typically positive and 
significant – often at the one percent level – while the ‘all-stock’ variable is significantly 
negative at the one percent level. For Europe, two positive coefficients – both significant 
at the five-percent level – suggest that more all-cash mergers also occurred there in the 
sixth wave. Mixed signs and a lack of significance on the all-stock variable, however, 
makes the discussion there less conclusive. And the same is true of Asia: all coefficients 
are insignificant in the base model, and the signs are not constant. If half-yearly merger 
waves are used, however, and a quarterly time trend is added ‘all-stock’ becomes 
negative and significant at the one percent level. The multinominal probit, however, 
compares the Fifth and Sixth Waves, and suggests this was not always the case. Positive 
coefficients on the ‘all cash’ variable in North America and Europe, and again in Asia 
when half-yearly merger waves are used, suggests that the Sixth Wave was characterized 
by a much higher number of all-cash mergers than its predecessor. Meanwhile, negative 
coefficients on the ‘all stock’ variable in North America, and in Europe (at least in the 
univariate model) suggest that the number of all stock deals has declined
8
. Negative 
results are also reported for ‘all stock’ in Asia, but only when monthly merger waves are 
used (and only then at the ten-percent level, and only in the univerate model).  
Taken together, these results suggest that more cash and less stock was used in the 
Sixth Wave than in previous times, and so supports Hypothesis 2 on the rise of cash.  
4.2.2 Sources of Finance 
Interestingly, the results on the control variable Acquirer’s Cash flow suggests the cash 
used to fund the Sixth Wave came from different sources in the different regions.  
For North America the coefficients for acquirer’s cash are significant, in the 
multinominal model, at the one-percent level in both merger wave models, with or 
without a quarterly time trend. And for Asia negative and significant coefficients are also 
                                                
8
 Insignificant results in the model containing all key variables likely due to colinearity. 
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found when half-yearly merger waves are used. This suggests that, in both cases, the cash 
used during the Sixth Wave was raised externally. For Europe the story is less clear, 
however. There the acquirer’s relative cash flow is negative and significant – at one-
percent level – when monthly waves are used, but positive and significant – at one-
percent level – when half-yearly waves are used. Because most of the signs tend to be 
positive, however, we can suggest - cautiously - that sixth wave acquirers in Europe 
tended to rely more on internal cash reserves. The low number of observations means that 
the cash-flow variable can not be tested for Europe with the multinominal probit model.  
As a result, we cannot comment on any changes that might have occurred there in 
the origin of M&A finance. For North America, however, and for all regions taken 
together, the model clearly suggests that Sixth Wave acquirers were less cash-flush then 
their predecessors in the Fifth Wave. Because the coefficient on the acquirer’s relative 
cash flow is significantly negative in all models. And the same is true of Asia, although 
the results there are weaker: only one model is significant and negative.  
Taken together, these results clearly suggest the it was the rise of cheap cash which 
drove the wave, at least in Asia and North America, while internal cash sparked Europe.  
4.2.3 Hostility 
Secondly, and turning to the question of hostility, we find partially support Hypothesis 2.  
Using the multinominal logit – which compares the Sixth Wave to the situation of 
the no wave – we find evidence to suggest that the sixth wave was a friendly wave in 
both North America and Asia. Significantly negative coefficients are found in all models, 
when all regions are taken together, and once more when North America is studied in 
isolation. For Asia, all coefficients for hostility are also negative, and significant at the 
five-percent level in the univerate model. Interestingly, however, the reverse is found for 
Europe: positive – albeit insignificant results – are returned in almost every model, 
suggesting that, relative to the no wave, hostility rose in Europe during the period. The 
probit model too suggests that, in acquiring targets, Sixth Wave acquirers were less 
hostile then those of the fifth. The coefficient on the ‘hostile’ variable is negative in 
North America, Europe and Asia, and significant in most cases at the one-percent level.  
Taken together, these results suggest that hostility on the decline in North America 
and Asia, but still employed as a takeover device in Europe. We thus partially support the 
second hypothesis, and find a divergence in the strategies employed across regions.  
4.2.4 Premiums Paid 
As might be expected from a friendly wave, the results on the control variable suggests 
that the premiums paid in the Sixth Wave were lower then was previously the case.  
Negative – albeit insignificant coefficients – are reported in almost all cases for 
North America and, surprisingly, given that the levels of hostitliy increased, negative and 
significant results are also found for Europe. And although mixed results are found for 
Asia, the clear suggestion is that the levels of premiums paid has declined. Comparing the 
fifth and sixth waves, however, we observe a divergence across regions. In North 
America mixed signs and insignificant results allow no conclusions to be drawn. 
Significantly negative results for Europe clearly suggest, however, that the levels of 
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premiums paid there has declined, while positive – albeit it insignificant – results in Asia 
allow us to cautiously suggest that the level of premiums paid there has increased.  
4.2.5 Bids and Bidders 
Interestingly, the results returned on the control variable Multiple Bidders suggests the 
Sixth Wave was a contested wave, with mulitple bids recieved from mulitple bidders.  
The strongest evidence of this is seen in Europe, where positive and significant 
results are achieved when half-yearly waves are used, with or without a quarterly time 
trend. Positive and significant results are also found for Asia and North America 
(significant at the ten- and five-percent levels respectively) when half-yearly data is used 
with a quarterly time trend. Mixed results are returned, however, when looking at the 
number of bids and bidders with the probit specification. In North America, and in all-
regions, the coefficient on the multiple bidders variable is positive and significant at the 
one-percent level; more bids with multiple bidders were recorded. In the univerate case, 
however, the coefficient becomes negative and insignificant. And if the half-yearly 
merger wave variable is used, the coefficient becomes significantly negative at the five 
percent level. The coefficient in the model that contains all key variables, however, stays 
significantly positive at the one-percent level. For Europe positive and significant results 
suggests that more bids did occur, and for Asia positive coefficients are returned in all 
cases. Sixth wave mergers in Europe and Asia thus received more bids.  
4.2.6 Internationalisation  
Third, and turning to the question of internationalization, we find mixed evidence to 
support the suggestion that the more cross-border mergers occurred in the Sixth Wave.  
Using the multinominal logit specification, for example, we find clear evidence to 
suggest that the number of cross-border deals increased in North America in the Sixth 
Wave. Surprisingly, however, negative results – significant at the one-percent level – are 
found in Europe, suggesting that fewer cross-border mergers occurred there. Inconclusive 
results are found for Asia, with insignificant coefficients in all cases. Results for the 
probit model suggests, however, that the Sixth Wave was more internationalising than the 
fifth. Positive and significant results are found for North America when all key variables 
are considered together, and in the univerate case for Europe. Positive and significant 
results are also returned for Asia, when monthly or half-yearly data is used.  
Taken together, the picture that emerges is of a North America which uses merger 
waves to take advantage of cross-border opportunities, a Europe which prefers to 
consolidate within their home markets, and a general trend across waves to increase in the 
levels of internationalisation. This thus provides only weak support for Hypothesis 3.  
4.2.7 Relatedness 
Fourth, and looking at the levels of relatedness, we again find a divergence across 
regions, and thus fail to support Hypothsis 5, on the general ‘rise of relatedness’.  
Looking at all regions, and then North America in isolation, we find evidence that 
Sixth Wave mergers we, in fact, less related, with significantly negative coefficients 
returned when both monthly and half-yearly merger wave variables are employed. 
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Positive and significant results, by contrast, are returned for both Europe and Asia, 
however, when quarterly merger waves are used. This suggests that while European and 
Asian firms used the sixth wave to build competencies, North American acquirers 
diversified. Clear evidence is found with the probit specification, however, to suggest that 
North American and European merger were less related in the Sixth Wave then they had 
been in the fifth. For North America negative and highly significant results are found 
whether monthly or half-yearly merger waves are used. And for Europe negative results 
are also found in both models, but only significant in the monthly case. For Asia the 
results are insignificant in all cases.  
We thus fail to support Hypothsis 5, on the ‘rise of relatedness’, and evidence the 
fact that different regions experienced the Sixth Wave in different ways.  
4.2.8 Firm Type 
Interestingly, the results returned on the control M/B Ratio suggests that while the 
strategies and deal types differed across regions, the Sixth Wave was driven by only one 
type of firm. The logit suggests that, relative to the no wave ‘lull’ in activity, sixth wave 
acquirers in North America and Europe were far more likely to be ‘value acquirers’ then 
‘glamour firms’. For North America the M/B coefficient is positive and significant, and 
for Europe positive, albeit less significant, findings are also evident. For Asia, however, 
contrasting signs and a lack of significance produces inconclusive results. Similar results 
are returned by the probit model, which compares acquirers across the fifth and sixth 
waves. The probit is not estimated for Europe or Asia, due to data limitations, but 
positive and significant results for North America, and for all-regions together, suggests 
that sixth wave acquirers had a higher M/B ratio then their counter-parts in the fifth wave.  
4.2.9 Firm Size 
Finally, and turning to the results on the control Firm Size, we find evidence to suggest 
that the Sixth Wave was driven by large acquirers, acquiring increasingly small targets.   
When relative acquirer size is considered with the logit specification, positive and 
significant results are found with both monthly and half-yearly merger waves for North 
America. In Europe and Asia positive and significant results are also found when 
monthly waves are used, but these results do not hold with the half-yearly waves. When 
relative target size is considered, the results are less conclusive: the coefficients are 
insignificant in all cases but one. Only when monthly merger wave data are used, in fact, 
are North American targets found to have increased in size, and only then at a ten-percent 
significance level. Turning to the probit specification, relative acquirer size is again seen 
to have increased from the fifth to the sixth merger waves. Significantly positive 
coefficients are found in Europe and Asia, and in North America (with half-yearly merger 
waves). Negative results – significant at the one and five-percent levels – suggest that 
average target size in North America declined, however, from the period of the fifth to 





4.3 Evaluating the Sixth Wave 
An event study methodology – which estimates the economic value of a strategic 
move by considering the markets response, in terms of abnormal shareholder returns, to 
its announcement – is used to ascertain estimate the performance of the sixth wave. 
Unfortunately, and due to data limitations, performance can only be measured for North 
American sixth wave mergers. The results of this investigation are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 – Evaluating the Sixth Merger Wave (Multinomial Logit Results) 
 
Merger Wave Data Monthly Merger Data 
Time Trend None 
 
None Quarterly Quarterly 
Univerate (U) or Multivariate 
(M) Specifications 
U M U M 
Logit CARs:  
Sixth wave vs Lull 
    
-1 Week  to +1 Day + -0.3602 -0.0087 -0.2163 
-1 Day to +1 Day -0.1036  -0.2476  
-4 Weeks to +1 Day 0.0012  -0.0016  
-1 Day to +1 Day (cum) -0.1077  -0.3030  
Probit CARs: Comparing waves     
-1 Week to +1 Day + -0.0126   
-1 Day to +1 Day -0.0173*    
-4 Weeks to +1 Day 0.0032*    
-1 Day to +1 Day (cum) -0.0165**    
Merger Wave Data Half-yearly Merger Date 
Time Trend None None Quarterly Quarterly 
Univerate (U) or Multivariate 
(M) Specifications 
U M U M 
Logit CARs:  
Sixth wave vs Lull 
    
-1 Week  to +1 Day + 0.5226 -0.0059 0.4925 
-1 Day to +1 Day -0.0283  -0.6349**  
-4 Weeks to +1 Day -  0.0033  
-1 Day to +1 Day (cum) -0.0253*  -0.0334**  
Probit CARs: Comparing waves     
-1 Week to +1 Day 0.0012 0.0127   
-1 Day to +1 Day -0.0139**    
-4 Weeks to +1 Day 0.0834    
-1 Day to +1 Day (cum) -0.0124**    
-1 Day to +1 Day (cum) -0.0124**    
 
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Looking first to the multinominal logit model, we find no significant results for the 
-1 week +1 day range. And a mixture of signs, make it hard to draw even suggestive 
conclusions. A somewhat clearer picture emerges when considering the -1 day +1 day 
range. All models there return negative results, one of which – using half-yearly merger 
waves – is significantly negative at the five percent level. Largely negative, albeit 
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insignificant results in the -4 weeks +1 day range, and negative and significant results in 
the cumulated -1 day +1 day range provide evidence to suggest that sixth wave mergers 
preformed below average. Next, and turning to the multinominal probit, to compare the 
fifth and sixth waves, we find that the sixth wave performed less well. Negative and 
significant results – typically at the five percent level - in the -1 day +1 day range, 
cumulated or otherwise, illustrate this point. Moving to a larger event window, however, 
we find that many of these results become positive, and often significant too. Looking at 
the -1 week +1 day range, and the – 4 week +1 day range, we see that performance 
actually increased from the fifth to the sixth waves. Taken together, these results support 
the hypothesis that sixth wave mergers performed: (i) less well than non-merger wave 
mergers in the inter-wave period; but (ii) still better than their predecessors in the fifth 
wave. Because merger waves are known to destroy value (Moeller et al., 2004) the 
finding that average performance is increasing is important.  
 
Table 4 – Summary of Findings   
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this paper was to identify, characterize and evaluate the sixth 
merger wave. In the process, we came to a number of conclusions. Table 4 summarizes 
these. Firstly, our results confirm the existence of a sixth wave, running from mid-2003 to 
2008. The sixth wave peaked in North American in Oct 2004, in Europe in Dec 2005, and 
   
North America Europe Asia 
All Cash + + ? Methods of Payment 
All Stock  - ? - 
M/B Ratio + + ? 
Acquirer CF - + - 
Acquirer 
Characteristics 
Acquirer Assets + + + 
Target Size + ? ? Target 
Characteristics  Related Deal - + + 
Hostile  - + - 
Multiple Bidders + + + 




Deal Characteristics  
Premiums - - - 
All Cash + + + Methods of Payment 
All Stock  - - - 
M/B Ratio + n/a n/a 
Acquirer CF - n/a - 
Acquirer 
Characteristics 
Acquirer Assets + + + 
Target Size - n/a n/a Target 
Characteristics Related Deal - - ? 
Hostile  - - - 
Multiple Bidders ? + + 





Deal Characteristics  
Premiums ? - + 
Positive (negative) signs imply largely positive (negative) results, or positive (negative) and 
significant results. “?” implies inconclusive results, and “n/a” implies the variable was not tested. 
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in Asia in Sept 2007. Interestingly, we find evidence to suggest that the wave was lead by 
Europe and Asia, with total deal values in both outstripping those of North America. 
Next, and by comparing the fifth and sixth waves, as well as contrasting the sixth wave 
with the inter-wave lull in activity, we draw a number of conclusions on the nature and 
unique character of the wave. We focus on the methods of payment, and the types of 
firms and deals, and find that while some of the characteristics of the sixth wave run 
common across all regions, there is evidence too of a divergence across regions. That is, 
the sixth wave was experienced differently in different places. We thus conclude:  
Sixth wave merger deals were financed with cash (rather than stock) 
Firstly, and as we expected, we find strong evidence to suggest that the sixth wave 
was financed with more cash, and that fewer all-stock deals occurred. Because stock 
payments are prone to overvaluation
9
 (see e.g., Andrade et al., 2001), this finding, at first, 
seems to suggest that that sixth wave mergers may have been more appropriately valued 
and, consequently, better performing then their predecessors in the fifth merger wave, and 
indeed in the lull in between. Bidding firms using cash to purchase the target typically 
exhibit a higher long-term performance (Heron and Lie, 2002; Linn and Switzer, 2001; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Sirower, 1997). 
The results of the ‘acquirer’s relative cash-flow’ suggests, however, that less of the 
cash used in the sixth wave came from internal sources. Again, given the availability of 
cheap credit during the course of the sixth wave, this is not a surprising result. Negative 
results in both the logit and probit models for North America and Asia suggest that 
borrowing increased in the sixth wave, relative to the fifth wave and the lull in between.  
According to Myers and Mailuf’s (1984) pecking-order hypothesis, external debt is 
more costly then internal cash, and thus a rise in the debt level raises costs, which lowers 
our expectations of performance. Because the sixth wave was a period of historical lows 
in the interest rate price, however, and one of historical highs in the levels of liquidity, the 
relative cost of external debt were, we suggest, lessened during the course of the sixth 
wave. Possibly even to the point that Myers and Mailuf’s (1984) pecking-order 
hypothesis may not have fully applied for sixth wave acquirers. This makes the positive 
result on cash-flows for European in the multinomial logit somewhat puzzling. It implies 
that European acquirers probably relied more on internal sources of cash, when the rest of 
the world borrowed. Jensen’s (1986) free-cash flow hypothesis suggests that agency costs 
increase in the levels of internationally available liquidity, and so predicts that mergers 
made in period of cheap cash will perform poorly. Jensen suggests that cash flush 
acquirers will make bad acquisitions, even after all the good ones have been made. The 
suggestion then is that Sixth acquirers in Asian and North American, disciplined by debt, 
should out-perform their European rivals.  Unfortunately, we could not test for this.   
 Sixth wave acquirers were ‘value’ acquirers, but their strategies varied across regions 
Secondly, our results suggest that the sixth wave was increasingly driven by 
‘value’, as opposed to ‘glamour’ acquirers. Because ‘value’ acquirers are less likely to 
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 To induce a target to accept its stock, the bidder has to offer a higher price than would have been 
necessary using some other form of payment. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the use of stock in the 
first place actually reflects the acquirer’s belief that its stock is, per se, overvalued (DePamphilis, 2005).  
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suffer the consequences of hyper-confident managers (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), value 
acquirers tend to demonstrate superior performance. Which is a good-news finding.  
It is interesting to note, however, that different firms in different regions adopted 
different strategies during the sixth wave. In North America, for example, our results 
suggest that acquirers sought out diversifications, and that sixth wave acquirers were less 
related then their fifth wave predecessors, or their predecessors in the lull in between. 
Interestingly, however, acquisitions in Europe and Asia focused on core-competencies, 
and were primarily amongst related industries. Such a strategy is generally thought to be 
the more beneficial (Gaughan, 2007, Chatterjee, 1986, Gugler, et al., 2003; Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Lins and Servaes, 1999; Besanko et al., 2006; Weston et al, 2004), because 
diversified firms are generally riskier, more difficult to understand and prone to 
opportunistic behavior (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). Harding et al., (2004) 
conclude that most successful mergers are those on deals that promote the acquirers core 
business. Relative to the fifth wave, however, our results suggest that, even in Europe, the 
sixth wave was less about integration then the fifth wave before it. The implication here 
may be that there is a general lagged tendency towards a policy of diversification.  
 Sixth wave mergers were larger, but different regions looked to different places 
We find clear evidence to suggest that sixth wave acquirers were larger then 
normal, relative to both the no-wave and fifth wave situations, in North America, Europe 
and Asia.  Furthermore, a positive coefficient on target size in the North American logit 
model suggests that target size also increased when compared to the case of the no-wave 
scenario, but a negative sign in the probit comparison of the fifth and sixth waves 
suggests that sixth wave targets were smaller then had been the case in the fifth wave. An 
investigation of target size in Europe and Asia is either absent – due to data limitations – 
or inconclusive. Our results suggest that a large number of cross border deals occurred 
during the course of sixth merger wave in North America; even more so then was the 
case in the so-called ‘globalizing’ fifth wave. Cross border deals are generally thought to 
destroy value (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Weitzel and Berns, 2006; Sarkissian and Schill, 
2008; Levine and Schmukler, 2006; Gozzi et al., 2008), and so this finding lowers our 
performance expectations there. Sixth wave M&A activity in Asia, and in Europe, also 
seem, however, to be more internationalizing then was the case in the fifth wave. But, 
strangely, it appears from the logit models that Europe experienced fewer cross border 
deals in the sixth wave then it did during the lull in-between the fifth and sixth waves. 
Perhaps, because European acquirers used the sixth wave to focus on a competence 
building strategy, the interpretation here could be that European acquirers decided to play 
it safe, and by keeping it national. Whatever the reasons, the decline in 
internationalization predicts higher performance.  
Sixth wave deals were more friendly, and less overpriced   
Next, we find strong evidence to suggest that sixth wave mergers were typically 
agreed after receiving more bids, from more bidders, then was the case in the fifth wave, 
or during the lull in between. Bidding is widely thought to reduce overvaluation, and an 
appropriate valuation is thought to improve performance.  
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We find clear evidence to suggest, however, that these bids were largely friendly in 
North America and Asia, and less hostile then the average merger in the fifth wave. 
Hostility seems, in fact, to be declining in both North American and Asia, maybe because 
the rise of alternative governance mechanisms (e.g. stock options, shareholder activism, 
non-executive director monitoring) makes hostility unnecessary (Holmström and Kaplan, 
2001). Because hostility predicts poorer performance, and wastes resources, this is to be 
welcomed. Interesting results are found when turning to the issue of hostility in Europe 
though. Hostility there was lower in the sixth wave then it was during the fifth, but higher 
then it had been during the lull in-between. Because the fifth wave was the biggest wave 
in Europe to date, European hostility, it can therefore be suggested, declines in merger 
intensity. Given the overall decline in hostility, the corresponding decline in the level of 
premiums paid in all three regions is hardly surprising. This is to be welcomed, as the 
payment of premiums dramatically increases the probability of failure (Schlingemann, 
2004). The rise of premiums paid in Asia, relative to the level of the fifth wave is, 
however, difficult to explain. It may simply be reflective of the levels of liquidity floating 
around the region at this stage, and of Asia’s relative inexperience in the M&A market.     
 Sixth wave mergers performed poorly, but better then their predecessors in the Fifth  
Finally, and in looking at the performance of the sixth wave, largely negative 
(albeit largely insignificantly) results in the logit model suggest that sixth wave mergers 
preformed less well than non-merger-wave mergers. Because the literature suggests that 
merger-wave mergers typically perform less well, as they are often motivated by 
exogenous shocks, such as unexpectedly low interest rates, such a finding is to be 
expected. The finding in the multinominal probit, however, suggests that sixth wave 
mergers performed better then their predecessors in the sixth wave. At least in the longer 
term. Fifth wave mergers, driven by bubbles and short-term gains failed to have create 
shareholder value, but our results suggest that the sixth wave created value, and worked 
in the long run. The fact that the sixth wave was a largely cash-financed, friendly merger 
wave, between mainly related firms in related industries is likely the explanation for this.  
6. CONCLUSIONS  
The purpose of this paper was to identify, characterize and evaluate the sixth 
merger wave. We achieved this: first, by illustrating the existence of the sixth wave; 
second, and by comparing the fifth and sixth wave, and by contrasting the sixth wave to 
the lull in between, we introduced and characterized the sixth wave in terms of a number 
of key (performance impacting) variables; and finally we evaluated the wave.  
The picture that emerges is one of a sixth wave with global impact and yet local 
difference. We find evidence to suggest that while all three regions – that is, Europe, Asia 
and North America – were united in embracing the sixth wave, each region experienced 
the sixth wave somewhat differently. In North America, for example, sixth wave mergers 
were driven by large and friendly acquirers, using externally sourced cash, for the 
purposes of domestic diversifications. European mergers, by contrast, were about 
integration, and consolidation, although less so than was the case in the fifth wave. 
European mergers were somewhat hostile, domestically orientated and financed with 
cash, a lot of which was generated internally. Asian mergers too were seen to have 
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focused on their core competencies, to have been increasingly hostile and increasingly 
expensive. The rise of both hostility and premiums paid in Asia runs contrary to the 
trends in Europe and North America, we suggest, just as the rising popularity of a 
diversification strategy in North America runs contrary to the strategies employed in 
Europe and Asia. All are important findings, we believe, which may offer important 
insights for managers and shareholders looking to ‘ride’ future M&A waves. 
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 Table 1 – Sixth Merger Wave compared with Lull (Multinomial Logit Results) 
 
Regions All Regions North America 
Merger Data Monthly  Half-Yearly Monthly Half-Yearly 
Time Trend None Quarterly  None Quarterly  None Quarterly  None Quarterly  
Univariate (U) or 
Multivariate (M) 
Specification  
U M U M U M U M U M U M U M U M 
All Cash 0.4818 
*** 
-0.0401 0.0320 - 02945** 0.5223*** 0.1490 0.1865*** - 0.6008*** 0.0325 0.0737 -0.2120 0.6338*** 0.0947 0.2113*** -0.0612 






























M/B Ratio + 0.0016 - 0.0026 + + ** + + * - + *** - +*** + + *** + + ** 
Acquirer CF -0.0097 -0.0322 -0.0053 -0.0163 + *** -0.0304 + *** -0.0195 -
0.0329*** 
-0.2214 -0.0324 ** 0.0304 
-
0.0343*** 
0.0017 -0.0324** 0.0599 
Hostile  -
0.6500*** 
-0.5585** -0.1362 -0.1783 -0.4578** -0.5163** -0.0506 -0.2425 
-
0.7106*** 
-0.5814* -0.0313 -0.0030 -0.6375** -0.4881 -0.0700 -0.0357 
Multiple Bidders -0.1180 0.1956 0.1057 -0.0627 0.0548 0.2974 0.2322** 0.1431 -0.1828 0.0695 0.0220 -0.2947 -0.1867 0.4887* -0.0158 0.2656 
Related Deal -0.1153*  -0.2585 * 0.0932 -0.0041 -0.0058 -0.0088 -0.1339* 0.1806 -0.1038 -0.3669* 0.1307 -0.0093 -0.0764 -0.3794* 0.0697 -0.1142 
Acquirer Assets 0.0875*** 0.0520 0.0378 0.0277 0.0405 
*** 
- 0.0502* 0.0044 
-
0.0718*** 
0.1017*** 0.0700* 0.0396** 0.0073 0.0484*** 0.0354 + -0.0875** 
Target Size -0.0023 0.0035 + 0.0044 + 0.0013 0.0025 0.0020 -0.0258 0.0651* -0.0306 -0.0164 -0.0021 - -0.0166 -0.0481 
Cross Border -0.0304 -0.1018 -0.1447** -0.0948 0.0040 0.0332 -0.0799 0.0397 -0.0970 0.4413 0.0122 0.4492 -0.0953 0.5935** -0.0268 0.5698** 
Premiums -0.0016 -0.0010 - + -0.0016 -0.0013 - - -0.0011 - - + - -0.0026 - - 
 
 
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Regions Europe Asia 
All Cash 0.2754** -0.3170 0.0353 -0.3194 0.2836** 0.1756 0.1733 0.5157 -0.0237 -0.9655 -0.3524 -5.8676 0.3213 -0.0293 0.1318 -0.1535 
All Stock  -0.0441 -0.1051 0.3106 -0.1040 0.0140 0.1092 0.1038 0.0539 -0.1545 0.1007 -0.1879 -1.1717 -0.5987 -0.2860 -0.7125*** -0.3173 
M/B Ratio + 0.0035 + * 0.0035 + -0.0017 + * -0.0032 0.0044 0.1336 0.0020 0.6598 -0.0051 -0.0110 -0.0069 -0.0162 
Acquirer CF - *** 0.0151 - *** 0.0152 + *** 0.0189 + *** 0.0044 -0.0045 -0.0918 - 0.2691 -0.0202 -0.1002* -0.0151 -0.1097** 
Hostile  -0.1452 0.2010 0.0625 0.1995 0.3775 0.2098 0.3749 0.2758 -1.5951** -2.0028 -1.4627 -7.0965 -1.2218** -1.3100 -0.8865 -1.0835 
Multiple Bidders -0.0559 -0.5826 0.1487 -0.5847 0.4812** -0.3686 0.5777** -0.0918 -0.0541 0.8951 0.1969 -3.5212 0.3457 0.9108 0.7110** 0.9262 
Related Deal -0.1808 0.7410 -0.0271 0.7422 0.1358 0.9779** 0.2174 0.8533* -0.1102 -0.5815 0.1508 -0.9807 -0.0656 0.9135** 0.1772 1.0276** 
Acquirer Assets 0.0655** -0.0661 0.0190 -0.0658 0.0315 -0.1192 0.0135 -0.1440* 0.0326 0.4766** 0.0556 1.1856 0.0089 0.0240 0.0297 0.0240 
Target Size -0.0013 + -0.0013 - 0.0024 - + -0.0024 -0.1150 0.0118 -0.1234 -0.0185 -0.0297 0.0054 -0.0291 0.0091 
Cross Border 








-0.0096* -0.0096** -0.006 - ** -0.0020 -0.0034 -0.0041 - 0.0026 + -0.0160 0.0026 0.0021 0.0028 0.0025 
 Table 2 – Sixth vs Fifth Merger Wave (Multinomial Probit Results) 
 
 
Regions All North America 
Merger Data Monthly Half-Yearly Monthly Half-Yearly 
Univerate (U) or 
Multivariate (M) 
Specifications 
U M U M U M U M 
All Cash 0.2258 *** 0.0538 0.2179*** 0.0693 0.2760*** 0.0506 0.2656*** 0.0638 
All Stock  -0.2701 *** -0.3310*** -0.2412*** -0.2872*** -0.3239*** -0.3362*** -0.2994*** -0.2742*** 
M/B Ratio + *** + *** + *** + *** + ** + *** + * + *** 
Acquirer CF 0.0157 *** -0.4560*** + -0.4478** -0.0152*** -0.3724** -0.0354 -0.4759*** 
Hostile  -0.3005 *** -0.2428** -0.2127*** 0.2701** -0.2729*** -0.2740** -0.2630*** -0.2432*** 
Multiple Bidders -0.0370 0.2640*** -0.0482  0.3335*** -0.0465 0.3233*** -0.0810** 0.3781*** 
Related Deal -0.1025 *** -0.2355*** -0.0959*** -0.3966*** -0.1141***  -0.2595*** -0.1405*** -0.2818*** 
Acquirer Assets 0.0454 *** 0.0606*** 0.0429*** 0.0653*** 0.0502*** 0.0577*** 0.0477*** 0.0578*** 
Target Size - 0.0068*** 0.0492** -0.0014* 0.0474 -0.0537** 0.0426 -0.0899*** 0.0292 
Cross Border 0.0692*** 0.1571 0.0605*** 0.0934 0.0240 02539** -0.0246 0.1709* 
Premiums - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Regions Europe Asia 
Merger Data Monthly Half-Yearly Monthly Half-Yearly 
Univerate (U) or 
Multivariate (M) 
Specifications 
U M U M U M U M 
All Cash 0.1142*** 0.0305 0.1025*** 0.0737 0.0181 -0.0527 0.1341* 0.1510 
All Stock  -0.0888* -0.0128 -0.0977** 0.0143 -0.1484* -0.1202 -0.0884 -0.0509 
M/B Ratio     +    
Acquirer CF     - ***    
Hostile  -0.3327*** -0.3371*** -0.2337*** -0.2286** -0.4039* -0.4624** -0.3685** -0.5847*** 
Multiple Bidders -0.0186 0.2748** -0.0172 0.3333*** 0.0731 0.2433 0.0792 0.0459*** 
Related Deal -0.0506 -0.2154** -0.0128 -0.1334 -0.0015 0.0032 0.0031 0.2062 
Acquirer Assets 0.0393*** 0.0495** 0.0392*** 0.0354* 0.0209  0.0233 0.0688 
Target Size         
Cross Border 0.1097** -0.0735 0.1850*** 0.0837 0.2667*** 0.2213* 0.1457* 0.0105 
Premiums -0.0038*** -0.0041*** - ** -0.0024*** 0.0016  + + 
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 CHAPTER THREE – MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
“The magnitude of [the merger gain] is constrained only by  
the [nature of the] arrangement, the policing costs of its enforcement […]  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The existence of ‘merger waves’ – a term which refers to the wave pattern of the 
number and the total value of takeover deals over time (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008) – is well-established in the empirical literature (Bouwman et al., 2007). 
To date, five merger waves have been examined in the academic literature, those 
of: the 1900s, 1920s, 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s. Of these, the most recently 
documented – the so-called ‘fifth wave’ – is probably the most remarkable. Because 
in the course of the fifth wave a record-breaking nine-thousand billion dollars was 
spent by North American and Western European firms alone on mergers and 
acquisitions (Schenk, 2003). And more deals were agreed in the final 2 years of that 
wave than had been agreed in the preceding 30 years (Andrade et al., 2001).  
From a public perspective, however, the question of whether such waves are to 
be welcomed or worried about remains unclear (e.g. Moeller et al., 2004; 2005).  
A regulatory experiment in the structure of the US banking industry makes it a 
particularly ideal setting in which to study this question. The Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (1994), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999, drastically altered the structure of the in the US banking industry in the 1990s, 
and in it wake an unprecedented volume of mergers and acquisitions occurred (Adams 
et al., 2009). The number of independent banking organizations fell in the US from 
12,342 at the end of 1980, to 9,221 in 1990, to 6,742 in 1999 (Amel and Starr-
McCluer, 2001). In the process the industry’s assets centralized: during the period of 
the fifth merger wave, the share of assets held by the ten largest commercial banks 
(ranked by assets) rose from 22 percent to 46 percent, and the share of industry 
deposits held by the ten largest rose from 19 percent to 41 percent (Pilloff, 2004).  
But what motivated this consolidation: efficiency, in the absence of oppressive 
regulation, or competitive abuse in (what became) an under-regulated market?  
We employ a number of concentration and competition measures, and data on 
the banking industry both before and after the deregulation of the 1990s, to consider 
the effects of this natural experiment on the competitive structure of the industry. We 
hypothesise that a reduction in the levels of competition would provide prima facie 
evidence that, at least amongst the banking industry, the fifth merger wave was 
motivated by the attainment of market power, whereas a reduction in the number of 
competitors, and a non-negative change in competition would evidence efficiency.  
We find that while the ‘fifth wave’ significantly impacted the number of 
competitors in the market, and caused a 36% contraction, it did not significantly 
impact the levels of competition. Despite the 463 mergers, acquisitions and market 
exists, we found that competition remained relatively constant across the period.  
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Using a dataset with 1,144 observations, we consider the effects of the periods 
various merger, acquisitions and restructurings (hereafter M&As) on the levels of 
concentration and competition within the relevant market, which we first broadly 
describe as the ‘total loans market’, and then subcategorise, for maximum exposure, 
as the total consumer, agricultural, commercial and real estate loans markets.  
We find that: (1) the fifth wave significantly impacted the scale of the US 
banking industry, and caused a 36% decrease in the number of competitors within the 
ten year period of our analysis. We find, however: (2) that the consolidation was not 
led by the larger players, but was a ‘bottom up’ wave, which occurred between the 
smaller players in the market. The consumer loans market was, we find, the most 
heavily contested market during the period, and the target of most M&A activity. This 
is an important finding, we suggest, with many real world implications for future 
merger waves. Next, we find: (3) that regulation impacts the levels of concentration 
within the industry; and (4) that the levels of concentration significantly impacts the 
performance of firm, which we interpret as evidence of market power. We find little 
direct evidence, however, for the impact of specific regulation on the levels of 
competition within our sample. We find, in fact, (5) that the level of competition 
within the industry is exogenously determined, and that the consolidations of the fifth 
wave did not significantly impact the levels of competition within the industry. Thus, 
although we find evidence to suggest (6) that the incentives to act in an 
anticompetitive manner are greater for the industries larger players, we conclude that 
the periods consolidations were not driven by the attainment of market power, but 
were efficiency driven. Given the current discussions on the necessity of regulation in 
the US banking industry, this, again, is a potentially important finding. 
The paper proceeds in the usual way. We begin in Section Two with an overview 
of the literature on merger waves, and of their effects on the levels of competition and 
concentration. In Section Three we introduce the data, and describe the various tools 
used in the study to discuss both the market and the competitive conditions within it. 
In Section Four we present the result, in Section Five we discuss the key findings and 
implications of our study, and the in Section Six we summarise and draw conclusions.  
2. LITERATURE   
2.1. Merger Waves  
Merger waves are turbulent events, caused by changes in the structure or 
nature of the market (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008), during which large number 
of firms cease to exist, as they are variously merged, acquired or consolidated.  
More than 3,000 firms disappeared in the course of the first merger wave 
(1897-1904). And through the 4,600 mergers that occurred in the second (1916-1929), 
12,000 manufacturing, mining, public utility and banking firms disappeared (Nelson, 
1959). In the exuberance of the third wave (1960-1969) another 25,000 firms were 
consumed (Gaughan, 2007). And as mergers continued to soar in popularity – rising 
from an average of 1.6% of US GDP in the 1960, to 3.4% in the 1980s, in the forth 
wave (1981-1989), to a high of 15.4% in 1999 (Weston et. al, 2004), during the Fifth 
Wave (1992-2001) – firms continued to disappear, and markets were consolidated.  
Each wave was sparked by an ‘exogenous shock’: the first and second were 
driven by changes in the physical operating environment of the firm, which allowed 
firms expand into new markets or regions. The third was driven by the rise of modern 
management theory, with its belief that ‘good managers can manage anything’, and 
that diversification creates value, and the fourth, described as the first ‘bust-up’ or 
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‘anti-merger’ wave, coincided with a number of financial innovations, which allowed 
increasingly large targets to be acquired (Weston et al., 2004). And while a number of 
shocks contributed to the rise of the fifth wave (1992-2001), it is generally agreed that 
deregulation was chief amongst these; Andrade et al (2001) reports that deregulated 
industries – such as airlines (1978), broadcasting (1984 and 1996), entertainment 
(1984), natural gas (1978), trucking (1980), utilities (1992), and telecommunications 
(1996) – accounted for half of all annual deal volume in the course of the fifth wave. 
 
Figure 1 – Five US Mergers Waves 
Source: Nelson (1959) for the period 1895 – 1918, the Federal Trade Commission (1970) for the period 1919 




2.2. On the Effects of Merger Waves  
The veracity with which merger waves have consumed firms, and consolidated 
industries, has lead some to suggest that merger waves are driven by the attainment of 
market power (Motta, 2004). A merger between two firms in a related industry, it is 
suggested, reduces competition, and may allow the firm to increase the prices it 
charges to its customers, or decrease the price it pays to its suppliers. This, it is 
suggested, creates a wealth transfer, and generates private gains (Gaughan, 2008).  
Chatterjee (1986) tests the market power hypothesis, using a database of 159 
mergers, and finds that horizontal mergers are associated with the highest value gains. 
This leads the author to conclude that ‘collusive synergies’ offers the firm the most 
significant source of gain. Kim and Singal (1993) and, more recently Sapienza (2002), 
support this suggestion, and show that mergers result in the creation of significant 
market power. In observing an upward change in the product prices charged by 
acquirers both before and after a merger, both infer that mergers increase market 
power and create immediate shareholder gains in the form of a wealth transfers from 
the firm’s customers to its shareholders. Chatterjee (1986) suggests that the magnitude 
of the gain is, in fact, restrained only by the nature of the arrangement, the policing 
costs of its enforcement, and the regulatory constrains it is subject to. Implicitly, these 
authors support the suggestion that merger wave mergers take advantage of changes 
in their environment, to negatively change the competitive nature of the industry.  
In a world of market power gains, the necessity of regulation is obvious. And, 
from a public perspective, a merger wave spawned from deregulation, transferring 
wealth from the firm’s customers to its owners makes for a frightful vista. The 
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existence of the redistributive wealth effect, and the suggested primacy of collusive 
synergies in motivating mergers is, however, the source of a long-standing debate.   
Eckbo (1983), for example, finds little evidence to suggest that mergers offer 
collusive gains. And in studies which measure the stock returns to suppliers, buyers, 
and rivals, in order to measure the gains to horizontal mergers, Fee and Thomas 
(2004), and Shahrur (2005) come to a similar conclusion. They find little evidence to 
suggest that mergers lead to market power gains. More recently, and in a study of 264 
mergers (1980-2001), Devos et al. (2008) show that the largest gains accrue to 
operative efficiencies. Of the total (10.3%) synergy in their sample, they find that 
8.38% arises from operating synergies, and the remainder from financial/tax savings. 
And it seems that managers understand this; in a survey of financial executives, 
Mukherjee et al. (2004) reports that only 4.3% of CFOs mention ‘increased market 
power’ as being a significant merger motive, while nearly 90% identify ‘operating 
economies’ as being a top-ranked source of synergy, and primary merger motive.  
2.3. The Banking Industry Wave 
Deregulation in the US banking industry makes this a particularly ideal setting 
in which to study the question of whether or not merger waves are to be welcomed. 
 In the early 1990s, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (1994) eliminated many of the geographical constraints on banking 
organisations, and allowed banks to establish branch networks within and, in some 
cases, across state lines (Hannan and Prager, 2009). Later the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999 reduced the barriers to consolidation, to allow mergers among banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies. Both were major (de)regulatory events, 
which dramatically changed the structure of the banking industry in the 1990s. 
In their wake, an unprecedented volume of mergers and acquisitions occurred 
(Adams et al., 2009), and the number of independent banking organizations in the US 
fell from 12,342 at the end of 1980, to 9,221 in 1990, to 6,742 in 1999 (Amel and 
Starr-McCluer, 2001). In the process the industry’s assets centralized: during the 
period 1990-2001, the share of assets held by the ten largest commercial banks 
(ranked by assets) rose from 22 percent to 46 percent, and the share of industry 
deposits held by the ten largest rose from 19 percent to 41 percent (Pilloff, 2004).  
But what motivated the consolidation: efficiency, in the absence of oppressive 
regulation, or competitive abuse in (what became) an under-regulated market?  
In the general case, Hannan and Rhoades (1987) do not find evidence that 
banks exhibiting lower profitability, or growth were more likely to be acquired. In a 
study of 1,046 Texan banks, and 201 mergers within the period 1970-1982, the 
authors fail to support the hypothesis that the mergers were efficiency driven, or that 
poorly managed banks are more likely to be acquired than well managed ones. The 
majority of scholars, however, do find that the attainment of operative synergies 
underscore most banking deals. Amel and Rhoades (1989), for example, find that the 
lower a bank’s earning, the more likely it is to be acquired. And Moore (1997) reports 
that the target banks share, profitability, and capital-asset ratio were all negatively 
related to the likelihood that a bank is acquired. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) too 
finds that a banks capital-asset ratio is inversely related to the likelihood of 
acquisition – a result which they attribute either to the possibility that banks with low 
capitalisation are generally close to failure and therefore more likely to be acquired.  
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Taken together, and even though – to the best of our knowledge – the motives 
behind banking merger waves have not been explicitly considered by the literature, 
we expect that deregulation will result in an efficiency driven fifth merger wave.  
We employ two measures, and data on the banking industry both before and 
after the deregulation of the 1990s, to consider the effects of this natural experiment 
on the competitive structure of the industry. From a public perspective, we suggest 
that a large reduction in the levels of competition – as opposed to numbers of 
competitors, or the levels of concentration – will provide evidence that the wave was 
motivated by the attainment of market power, and that a reduction in the number of 
competitors, and a non-negative change in competition will evidence efficiency.  
 
Hyp 1: Banking mergers are efficiency driven and thus, despite changes in the 
structure of the market and the resultant changes in the levels of 
concentration, the levels of competition will not change in the period.  
 
3. DATA & METHODOLOGY   
3.1. Data Sample  
The data employed in this study has been made available by the US Federal 
Reserve. We refine it, in terms of the relevant product and geographical markets (see 
below), to include all mergers and acquisitions: (1) in the banking industry; (2) in the 
US state of Texas; (3) within the period of the ‘fifth wave’, that is Jan 1992 to Dec 
2001. The result of this refinement is a dataset of 1,144 banking observations.  
3.2. Defining the Market  
Defining the market is a necessary first step. Because to discuss concentration 
and competition one must first define within which market concentration and 
competition is being discussed (Motta, 2004). The relevant market is typically defined 
in terms of products, and geographical reach (Korah, 2003; Church and Ware, 2003). 
3.2.1 The Relevent Geographical Market  
Strict geographical limitations are imposed to ensure an accurate description of 
competition and concentration within a the market, and because using a larger sample 
would be tantamount to making an assumption of perfect information amongst 
consumers, or of total freedom to choose amongst banks
2
. Many studies of bank 
performance use the local areas as the relevant geographic market definition (Hannan 
and Liang, 1995; Rhoades, 1995; Hannan, 1997; Kamerschen and Frame, 1997; 
Berger and Hannan, 1998; Hannan and Prager, 1998; Pilloff, 1999), and typically the 
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 Market boundaries exist, even within a single market, and must be accounted for. It has been suggested, however, 
that in a single market the nature and location of these boundaries depends on the type of customer, their mobility 
and their economic size much more than on imagined geographic borders such as cities, states or regions. To 
account for this, a narrow definition of the market is adopted, which is appropriate for consumers of the retail 
banking market – a market comprised of ordinary consumers and is dependent on the local dimension – while the 
regional and international dimension is relevant for medium and larger banks. In doing this, the paper first makes 
the assumption of uniformity within the market, and calculates the model accordingly, before then attempting to 
capture the suspected size variances for both the relevant geographical markets, and the relevant product markets, 
by dividing this market into different segments dependent on the economic size of the entities concerned. The 
relevant temporal market is finally then held to be defined to consist of the entire ten-year period under analysis.  
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unit of observation is the metropolitan statistical area (MSA); that is, a city and the 
suburbs around it (Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2001). This basic approach has been 
standard in banking research for years (Pilloff and Rhoades, 2002), and it continues to 
be reasonable today (Adams and Amel, 2007; Berger et al., 2004; Keeton, 2000; 
Seelig and Critchfield, 2003). Because despite the emergence of electronic banking, 
and the fact that some financial markets are national or even global, competition is 
seen to takes place in markets that are geographically small (Adam et al., 2009; Amel 
and Starr-McCluer, 2001; Federal Reserve Board, 1993; 1998). Data from the supply 
side too confirms the relevance of local markets. For instance, research suggests that 
bank offices have remained important, increasing in number from about 53,000 in 
1980 to 72,000 in 1998 (Pilloff and Rhoades, 2002). Of course large businesses and 
wealthier household may readily access a greater range of financial institutions. But 
markets are defined in the literature to reflect the regular use of banking services by 
typical households and small businesses, who face the practical necessity of banking 
closer to home (Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2001). For this reason, we consider 
competition and concentration at the MSA levels, in one US state: the state of Texas. 
3.2.2 The Relevent Product Market  
The relevant market, within which concentration and competition is to measured, 
is defined in terms of total loans
3
. Loans, we suggest, are at the core of the banking 
business, and the use of loans is consistent with proior studies on the topic (Hannan 
and Liang, 1995; Rhoades, 1995; Hannan, 1997; Kamerschen and Frame, 1997; 
Berger and Hannan, 1998; Hannan and Prager, 1998; Pilloff, 1999). We consider 
concentration and competition first in the total loans market (T), and we then 
subdivide this into its constituent parts: that is, the consumer loans market (P), the 
agricultural (A), commercial (C) and real estate (R) loans markets. Data on each of 
these loan markets in the State of Texas is made available by the US Federal Reserve.  
3.3 Estimating Market Concentration  
Two measures can be employed to study the effects of the merger wave on the 
structure of the market: the K-Bank and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
The K-Bank is one of the most frequently used measures of concentration. It 
sums the market shares of the K largest banks, with equal weight, and assumes that 
the behaviour of the market is dominated by a small number of large banks with a 
large market share. We calculate it for the 3, 5, 10, 15 and 20 largest banks. The 
results (reported below in Section Four, and discussed in Section Five) range between 
0 and 1, and approach 0 in the case of an infinite number of equally sized banks.  
 
 , where 0 ! HHI ! 1      (1) 
 
To counter the arbitrariness in the identification of K-Bank, we also calculate 
the size insensitive HHI for each of the loan markets (P, A, C and R) and for their total 
(T). The HHI. The HHI avoids the arbitrary cut-offs of the K-Bank, and is calculated 
as the sum of the squares of the bank sizes measured by market share (Eq.1). Because 
it incorporates each bank individually, it captures features of the entire market. The 
index ranges between 1/n for perfect competition, and 1 for monopoly, and the results 
of this measure are reported in Section Four and discussed in Section Five. 
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 Although other measures like total assets, net income after taxes and total assets were also considered.  
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3.4 Modeling Competition  
Two types of models can be employed to comment upon competition within an 
industry (see e.g., Bikker and Haaf, 2001; 2002 for an overview). Structural models 
explain competitiveness as a function of concentration, and by explicitly linking 
concentration with competition, estimate the incentives to act in a anti-competitive 
manner, in a given market. Non-structural models, by contrast, are formulated 
independently of overt information about market structure, and are employed to 
analyse the firms’ competitive conduct over time. We calculate both, in an effort to 
quantify the incentives to monopolise, and to analyse the results of the merger wave.   
3.4.1 The Structual Competition Models 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model is based on Chamberlin’s 
(1933) theory of monopolistic competition, and explains performance in terms of the 
firms exogenously given market structure. It is used by regulators to comment on the 
incentives to act in an anticompetitive manner, and explain performance as a function 
of a set of market structure variables, a set of demand variables, and a set of firm 
specific control variables. Eq. 2 provides an empirically testable version of the SCP. 
A wide range of performance measures are considered in the literature, with little 
agreement on which is best (Molyneux et al., 1997; Gilbert, 1984; Berger, 1995). The 
majority, however, employ financial measures, such as the Return on Assets (ROA) – 
calculated here as the sum of total interest income and total non-interest income 
variables, divided by total assets – or the Return on Equity (ROE) – calculated as the 
sum of total interest income and total non-interest income variables, divided by total 
equity. Because ROA is time invariant to changes in risk appetite (Martin, 1993), the 
ROA seems the more appropriate, and we adopted it as our dependent variable.  
 
InROAt = !t + " In(Con)t + # In(CE)t + $ In(RISK)t + % In(LIQ)t + & In(MRT)t +µt 
 
 
Here, CON is a measure of concentration, and is estimated independently in 
each instance as the C3, C5, C10, C15, C20, or as the HHI. The variable CE 
represents a measure of cost efficiency, and is calculated as the summation of total 
income (that is, the sum of total interest income and total non-interest income) divided 
by total operating costs (calculated as the summation of total interest expenses, total 
salary expenses, total fixed asset expenses and total non-interest expenses). 
Differences in risk attitude are represented by the variable RISK, which is usually 
controlled for by using either loans over assets or equity over assets. For consistency, 
we define RISK as total net loans (total real estate loans, total agricultural loans, total 
commercial and total consumer loans) divided by total assets. LIQ consists of the 
liquid assets (or more specifically cash) of the bank as a proportion of the total assets, 
and MRT is a measure of market size, where total loans are used as a proxy measure 
for total demand. The number of additional control variables included in the model is 
purposefully low, so as to avoid high-correlation between different controls that 
would render the interpretation of the model overly complicated (Crowling, 1976). 
The model is then calculated in the log-log form, for later ease of interpretation.  
3.4.2 The Non-Structual Competition Models 
The most frequently applied non-structural models is the Panzar-Rosse (P-R). 
The P-R Model employs a H-Statistic to discriminate between different market 
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structures, based on the properties of a reduced form revenue equation at the firm 
specific level
4
. In estimating this it is assumed that: (1) the firm has operated in a 
long-term equilibrium, so that the number of firms is endogenous to the model; (2) the 
performance of the firm can be influenced by the actions of the other market 
participants; (3) the price elasticity of demand, e, is greater than unity, and that there 
is a homogeneous cost structure; and (4) that to obtain the equilibrium output, and the 
equilibrium number of firms, profits are maximised by the firm, and by the industry as 
a whole. That means, first, that bank i maximises it profits where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost (Eq. 3 – where: R’i refers to the marginal revenues and C’i to the 
marginal costs of bank i; xi is the is the output of the bank i; n is the number of banks; 
wi is the vector of exogenous variables that shift the banks revenue function and ti is 
the vector of exogenous variables that shifts the bank’s cost function for the profit-
maximising condition); and secondly, that in equilibrium the zero profit constraint 
holds at the market level (Eq.4, where an asterisk implies an equilibrium condition).   
 
       (3) 
       (4) 
 
Market power is then measured by the extent to which a change – measured by 
the partial derivative in factor input prices (!wki) – is reflected in the equilibrium 
revenues (!R
*
i) earned by the bank i over time. While the measure of competition, (H) 
is defined as the sum of elasticises of the reduced-form revenues with respect to factor 
prices (Eq. 5). The resulting H-statistic serves as a measure of competitive behaviour, 
where: H<0 for monopoly, with each bank operating independently under a monopoly 
profit maximising condition (so that H is a decreasing function of the perceived 
demand elasticity); 0"H"1 for monopolistic competition, or a free entry equilibrium 
(so that H is an increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity); and H=1 for 
perfect competition, a free market equilibrium with full efficient capacity utilisation.   
 
,  where       (5) 
 
In its empirical application, the reduced-form equation of revenues for bank i is 
used, and interpreted to be Eq.6 below. In this, INTR is used as the dependent variable, 
and defined as the ratio of total interest revenue to the total balance sheets, calculated 
as the total balance sheet, proxied for by total assets. AFR is the ratio of annual 
interest expenses to total funds, calculated as total interest expenses divided by net 
income after taxes. PPE is the ratio of personal expenses to the total balance sheet. 
PCE is the ratio of physical capital expenditure – calculated as the summation of total 
non-interest expenses, total interest expenses, total salary expenses and total fixed 
asset expenditure – and other expenses to fixed assets. BSF are bank specific 
exogenous factors, and OI is the ratio of other income to the total balance sheet. To 
this, a linear time trend is then added – as is the common practice in P-R modelling – 
which explicitly addresses the possibility that there exists within the data an overall 
tendency amongst sequences to grow over time. Sequences can trend in the same or 
opposite directions however, and to account for this an exponential trend is also 
included. Such a step is necessary, for ignoring the possibility of trends can lead to the 
false conclusion that changes in one variable are caused by changes in another.   
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InINTR = ! + " InAFR + # InPPE + $ InPCE + %& InBSF + 'OI + µ   (6) 
 
Together, AFR, PPE and PCE can be interpreted as the unit prices of the inputs 
of the bank – funds, labour and capital – and a H-Statistic can be calculated by the 
summation of their coefficients. In order to see whether the competitive structure has 
changed over time, however, and because ignoring such market dynamics may lead to 
imprecise parameter estimates and a biased H, and lead to wrong inferences about the 
nature of the market, the elasticities of H must be multiplied by a continuous time-
curve model exp(!TIME)
5
. The Standard-Approach calculates H as the regression of 
profitability on the independent variables, and in so doing implicitly assumes that the 
profitability of all banks is equally reactive to input prices AFR, PPE and PCE, 
irrespective of the size of the bank. The Alternative-Approach drops this assumption, 
and explicitly addresses the question of size by dividing the market into small, 
medium and large sized banks. The suggestion here is that input processes affect 
different sized banks differently, and therefore regresses a size specific model; the 
result of which will illuminate the significance of size on competition. For robustness, 
we calculate and report both the Standard and Alternative-Approach H-statistics.  
  
Figure 2:  The Market Exit Trend 
 
 
4. RESULTS   
4.1. Concentration   
Figure 2 graphs the number of banks within the sample, and illustrates an 
alarming decline in the size of the industry. Because despite 58 new entries, the 
number of banks drops from 1,086 in 1992, to only 684 in 2001. Fifth wave mergers 
and acquisitions, consolidations, and/or market exits thus cause the number of players 
to skink by 36% within the period, leaving only 623 to have survived unaltered. This 
evidences the suggestion that the fifth wave seriously impacted the banking industry.  
A steep decline in the number of banks implies a steep increase in the levels of 
concentration. Interestingly, however, a look at the K-Bank concentration measure – 
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 This technique is based on Molyneux, P., D.M. Lloyd-Williams and J. Thornton (1994), Competitive conditions 
in European Banking, Journal of Banking and Finance; and more recently the application of Bikker, J.A. and K. 
Haaf (2002), Concentration, Competition and their Relationship, Journal of Banking and Finance  
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which concerns itself with the concentration of the markets larger players – finds little 
evidence to suggest that the increase occurred amongst the industries largest banks.  
 
Figure 3: K-Bank Concentration Ratios  
Figure 3a: (Left) C3 in Each of the Four Loan Markets 




Figure 4: HHI Concentration Ratios  
Figure 4a: (Left) HHI in Each of the Four Loan Markets 




The K-Bank is calculated for each of the five loan markets, for the 3, 5, 10, 15 
and 20 largest banks. Figure 3a depicts the C3 concentration in the real estate 
(RE_C3), commercial (C_C3), consumer (P_C3), agricultural (A_C3) and total loans 
markets (T_C3). Figure 3b shows the C3, C5, C10, C15 and C20 for consumer loans.  
In general – and with the exception of the consumer loans market, which holds 
approximately constant – we observe a decline in overall concentration. Given that 
the market consolidated, and contracted by some 36% within the period, this suggests 
that the consolidation illustrated by Figure 2 did not occur amongst the larger banks, 
but – by implication – amongst the small and/or medium sized banks. Furthermore, 
we note a drastic decrease in the levels of concentration, beginning in the year 2000. 
Given that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 came into effect at the same time, 
and reduced the barriers to consolidation, and allowed mergers among banks, 
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securities firms and insurance companies, we suggest that it is this (de)regulation that 
is responsible for this dramatic change in the structure of the banking industry.  
A similar picture emerges from the results of the HHI, which is again calculated 
for each of the five loan markets. Figure 4a depicts the results for HHI concentrations 
in the real estate (RE_HHI), commercial (C_HHI), consumer (P_HHI), agricultural 
(A_HHI) and total loans markets (T_HHI). Figure 4b isolates consumer loans. 
 In these a number of points are noteworthy. Firstly, it is evident that the 
patterns illustrated by the K-Bank are only very approximately mirrored by the HHI. 
The asymmetry implies that the larger banks in the industry reacted very differently to 
those in the mid-to-lower end of the competitive spectrum. Secondly, it is evident that 
the incline in the HHI is much steeper in the period 1991 to 1995 than in the K-Bank 
for the same period. As the HHI is concerned with the total market, while the K-Bank 
is limited to the bigger players, this suggests that concentration increased amongst the 
smaller and medium sized bank market during this period at a far greater rate than 
amongst the larger banks. Thirdly, it is interesting to note that according to the HHI, 
concentration increased and then declined in most markets – with the noticeable 
exception of the consumer loans market (P_HHI) – not in 2000 as was suggested by 
the K-Bank, but rather in 1995. Thus, we suggest that while the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999 effected the concentration of large firm, by reducing the barriers to 
consolidation, the average market, as measured by the HHI, is more significantly 
impacted by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (1994). 
This eliminated many of the geographical constraints on banking organisations, and 
allowed banks to establish branch networks within and, in some cases, across state 
lines (Hannan and Prager, 2009). It, we suggest, was the (de)regulatory event which 
dramatically changed the structure of the banking industry in the mid-1990s. Finally it 
is interesting to note that, until the 2001 ‘concentration crash’, and whether the HHI 
or the K-Bank is used, consumer banking was the most actively consolidated market.  
4.2. Competition   
4.2.1 The Structual Models 
The empirical SCP is estimated according to the specifications of Eq. 3, and 
uses a log of the firms’ ROA as a dependent variable. Table 2 reports estimated 
coefficients for the CE, RISK, LIQ and MKT variables, and both the K-Bank and the 
HHI concentration indices are used as indicators of market structure.  
This table is to be read as the regression results of six different SCP models, 
each of which utilises a different measure of concentration. The measures are 
identified on the horizontal, and the details of each variable are reported in the vertical. 
The R
2
 and the adjusted R
2
 for each model are reported at the end of the row.  
Before discussing the significance of these results, three checks are necessary. 
Firstly, and as the SCP is in the log-log form, the suitability of this specification must 
be checked, to ensure the non-negativity of the variables included
6
. A quick look at 
the data, however, illustrates that all variables are positive in their level form. 
Secondly, we check that the full spectrum of observations is used, with no missing 
variables, to ensure unbiased results. Again, a quick inspection of the data shows that 
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 A log-log model assumes that neither the dependent nor the independent variables are negative; a clearly 
unrealistic assumption which negates the possibility that variables such as ROA and CE are negative which could 
biases the results towards success. This is a serious flaw of the log-log specification of the SCP – and one which is 
broadly ignored on application in the empirical antitrust literature. Fortunately in this case, all exogenous and 
endogenous variable are positive, and so we can interpret the log-log specification with confidence.  
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while this is not a problem for ROA, CE, MKT and LIQ, it is a problem for RISK. To 
correct for this, the missing values in the log of RISK are therefore replaced with a 
zero value. Finally, and with these assurances, we consider the ‘goodness of fit’, and 
see that for all measures more than 53% of the variation is explained. Adjusting for 
sample size, similar results are reported by the Adj R
2
, which confirms the robustness 




 (0.2477 and 0.2441 respectively) are 
returned by models (not reported here) that employ the firm’s Return on Equity as the 
dependent variable, and in so doing justifying our choice of dependent variable. 
 











































































* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (t-values in parenthesis) 
 
 
Turning now to the results, we discern a number of interesting outcomes. Firstly, 
we see that the coefficients on all concentration ratios are positive and significant at 
the 1% level, which implies that concentration is extremely important in explaining 
performance. In a log-log specification the coefficients can be interpreted as the 
elasticities of the dependent with respect to the independent explanatory variables
7
. 
Thus, the suggestion from Table 2 is that a one percent increase in concentration 
would improve the firms’ performance between 7.53% and 24.59%. This evidences 
the existence of a large degree of market power within the industry, and suggests that 
the attainment of market power is a legitimate merger motive.  
Of the two concentration measures, the results of the K-Bank tend to the higher 
end of the spectrum. A one percent increases in the concentration of the top 3 banks 
increases profitability in the segment by 13.49%, by 15.88% for the top 5, by 18.44% 
for the top 10, by 21.88% for the top 15, and by 24.29% for the top 20. A positive and 
significant relationship between concentration and profitability is, however, be 
expected. A high R
2
 and Adj R
2
, particularly in the case of the C3 and C5, suggests 
that the coefficients in each and all of these models can be readily relied upon. Similar 
– albeit lower – results are reported by the model that employs the HHI concentration 
ratio, which shows that a one percent increases in the concentration of banks – across 
the market and irrespective of size – increases firm profitability by 7.53%. 
Positive and significant results in both measures allows us to conclude that 
concentration significantly affects performance. The difference between the two 
measures, however, suggests that the incentives to consolidate differ, and are larger 
for the larger banks. This is an important finding, and a contribution from the SCP.  
                                                      
7
 Wooldridge, J, (2003), Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, Thomson 
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The results of the SCP suggest, however, that while the benefits of 
concentration are large, concentration does not fully explain performance differences. 
The second observation we make from the results of the SCP is that the coefficients 
on CE, RISK and MKT are also significant at the one-percent level. In the C5 model, 
in particular, the suggestion is that a one-percent increase in the firm’s cost efficiency, 
liquidity and market demand causes profitability to increase by 28.66%, 36.81% and 
6.35% respectively. And while such results might be expected for cost efficiency, the 
high impact of RISK, and the relatively low impact of MKT are surprising. The 
symmetry between these and the results of the HHI model, however, are to be 
expected, as only the concentration measure varies between the two models.  
4.2.2 The Non-Structual Models 
The Panzar-Rosse (P-R) model is calculated in a log-log specification. And, like 
the SCP, the model is first checked robustness – in that all observation are included in 
the regression, and all variables are non-negative  – before the results are interpreted.  
 
Figure 4: The Panzar-Rosse Output  
Figure 4a: The Standard Approach H-Statistic 





The P-R model is calculated under the assumption that the number of banks is 
exogenous to the model, and that each bank is profit maximising. Implicitly, it also 
assumes that all banks are uniformly affected by input prices. To ensure the validity 
of the model, the latter – potentially unreasonable – assumption must be tested
8
. 
To do so, we first estimate the H-Statistic according to the Standard-Approach 
– which holds that inputs affect all banks symmetrically – and then compare the 
results of this to those of the Alternative-Approach – which is size sensitive to inputs, 
and calculated on the basis of a division of the market into small, medium and banks
9
. 
Figure 4 graphs the results for both the Standard and Alternative H-Statistics, for the 
consumer (P) and total loans (T) markets. From it we see that uniformity is not the 
case: banks do not respond symmetrically to input prices. This invalidates the 
                                                      
8
 It seems especially unreasonable to make this assumption of uniformity after our discussion of the results of the 
K-Bank and the HHI above. Both of these concentration indices suggested that larger and smaller banks react to 
their environments – albeit it their legislative environments in this case – differently. On the basis of reasonable 
doubt, we believe that further investigation of input prices is justified here.   
9
 Banks in the lower 30
th
 percentile of the distribution are defined as being small, banks in the largest 30
th
 are said 
to be large, and those in the middle are defined as being medium. 
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assumptions of the Standard Model, and consequently, we move forward in our study 
with the use to the Alternative H-Statistic. The results of this are reported in Table 3.  
 





















































* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (t-values in parenthesis) 
 
 
As with the SCP, this is to be read as the output of four individual regression 
models, each of which is identified on the rows, with the variables described in the 
columns. The Alternative-Approach H-Statistic is calculated as the sum of the 
coefficients (AFR + PPE + PCE) times exp(!TIME). From Table 3 we see that the 
coefficient on AFR is almost uniformly negative and invariably insignificant, that 
PPE is positive, highly significant and is the largest contributor to H, and that PCE is 
less important but again positive and highly significant. These coefficients are then 
multiplied by the continuous time-curve exp(!TIME), the effect of which is to 
produces a H-statistic for each market and for each year. The result of this calculation 
are presented in Table 4, for the small, medium and large divisions, as well as the 
total market, for both the consumer loans (P) and total loans (T) market. And, based 
on prior research, the results of H are interpreted to lie on the interval [0,1], as a 
continuous measure of the level of competition, in the sense that higher value of H 
indicates a higher level of competition than a lower value of H (Vesala, 1995).  
The results reported for H in the aggregate market (H_All_T) suggests that it is 
neither characterised by a state of perfect cartel (H=0), nor by one of perfect 
competition (H=1). Monopolistic competition characterises the total loans market.  
 
Table 4: H-Statistics 
 
 Total Loans Consumer Loans 
 H-Small H-Med H-Large H-All H-Small H-Med H-Large H-All 
1992 0.514 0.710 0.586 0.607 0.937 0.284 0.460 0.607 
1993 0.490 0.678 0.567 0.580 0.892 0.273 0.438 0.580 
1994 0.489 0.678 0.569 0.581 0.891 0.274 0.439 0.581 
1995 0.502 0.700 0.587 0.599 0.919 0.281 0.454 0.599 
1996 0.502 0.699 0.587 0.600 0.917 0.281 0.455 0.600 
1997 0.504 0.699 0.588 0.601 0.920 0.282 0.456 0.601 
1998 0.500 0.697 0.583 0.597 0.917 0.279 0.454 0.591 
1999 0.495 0.688 0.578 0.591 0.899 0.242 0.450 0.598 
2000 0.503 0.695 0.590 0.602 0.917 0.288 0.457 0.602 
2001 0.487 0.677 0.555 0.586 0.884 0.275 0.446 0.586 
 
 
The picture becomes slightly more diverse, and the results more interesting, 
when the market is split into segments. Because then it can be seen that, although the 
same general trends exist amongst segments, the scale of the competitive forces varies 
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significantly. In the total loans market, and with an average H of 0.498 amongst the 
small banks (H_Small_T), 0.692 amongst the medium banks (H_Medium_T) and 
0.579 amongst the larger banks (H_Large_T), the implication is that small local banks 
encounter less steep competition in providing their services than medium sized banks 
and larger banks. Such a finding is, however, rather intuitive. What is interesting from 
the results, though, is the fact that medium banks face more competition in their 
market than even larger banks. While it is possible that such a result could be due to 
the larger proportion of the banks in this market – due to subjective definition of 
market size employed in this model – the result by itself is not counter-intuitive. 
Larger banks, providing specialised and differentiated services could easily be 
expected to face less competition in their chosen product market; making the 
predictions of the model economically reasonable. Figure 5 graphs the H presented on 
Table 4 over time, and allows us to draw a number of additional insights.  
 




Firstly, it appears that the different segments of the market face different levels 
of competition dependent upon their economic size, a fact represented in this diagram 
by the variation of heights of the H trends off the x-axis. Secondly, it appears that the 
same competitive trends are depicted for each segment, and for each time frame, 
almost as extensions of each other. Thus, despite the fact that the medium-sized 
banking market for total loans (H_Medium_T) is more competitive than that of both 
the small-banking segment (H_Small_T) and the large-bank market (H_Large_T) for 
total loans, the competitive in all three of these markets have not significantly altered 
over time. Corresponding results have been produced for the consumer loans market, 
although here the differences between the level of competitive forces in the small 
(H_Small_P) and medium (H_Medium_P) are extremely exaggerated. Interestingly, 
too the aggregate H produced for total loans markets (H_All_T) is exactly equal to the 
aggregate produced for the consumer loans market (H_All_P).  
From these results we see that, despite the ferocity of the market exit trend 
illustrated in Figure 1, and despite the huge changes in the levels of market 
concentration brought about by the enacting of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (1994) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, our 
results suggest that competition has not changed throughout the period. This finding 
implies that the level of competition between banks is derived irrespective of the 
absolute number of competitors, despite the incentives to consolidate. The almost 
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linear levels of competition reported by Figure 5 suggest, in fact, that banks appear to 
operate virtually independently of the regulatory market forces, to merge efficiently.  
5. DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS  
In this paper we employ two measures, and data on the banking industry both 
before and after the deregulation of the 1990s, to consider the effects of this natural 
experiment on the competitive structure of the industry. We argue that, in the face of 
deregulation, a reduction in the levels of competition – as opposed to numbers of 
competitors, or the levels of concentration – would provide evidence that the wave 
was motivated by the attainment of market power, whereas a reduction in the number 
of competitors, and a non-negative change in competition would evidence efficiency. 
We explore the motives behind the banking merger wave, and in the process find:  
1. That the Fifth Merger Wave significantly impacted the US banking industry  
We find evidence that the ‘fifth merger wave’ significantly impacted the US 
banking industry, with mergers and acquisitions, consolidations, and/or market 
exits causing a 36% decrease in the number of competitors within the period. 
Of the 1,086 banks in our sample, only 623 survived the wave unaltered.  
2. That the market consolidated from the bottom up, not the top down, and that 
consumer loans was the most actively consolidated market during the period.  
An analysis of market concentration, using the K-Bank measure, suggests that 
the consolidation which occurred in the period did not occur amongst the 
larger banks but, by implication, amongst the small and medium sized ones. A 
look at the results of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is 
concerned with concentration in the total market, confirms this, and further 
suggests that rate of concentration amongst the smaller banks was greater 
during the period. Furthermore, we see that, until 2001, and whether the HHI 
or the K-Bank is used, the consumer banking market was the most actively 
consolidated market. While its concentration rose steadily there throughout the 
period, most other markets declined. This an interesting result.  
3. That concentration significantly impacts bank performance, that market power 
exists, but that the gains from operative synergies trump collusive synergies  
The results of the SCP – which, explains performance as a function of a set of 
market structure variables, a set of demand variables, and a set of firm specific 
control variables – suggests that concentration impacts performance. We find 
that a one percent increase in concentration improves bank performance by an 
average of 7.53%. This not only suggests that there is a large degree of market 
power within the industry, but that the attainment of market is a legitimate 
merger motive, which could be used to explain the fifth merger wave. The 
finding that a one percent increase in the firms cost efficiency increases 
performance by 28.66%, however, suggests that ‘operative’ synergies are a far 
greater source of gain, and a far more likely driver of the merger wave.  
4. That larger banks benefit more from concentration than their smaller rivals 
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The results of the K-Bank tend to the higher end of the performance spectrum, 
with a one percent increases in the concentration amongst the C10, for 
example, increasing performance by 18.44%. The results of the model using 
the size-insensitive HHI, by contrast, reports that, industry wide, a one percent 
increases in the concentration increases bank profitability by 7.53%. The 
difference between the two measures suggests that the incentives to 
consolidate differ, that bigger banks are more capable at attaining market 
power synergies, and that the incentives to capture market share are therefore 
larger for the bigger banks. Given that the results of the K-Bank and HHI 
suggest that the consolidation which occurred within the period was primarily 
amongst the smaller players, this again suggests that market power was not the 
driving force behind the consolidation which occurred in the fifth wave.   
5. That the industry is characterised by monopolistic competition 
The results for H-Statistic suggest that the banking market is characterised by 
monopolistic competition. When we split the market into segments, however, 
we find that the scale of the competitive forces varies significantly. Small, 
local banks, are seen to encounter less steep competition in providing their 
services than medium sized banks and larger banks. Such a finding is, 
however, rather intuitive. Especially when we take previously discussed 
incentives to consolidate into account. What is interesting from the results, 
however, is the fact that the medium sized banks face more competition in 
their market than even larger banks. And while it is possible that such a result 
could be due to the larger proportion of the banks in this market – due to 
subjective definition of market size employed in this model – the result by 
itself is not counter-intuitive. Larger banks, we suggest, providing specialised 
and differentiated services may face less competition in their chosen product 
market; thus making the predictions of the model economically reasonable.  
6. Despite the consolidation, and the incentives, competition has not decreased  
We see that, despite the increases in concentration, and despite the incentives 
(in particular for the larger players) to consolidate and to act ant competitively, 
the levels of competition within the banking industry did not change across the 
period of the fifth wave. This finding not only implies that the level of 
competition between banks within the banking industry is derived irrespective 
of the absolute number of competitors, but again suggests that the attainment 
of market power was not a major merger motive for this wave. The finding 
that 463 of the 1,086 banks in our sample could disappear, within the ten year 
period of our analysis, without negatively impacting the levels of competition, 
suggests that they were most likely acquired for ‘operative’ reasons. And the 
findings of the SCP, which recognises the gains to consolidation, while 
demonstrating the superior gains available to ‘operative’ motives, such as, for 
example, increased cost efficiency, supports this suggestion. As such, this 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that acquisition serves to transfer 
assets from poorly managed firm, to better performing and more efficient ones 
(e.g., Amel and Rhoades, 1989; Moore, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000) 
7. That regulation effects concentration, but not competition  
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Contrasting the results of the HHI and the K-Bank suggests that that while 
concentration amongst the larger banks increased and then declined in the year 
2000, concentrations in the more general banking market – with the noticeable 
exception of the consumer loans market – started in 1995. The implication 
here is that the introduction of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act in 1994 drastically altered the concentration 
amongst smaller banks, and that the bigger banks remained unaffected until 
2001, when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 took effect. The effects are 
not, however, seen when we turn to the P-R Model; the virtually linear levels 
of the H-Statistic reported by Figure 5 suggests that while regulation may 
have effected concentration, it did not effect competition. The banks in our 
sample, it is suggested, thus operate virtually independent of regulatory forces 
and intervention. Such a finding is an important one, given the current 
discussions on the nature of the industry and the necessity of regulation.  
6. CONCLUSIONS  
Using data on the US banking industry, the aim of this paper is to understand 
what motivated the post-deregulatory consolidation that was observed in the 1990s; 
efficiency, in the absence of oppressive regulation, or competitive abuse in (what was 
to become) an under-regulated market? We employ two measures, and data on the 
number of competitors both before and after the deregulatory events, to consider the 
effects of this natural experiment on the competitive structure of the industry.  
We argue that a reduction in the levels of competition would provide prima 
facie evidence that, at least amongst the banking industry, the fifth merger wave was 
motivated by the attainment of market power, whereas a reduction in the number of 
competitors, and a non-negative change in competition would evidence efficiency.  
We began by overviewing the general literature on merger waves and gains, and 
the specific literature on banking mergers. We then described a number of complex 
methodological tools to measure the market and the competitive conditions within it. 
And after applying these to a sample of 1,144 observations, spanning ten years and 
five banking markets, we came to a number of interesting and important conclusions. 
 We found, firstly, that while the ‘fifth wave’ significantly impacted the number 
of competitors in the market, and caused a 36% contraction, it did not significantly 
impact the levels of competition. Despite the 463 mergers, acquisitions and market 
exists, we found that competition remained relatively constant across the period.  
Secondly, we found that while the incentives to act anti-competitively are 
significant – and rise in their significance with the size of the players involved – that 
‘operative’ synergies, in the form of increased cost efficiency, for example, trump 
those available to collusive gains. We suggested, therefore, that while market power 
could motivate a merger wave, in general, the attainment of operative synergies is far 
more likely cause. Because we find that the consolidations which occurred in the fifth 
wave occurred primarily between the smaller players – with the least to gain from 
increased market power – we conclude, however, the fifth wave was more likely 
driven by efficiency amongst the smaller players, than by marker power gains.  
Finally, and while we find evidence to suggest that regulation and external 
interference may effect the levels of concentration – and may therefore appear to 
positively effect the competitive structure of an industry – we find no evidence to 
suggest that regulation directly effects competition. Given the current discussions on 
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the necessity of regulation, particularly in the case of the US banking industry, this is, 
we suggest, a important finding with potentially significant policy implications.  
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APPENDIX – BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
FIXED ASSETS: 
01) Premises & Fixed Assets 




03) Intangible Assets 
04) Total Loans & Leases =  
Real-Estate Loans   
+ Agricultural Loans   
+ Commercial Loans   
+ Consumer Loans 
05) Net Income After Taxes & Extraordinary Items =  
 Net Interest Income 
 = Total Interest Income 
         – Total Interest Expenses 
+ Net non-interest income 
  = Total non-Interest Income  
      – Total non-Interest Expenses 
– Total Interest Expenses  
   = Transaction Account Interest Expenses  
       + Non-transaction account interest expenses  
       + interest on time deposits  
– Total non-Interest Expenses  
= Salary and Employee Benefits 
+ Expenses of Premises & Fixed Assets 
+ Total Loan Charge-offs 
– Total Recoveries on Loans 
= Total Current Assets 
 
CURRENT LIABILITIES  
 06) Provisions for Loan Losses 
 07) Allowances for Loan Losses 
 08) Total Transaction Accounts 
 09) Total Non-Transaction Accounts 
 = Total Liabilities 
 
EQUITY  
10) Total Equity Capital  
11) Total Securities 
+ US Government Securities   
12) Total Deposits  
+ Non-Interest Bearing Deposits 
13) Non-Deposit Funds 









CHAPTER FOUR – MERGER PURPOSE 
 
“Most observers agree that mergers are driven by a complex pattern of motives,  
and that no single approach can render a full account.  
But knowing that the world is complex cannot  








CHAPTER FOUR –MERGER PURPOSE 
MERGER MOTIVES AND THE REALISATION OF GAINS*1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The extent to which the attainment of ‘synergies’ plays a role in motivating 
mergers is subject to an intense and long-standing debate (Andrade et al., 2001) 2.  
The theories of hubris (Roll, 1986), risk diversification (Amihud and Lev, 
1981), reputation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), herding (Devenow and Welch, 1996), 
entrenchment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) and empire building (Marris, 1963) suggest 
that most mergers are motivated by managerial interests. But perhaps the most 
testable and widely accepted of these is Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis.  
Jensen (1986) suggests that as the level of free cash flow (FCF) – that is, the 
level of liquidity in excess of the investment required to fund positive net present 
value projects – increases, so too does the degree of managerial discretion. Excess 
liquidity, it is argued, provides managers with the opportunity to make self-serving 
acquisitions (Jensen, 1986), and so magnifies any agency issues that may already be 
present. Indeed, several empirical studies have demonstrated that financial slack has a 
directly negative relation with acquirer returns (see e.g., Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 
1991, Schlingemann, 2004, Smith and Kim, 1994; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  
Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis is thought to apply generally. We suggest, however, 
that the moderating effects of liquidity are likely to be more clearly visible in some 
merger motives than in others. That is the central assertion of this paper. 
To account for this suggestion, we first build upon the contributions of 
Chatterjee (1986), Houston et al. (2001), and Devos et al (2008) and identify four 
distinct merger motives, namely: ‘strengthen existing operations’, ‘product 
diversifications’, ‘geographic expansion’, and the ‘cutting of costs’. Then, using 
Thomson Reuters’ SDC mergers and acquisitions database, and a set of 3,257 U.S. 
mergers announced between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2006, we estimate the 
relationship between merger announcement and abnormal acquirer returns with an 
event study methodology. Finally, and having established the resultant ‘purpose-
performance’ relation, we interact each of the four merger motives with the acquirers’ 
free cash flow, in order to study the moderating effects of excess liquidity.  
We find: (1) that most mergers are expansionary. Our results show that ‘product 
diversification’ and ‘geographic expansion’ are not only two of the most commonly 
announced merger motives, but also that they are most likely to be the only 
announced reason for a takeover. In contrast, we find that ‘cost reduction’ is more 
typically announced as part of a bundle of motives, while ‘market share’ motives are 
typically announced as a secondary purpose. (2) We see that shareholders are not 
convinced of the synergies that these expansionary motives claim to generate. In fact, 
we find strong evidence that ‘product diversification’ and ‘geographic expansion’ are 
each associated with significantly lower announcement returns. (3) We find, however, 
                                                
1
* By Killian J McCarthy, and Utz Weitzel (Nov 2010). A version of this paper was presented at the 
2009 SOM PhD Conference, Groningen, (March 2009) 
2
 We uses the terms ‘merger’, ‘acquisition’, ‘takeover’ and ‘M&A’ synonymously. 
 
72 
that some expansionary motives are received favorably, if the acquirer has sufficient 
levels of excess liquidity. This applies in particular to geographical expansion and 
suggests that liquidity is seen as a necessary condition for firms seeking a flexible and 
efficient expansion. (4) Because we find support for agency effects in general, our 
results support but qualify Jensen’s (1986) FCF hypothesis, by providing evidence for 
positive moderator effects of slack. Finally, (5) we find that it is important to take 
multiple motives into account when assessing performance, as the average merger is 
motivated by a bundle of reasons, and the predictive power of each motive in isolation 
is actually quite limited. In fact, we find that geographic expansion is the only one of 
our merger motives that consistently predicts poor performance amongst mergers.  
In doing so, this paper contributes to our understanding of which mergers work 
and why, and enhances our understanding of the role of liquidity. Section Two 
introduces the literature and builds hypotheses on merger motives and the moderating 
role of excess liquidity. Section Three introduces the data and methods employed in 
the paper, Section Four presents the results, and Section Five discusses theses.  
2. HYPOTHESES  
2.1. On the Origin of Gains  
The origin of merger gains is the subject to a long-standing debate. And yet only 
a few studies examine the relationship between merger motives and acquirer returns.  
In one of the earliest, Chatterjee (1986) identifies three merger motives, 
namely: the attainment of ‘operative’, ‘financial’, and ‘collusive’ gains, which are 
attainable, it is suggested, by horizontal mergers within the same industry. Houston et 
al. (2001) focuses specifically on the ‘operative’ measures – broadly defined as 
measures to increase efficiencies or revenues – and splits the mergers in his sample 
into two, which are classified as measures to ‘expand revenue’, or ‘reduce cost’. 
Krishnan et al. (2007) distinguish between three motives, namely: the attainment of 
‘market power’, ‘cost reduction’ and ‘complimentarity’, which are understood to be 
an expansion into new products or regions. Finally, and most recently, Devos et al. 
(2008) develops a two-stage approach, which builds on all of these, by first comparing 
‘operative’ synergies and ‘market power gains’, and then splitting operative synergies 
into mergers designed to: ‘increase operating profits’ or ‘reduce investments’.  
We identify four motives in our study: (1) ‘strengthening existing operations’; 
(2) ‘product diversification’; (3) ‘geographic expansion’; and (4) cost-cutting. As four 
sources of gains, we develop hypotheses on each of these in this section.  
2.1.1 Strengthening Existing Operations 
At the highest level, mergers can be used to explore new markets and new 
product potential, or to build upon and strengthen existing market operations. A 
horizontal merger – between firms in the same industry – is therefore said to be an 
‘exploitative’ merger. ‘Explorative’ mergers are mergers that expand the firm into 
new products, technologies and geographical regions (Dosi et al., 1990), and in doing 
so ‘disrupt and destroy the firms existing competences’ (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). 
‘Exploitative’ mergers, by contrast, see the firm ‘stick to what it knows’, by 
exploiting it’s existing resources, and by refining it’s existing technologies (March, 
1991; Nooteboom, 1999), and as such are relatively cheaper and less risky. 
Exploitative mergers produce more immediate and tangible gains by directly 
‘enhanc[ing] the value of [the firms] existing competences’ (Abernathy & Clark, 
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1985), and research has shown that firms that exploit their ‘competencies’, and 
strengthen their existing market operations, enjoy positive abnormal returns (Rumelt, 
1974; Montgomery, 1979; Bettis, 1981). Explorative mergers have ‘less certain 
outcomes, longer time horizons, and more diffuse effects’ (March, 1991), and are 
typically therefore found to destroy value (Weston et al., 2004; Mukherjee et al., 
2004; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988). Because of this – and from a competencies point of 
view – we suspect that horizontal mergers, which seek to strengthen the firms 
operations, will be better received by shareholders, and will out-perform those of an 
explorative nature in an unrelated industry.  
A merger between two firms in a related industry can also reduce competition, 
however, and may allow a newly merged firm to increase the prices it charges its 
customers. The resultant wealth transfer – from the firm’s customers and suppliers to 
its shareholders – can produce, it is suggested, an additional gain in the form of 
‘collusive’ synergies. The existence of this redistributive wealth effect is, however, 
still the source of some debate (Martynova and Renneboog, 2003). Mukherjee et al. 
(2004) report that only 4.3% of financial executives are motivated by the attainment 
of ‘increased market power’, and consistent with prior studies (see e.g., Eckbo, 1983), 
Fee and Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005) and Devos et al. (2008) find little evidence 
that mergers lead to increased market power gains. Chatterjee (1986) and Gugler et al. 
(2003), however, show that the average profitable merger significantly increases 
profits through the attainment collusive synergies, and Kim and Singal (1993), and 
more recently Sapienza (2002), evidence changes in the product prices charged by 
acquirers after a merger, in studies of both the airline and banking industries.  
A merger between firms in the same industry will therefore, we suggest, 
produce positive gains, either in the form of increased competency, or collusive 
synergies, or both. In either case, the announcement of such a merger should be well 
received by the market. Thus:  
Hypo 1: Mergers aimed at strengthening the firms existing operations will be 
positively related with acquisition returns. 
2.1.2 Product Diversification 
A merger which expands into new products and services (hereafter products) is 
said to be an explorative merger, and is described as a ‘diversification’.  
Diversification was once thought to generate value (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008), as the conglomerate structure: (a) reduces earnings variability (Lewellen, 
1971) and the risk of bankruptcy (Higgins and Schall, 1975; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992); and (b) allows the firm to sidestep imperfections in the external capital market 
(Williamson, 1970; Bhide, 1990; Hubbard and Palia, 1999), while sustaining a higher 
level of leverage (Lewellen, 1971). It is now recognized, however, that diversification 
is not costless (Datta et al., 1991); a large number of studies document poor 
performance for diversifying mergers. Diversification creates: (a) increased control 
and coordination costs (Jones and Hill, 1988); (b) bargaining problems within the firm 
(Rajan et al., 2000); (c) bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998); (d) information 
asymmetries (Williamson, 1967); (e) production inefficiencies (Lancaster, 1990); and 
(f) causes growing strains on top management teams (Grant et al., 1988). These, and 
other internal ‘governance bottlenecks’, increase with the level of diversification (Hitt 
et al., 1994), and destroy shareholder value, to the point that the costs typically 
outweigh the benefits (Lichtenberg, 1992; Liebeskind and Opler, 1993).  
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Furthermore, the ‘managerial theories of the firm’ suggest that diversification 
destroy value, because diversifying mergers are more likely to suffer from agency 
(Baumol, 1962). Diversification, it is suggested, allows managers: (a) to entrench, and 
reduce their human capital risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Schleifer and Vishny, 1989); 
(b) increase their discretion; and (c) build ‘empires’, power and prestige (Mueller, 
1969; Rhoades, 1983). Shleifer and Vishny (1990) suggest that this sort of thinking 
played an important role in motivating the third merger wave (1960-70), and led to the 
creation of inefficient conglomerates, with insufficient incentive to focus on 
shareholder concerns. Because of this, the announcement of a product-diversifying 
merger is often interpreted as being an outgrowth of agency (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). And this places what the literature reefers to as a ‘diversification 
discount factor’ on the acquirer’s returns (Lang and Stulz, 1994).  
A diversifying merger will therefore, it is suggested, destroy shareholder value, 
for strategic or managerial reasons, or both. Consequently, the announcement of such 
a merger will, be poorly received by the market. And this thinking leads us to suggest:  
Hypo 2: Diversifications will be negatively related with acquisition returns.  
2.1.3 Geographic Expansion 
A merger that expands the acquirers’ presence into a new city, state or 
geographical region is said to be an explorative merger, and is described as a 
‘geographic expansion’. Geographic expansions, it is suggested, can be driven by the 
desire to expand the firms’ revenue, or to reduce its costs (Besanko et al., 2006).  
Geographic expansions allow for the realisation of efficiencies in scale 
economies (Markides and Ittner, 1994, Markides and Oyon, December 1991, Morck 
and Yeung, 1991), and for a reduction in purchasing, management, finance, R&D, 
marketing and production costs (Besanko et al., 2006; Markides & Oyon, 1991; 
Morck & Yeung, 1992; Markides & Ittner, 1994). According to these and other 
studies of cross-border mergers, geographic expansion improves the competitive 
standing of the firm – provided that the firms are sufficiently related (Dos et al., 2008) 
– because geographically diverse operations not only benefit from local specialization 
and improved capacity utilization and technical efficiency, but all without necessarily 
giving up their local responsiveness.  
A large number of studies, however, document poor performance for 
geographically expansionary mergers (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Gozzi et al. (2008) 
finds that the Tobin’s Q of a firm decreases after an expansion, and others have shown 
that any gains to such mergers are, at best, ‘transitory’ (Sarkissian and Schill, 2008; 
Levine and Schmukler, 2006). Child et al. (2001) suggests that this may be because 
mergers outside of the home market often face ‘unforeseen and insurmountable 
challenges’. In fact, several studies show that, in an international context, lower 
institutional quality in the host countries negatively affect the frequency, size, and 
performance of cross-border deals (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Weitzel and Berns, 
2006). Roll (1986) suggests that managers pursuing cross-border deals may, however, 
be fully aware of the challenges but, because of ‘hubris’ or over-confidence, may 
simply ‘feel’ that ‘their deal’ will be different. Others are less forgiving. And 
proponents of the ‘managerial theories of the firm’ (Marris, 1963) suggest that cross-
border mergers are often little more than agency driven attempts to grow the firm 
beyond its optimal size, designed to maximize managerial power or prestige, or to 
build empires (Rhoades, 1983; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Indeed, several 
studies find that empire building plays at least some role in expansionary merger 
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decisions (Rhoades, 1983, Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Because a merger which 
expands without a clear link to greater profitability cannot be expected to realize the 
optimal, in terms of positive gains, the announcement of an expansionary merger, it is 
suggested, will be treated skeptically by the market.  
Geographical expansions, like product diversifications, may therefore include a 
substantial ‘diversification discount’. Next to possible agency effects, this captures the 
added complexity and uncertainty of entering regions where the firm has no 
‘geographic core competence’, which together serve to destroy shareholder value. As 
a result, the announcement of such a merger will be poorly received. Thus:  
Hypo 3: Expansionary mergers will be negatively related with acquirer 
returns.  
2.1.4 Cost Reduction 
Finally, a merger designed to create ‘cost synergies’ by eliminating duplication, 
and reduce the firms operating costs, is described as an exploitative merger.  
Previous research suggests that the achievement of such cost synergies is a 
prominent motive for mergers (Devos et al., 2008, Krishnan et al., 2007). One 
explanation is that it is often easier to implement cost reductions than it is to achieve 
revenue enhancements (Carey, 2000). Workforces, for example, are one of the more 
common victims of the cost reduction process, because workforces present one of the 
more significant – and one of the most easily reduced – costs for the firm (Krishnan et 
al., 2007). And although some scholars warn that such downsizing measures may 
unnecessarily erode the firm’s knowledge base (Cascio et al., 1997; Chadwick et al., 
2004; Krishnan et al., 2007), or server to create disgruntled employees (Gutknecht and 
Keys, 1993; Lee, 1997), a large number of studies find a positive relationship between 
downsizing and performance (Bowman and Singh, 1993; Love and Nohria, 2005).  
In mergers, ‘cost reductions’ typically refers more broadly, however, to the 
elimination of redundancies and duplication in related operations (Gaughan, 2007; 
Weston et al., 2004). In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, where fixed R&D 
costs are typically high, this means that laboratories researching identical topics 
(diseases) can be streamlined to cut costs. And the same can be true of consumer 
banking, where one of two branch offices in the same neighborhood may easily be 
closed, so that the other can offer an integrated service.  
Measures aimed at eliminating duplication are widely recognized to create 
positive value (Devos et al., 2008, Bradley et al., 1988, Mulherin and Boone, 2000, 
O'Shaugnessy and Flanagan, 1998). This, coupled with the fact that cost-cutting 
mergers are ‘exploitative’ – and exploitative mergers are thought, in general, to 
‘enhance the value of [the firms] existing competences’ (Abernathy & Clark, 1985) 
and to create positive abnormal returns (Rumelt, 1974; Montgomery, 1979; Bettis, 
1981) – the suggestion is that the announcement of a cost-cutting mergers will be 
well-received by the market. This reasoning leads us to suggest:  
Hypo 4: Cost-cutting mergers will be positively related with merger returns 
2.2. On the Moderating Effects of Financial Slack 
According to many prominent scholars, the impact of a merger on the 
performance of the acquiring firm is, at best, “inconclusive” (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991, Roll, 1986, Sirower, 1997), and at worst “systematic[ally] 
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detrimental” (Dickerson et al., 1997). A number of value-destroying explanations 
have been put forward to explain this finding, ranging from the managerial theories of 
hubris (Roll, 1986) reputation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) and risk diversification 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981), to the theories of entrenchment (Schleifer and Vishny, 
1989), and empire building (Marris, 1963). Perhaps the most widely accepted of these 
is, however, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis.  
In essence, Jensen’s (1986) FCF hypothesis suggests that firms with a higher 
level of free cash – that is, firms whose internal funds are in excess of the investments 
required to fund positive net present value projects – are more likely to make quick 
strategic decisions, and are more likely to engage in large-scale strategic actions with 
less analysis than their cash-strapped peers. High levels of liquidity, it is suggested, 
increase managerial discretion, making it possible for managers to choose poor 
acquisitions when they run out of good ones (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
Moreover, it is suggested that in a ‘cash flush firm’ the other stakeholders will be 
more likely to give management the benefit of the doubt, and to approve acquisition 
plans on the basis of fuzzy and subjective concepts such as managerial ‘instincts’, ‘gut 
feelings’ and ‘intuition’, based on high past and current cash flows (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998). Thus, like the hubris theory (Roll, 1986), the theory of FCF 
suggests that otherwise well-intentioned mangers may also make bad decisions simply 
because the quality of their decisions are less challenged than they would be in the 
absence of excess liquidity. Of course though, as the degree of managerial discretion 
increases in FCF, or in high market valuations (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), so too 
does the opportunity for self-interested managers to pursue self-serving acquisitions 
(Jensen, 2005). And indeed several empirical studies demonstrate this, and show that 
the abnormal share price reaction to takeover announcements by cash-rich bidders is 
negative and decreasing in the amount of FCF held by the bidder (Lang et al., 1991; 
Schlingemann, 2004; Smith and Kim, 1994; Harford, 1999).  
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis is thought to apply generally, to all 
mergers. As discussed in relation to Hypotheses 2 and 3, however, we suggest that 
increased agency costs may be associated with particular merger motives. In other 
words, we suggest that the effects of agency will be more clearly visible in some 
merger motives than in others. For example, the market’s reaction to the 
announcement of a diversification into new regions may, we suggest, be interpreted as 
value-destroying ‘empire building’ or as a value-increasing expansion, contingent on 
the level of financial slack as an indicator of agency costs. We therefore consider the 
consequence and effect of financial slack on the performance of each of the merger 
motives in turn, as measured by acquirer abnormal returns. If agency costs affect all 
motives we would expect there to be a negative moderator effect of free cash flow on 
the returns of each motive. If not, we suspect that its moderating effects will be more 
clearly visible in the expansionary motives exploring new markets and new product.  
Hypo 5: Higher levels of financial slack will negatively moderate the 
relationship between expansionary motive and acquirer returns. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample 
The data against which we test these hypotheses has been made available by 
Thomson Reuters, and published in the form of the SDC merger database.  
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We refine this to include: (1) acquisitions announced between January 1, 2000 
and December 31, 2006; (2) acquisitions completed or withdrawn before January 1, 
2008; (3) acquirers seeking to buy 100% of target shares at announcement; (4) 
acquirers and targets of U.S. origin; (5) acquirers which are publicly listed; (6) deal 
greater than 10 million US$; (7) deal transaction values which are at least 1% of the 
market value of the acquirer (four weeks prior to the announcement); (8) acquisitions 
which do not involve a recapitalization, repurchase of own shares, or a spin-off to 
existing shareholders; (9) acquisitions where neither the acquirer nor the target is fully 
or partially owned by public authorities, such as the U.S. government; (10) where the 
acquirer and the target are not part of the same group (i.e: do not have the same 
ultimate parent); and (11) where none of the financial variables needed for our 
analyses (see below) are missing. In doing so, we create a set of 3,794 merger 
observations.  
 
Table 1: Programming for Merger Motives  




Increas/e/es/ing, Improv/e/es/ing, Expand/es/ing, Strengthen/s/ing, 
Bolster/s/ing, Boost/s/ing, Solidify, Support/ing, Enhanc/e/es/ing, 
Market Share, Operations, Business, Position, Leader(ship), 
Existing, Core, Focus 
Product Diversification New Product(s)/Service(s), Product/Service 
Extension(s)/Expansion(s)m Expand Product(s)/Service(s), 
Product/Service Portfolio(s), Extend/Expand Portfolio(s), Portfolio 
Extension(s)/Expansion(s), Diversify, Diversification(s) 
Geographic Expansion Geographic, Geographical/ly, Region(s), Regional 
Cost-cutting Cost synergy(ies), Duplicate/e/eve/ion, Saving(s), Cut/ting, 
Reduc/e/tion, Efficienc/y/ies, More Efficient, Consolidate/e/ion 
 
3.2. Independent Variables 
As independent variables we create four indicators variables, identifying 
mergers as being motivated by the attainment of: ‘market share’ (MKT); ‘cost saving’ 
(CST); ‘product diversification’ (PROD); and/or ‘geographical expansion’ (GEO).  
We programme these with the assistance of a string variable – provided by the 
SDC –which lists the officially announced motive for the merger makes this possible. 
This states, for example, that “the purpose of the transaction was to broaden the 
geographic reach of Flotek Industries Inc.” We delete 164 cases where only the 
target’s merger motives are mentioned, and 20 cases where the text variable did not 
contain any text at all. We also drop 353 cases where the purpose could not be 
discerned. For example: “the purpose of the transaction was to increase shareholder 
value”. In doing so, we create a final sample of 3,257 observations, and using a 
content coding methodology, program these according to the following process.   
First, and after confirming the accuracy of the SDC variable3, we ‘machine 
code’ for key words relevant to each of the four strategies. Table 1 lists the search 
terms employed. Then, and because these key words were not sufficiently 
discriminating, we manually checked and corrected the results for ‘obvious errors’. 
                                                
3
 We check for accuracy by comparing 100 randomly selected purpose texts with the original press 
releases. We retrieve 94 of these, and in all case the purpose variable reflected a full or partial quotation 
of the merger motive.  
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‘Obvious errors’ occur when an observation is incorrectly coded, because a key word 
is present in the description, but in the wrong context. For example, in searching for 
the keyword ‘operations’ any company with the term ‘operations’ in its name will 
produce a ‘hit’, even if the actual merger motive differs significantly. In this case, the 
indicator variable for the motive ‘strengthening existing operations’ must be manually 
recoded from MKT=1 to MKT=0. Then, we manually checked and corrected for 
‘obvious omissions’. These occur when an observation is incorrectly coded, because a 
key word is not present in the description. For example, when a merger specifically 
mentions a geographical location – such as the ‘the Western states’ or the ‘New York 
area’ – the automated process will, clearly, not produce a positive result. In these 
situations the indicator variable must therefore be manually recoded to GEO=1.4 
3.3. Dependent Variable 
We hypothesize that the merger motive is related to abnormal acquirer returns, 
which we proxy for performance. We follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard 
event study methodology in measuring performance, computing cumulated abnormal 
returns (CARs) for the 21-day period (-20, 1) around the announcement date. We start 
20 business days (4 weeks) before the announcement to include pre-bid run-ups 
(Schwert, 1996). And following Fuller et al. (2002) and Dong et al. (2006), we 




Here, ARi is the acquirer i’s abnormal return, winsorized between 1% and 
99%, ri is the stock return on acquirer i, and rm is the return of the S&P 500 market 
index. Since our sample includes frequent bidders, we do not estimate market 
parameters based on a time period before each bid because there is a high probability 
that previous merger attempts would be included in the estimation. This would make 
beta estimations less meaningful (Fuller et al., 2002). 
3.4. Model Specification  




where ARi,j,t = acquirer i’s abnormal return in taking over target j in year t 
 Pi,j,t = a dummy variable indicating diversification as merger motive 
 Gi,j,t = a dummy variable indicating geographic expansion as merger motive 
 Ci,j,t = a dummy variable indicating cost saving as merger motive 
 Mi,j,t = a dummy variable indicating the ‘strengthening existing operations’ as 
merger motive 
Fi,t-1 = a vector with firm-specific control variables for acquirer i and target j 
in year t-1 (described below) 
 Di,j,t = a vector with transaction-specific control variables for the deal 
between acquirer i and target j in year t (described below) 
! = a normally distributed error term. 
                                                
4




In all estimations we control for unobserved effects by including year 
dummies. We correct for possible correlations within the acquirers’ industries by 
clustering at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code industry level, 
according to Froot (1989) and Wooldridge (2002), and adjust all reported standard 
errors for heteroskedasticity using the Huber (1967) and White (1980) sandwich 
estimator (or ‘robust estimation’) of variance.  
3.5. Moderator Variable   
We follow Davis and Stout (1992), and use acquirer operating cash flow, 
normalized to acquirer total assets (both available from SDC), to calculate the firms 
free cash flow. This variable, as well as all other financial or accounting variables 
below, refers to the period of the last four quarters before the announcement, and is 
winzorised between 1% and 99%. 
3.6. Control Variables   
Because an extensive literature shows that several firm- and deal-specific 
characteristics are related to merger performance (King et al., 2004), we include a 
number of control variables (in vectors Fi,t-1 and Di,j,t) in the base specification.  
We include: (1) the acquirer’s market value in our model, 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement (in billion US$), because Moeller et al. (2004) show that acquirers size 
matters. (2) We compute a leverage variable, by dividing acquirer total debt by 
acquirer total assets, because Jensen (1986) shows that debt reduces agency, and Hitt 
et al. (1998) shows that leverage affects the outcome of acquisitions. (3) We create an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is a public company, because Officer (2007) 
and Chang (1998) provide evidence that acquirer returns differs from public to private 
targets. (5) We control for the total consideration paid for the acquisition (in billion 
US$), because Moeller et al. (2005) show that relatively few large loss-making deals 
contributed significantly to the low average performance of mergers, and because 
Carline et al. (2002) shows that deal value is a significant characteristic when 
explaining firm performance. (6) We include the number of bidders in the takeover 
contest, and use an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target’s board officially rejects 
the takeover bid, because both have been found to impact acquirer returns (Betton and 
Eckbo, 2000; Schwert). (7) We include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the SDC 
reports that the acquisition was made by tender offer, because tender offers are found 
to be positively related with acquirer returns (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). (8) Because 
takeover bids that are not completed can be negatively related to acquirer 
announcement returns (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Chatterjee, 1992), we include an 
indicator variable which equals 1 if the SDC reports them as ‘withdrawn’. And finally 
(9) because mergers in the same industry are found to be more profitable (Gaughan, 
2007; Chatterjee, 1986), we compute an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target and 
acquirer share the same primary two-digit SIC code.  
3.7. Sample Description   
Table 2 reports the number and type of mergers, by motive. We can see that 
‘product expansion’ and ‘market share’ are the most frequently announced merger 
motives. Also, we see that an increasing number of mergers were announced, 
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beginning 2004; rising from about 400 to 600 per annum. DePamphilis’(2008) 
suggests that this is evidence of a ‘sixth merger wave’, which began around this time.   
 
Table 2: Number of Merger Motives per Year.  
  
 
Table 3: Merger Motives per Industry 
 
 
Table 3 provides a break-down of merger purposes at the industry level. From 
it we can see: (1) that the number of mergers differs significantly between industries 
(from 1,057 in manufacturing to 5 in agriculture); and (2), because the number of 
announced purposes is significantly higher (4,961) than the number of mergers 
(3,257), that the average merger is announced with more than one motive. The 
average merger, in fact, has 1.5 motives. Figure 1 plots the relative importance of the 
individual motives across industries. From it we see that product expansion dominates 
in agriculture, manufacturing and services, while geographic expansion play a strong 
role in construction and financial services (ex insurance and real estate), and cost-
cutting has a universal but less significant appeal. Table 4 shows that up to four 
merger purposes can be announced at any one time. For less than half of all mergers 
only one motive is recorded, two purposes are announced in 44% of cases, and only 
11% of mergers are pursued with three or four concurrent motives.  
The last four columns of Table 4 provide a break-down of the individual 
motives per class of concurrent announcements. Here, two contrasting distributions 
across classes can be detected. Firstly, the motives to expand into new products or 
regions seem to be ‘primary purposes’, which are relatively frequent when only one or 
two motives are announced. Contrasting this, cost reduction seems to be typically 
announced as a ‘secondary purpose’. Their relative frequency increases in the number 
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of concurrent merger motives, while the frequency of ‘primary purposes’ decreases in 
the number of other motives. Between these two extremes, ‘market share’ motives are 
seen to play a strong supportive role as a ‘secondary purpose’. Although it is also 
quite prominent as a primary purpose, it appears that its relative strength seems to lie 
in its combination with one or two other motives. 
 
Table 1: Frequency of Specific Merger Motives per Industry  
 
 



















1 1445 44.4% 658 326 86 375 
2 1459 44.6% 1007 366 98 1170 
3 349 10.7% 323 117 57 342 
4 11 0.3% 11 6 8 11 
 
 
Table 5 reports the pairwise correlations for all primary variables in our 
model, as well as their means and standard deviations. And although a number of 
correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level, no coefficient exceeds an 
absolute level of 0.35. We test for multi-collinearity by computing variance inflation 
factors (VIF). None of the independent variables exceeds a VIF-value of 1.81, with a 
mean of 1.60 for all independent variables. Because these are below the established 
cut-offs, we conclude that multi-collinearity is not an issue. 
 





We estimate several robust ordinary least square regressions to test the five 
hypotheses. Tables 6 and 7 report the results of the different specifications, and the 15 
models produced will be referred to hereafter as Models 1 to 15.5 
 
[See TABLE 6 – Test of Hypothesis 1- 4] 
4.1. On the Origin of Gains  
Model 1 only includes the control variables discussed above. The negative 
significance of cash flow illustrated in this, and in all other models, provides support 
for Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis that financial slack predicts underperforming mergers. 
Models 2 to 5 then tests the individual merger motives, without controlling for 
the possible existence of other motives. In each model a dummy variable is used to 
indicate whether a specific motive is present, compared with the situation that this 
motive is not present. From the results we see that – with the exception of 
geographical expansion - none of the motives affects bidder returns in a statistically 
significant way when studied in isolation.  This is not surprising, however, as we 
know from Table 3 that the average merger has more than one motive. Because a 
merger that aims to cut costs is, for example, likely to be quite different to a merger 
that announces such a purpose in combination with several other motives, individual 
merger motives are an understandably incomplete predictor of performance. 
 Cognizant of this, Model 6 controls for the presence of other motives, and 
shows that the predictive power of merger motives increases when at least two are 
used. From the results we find support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, which suggests that 
mergers expanding into new products and new regions carry with them an expectation 
of poor performance. As illustrated by Table 4, more than half (55.6%) the mergers in 
our sample announced multiple motives: 44.6% announce two motives. Up to this 
point, however, we did not test for the effects of specific combinations of merger 
motives. And although we controlled for the presence of other motives in Model 6, the 
coefficients of the individual motives still reflect an average effect across all existing 
combinations with other motives. The reaction to a merger, however, that aims to cut 
costs and expand into new regions is, for example, likely to be quite different to a 
merger that intends to expand into new products and regions simultaneously, or to 
increase the market share in existing products while moving into new regions. 
Because the average merger includes two motives, we therefore test all pairwise 
combinations of motives, after controlling again for the presence of all individual 
motives, as in Model 6. Table 7 reports the results of these motive pairs.  
 
[See TABLE 7 – Test of Hypothesis 1 – 4] 
In Model 7 only one of the four motive pairs is statistically significant: ‘new 
product’ in combination with ‘new region’. The positive sign of the coefficient 
                                                
5
 As stock return series typically follow a random walk (Brealey and Myers, 1996 Chapter 13), 
influenced by a multitude of factors, the R-squares in cross-sectional event studies are generally quite 
low. The level of R-squares in this paper are comparable with other event studies in M&A that use 
similar econometric specifications (see e.g., Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002, Dong, et al., 2006, 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). 
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contrasts the negative effects observed in the individual cases in Table 6. Possible 
explanations for this will be discussed in the following section. The results of Models 
8 and 9 support the robustness of the previous specifications. Model 10, however, 
provides an additional result: the counter-intuitive combination of diversifying into 
new products while simultaneously strengthening existing market shares is negative 
and significant. We do not, however, consider this to be a robust result, as this 
relationship is not supported in the reverse case described in Model 8. 
From Table 7 we again find evidence to support Hypothesis 2 and 3. 
Geographical expansions are negative and significant in all models – except Model 10 
– and so support the conclusion that geographically expansionary strategies lead to 
value destruction. Model 7, 8 and 9 also support Hypothesis 2, on the negative role of 
product diversification, although here the evidence is somewhat weaker. As discussed 
in the next section, however, the negative performance of the motive ‘new product’ is 
less robust and seems to be more contextual. 
4.2. On the Moderating Effects of Financial Slack 
In order to test our hypothesis on the role of liquidity, we again estimate 
several robust ordinary least square regressions, but this time account for the 
interaction effects between the control variable ‘cash flow’ and each of the dummies 
for each of the individual merger motives. Table 8 reports the results of altogether five 
interactions models (Model 11 to 15). 
 
[See TABLE 8 – Test of Hypothesis 5] 
 
As in Table 6 and 7, we see that liquidity produces a negative and significantly 
effect on performance in all models on Table 7. We thus support Jensen (1986) FCF 
hypothesis. Our results fail to support Hypothesis 5, however, on the moderating role 
of financial slack. Contrary to expectations we do not find evidence to support the 
conclusion that excess liquidity negatively moderates the relationship between motive 
and acquirer returns: the results of Models 12 and 15 show that the interaction of cash 
flow with geographical expansions (identified by the variable ‘CF x New reg’) is 
positive and statistically significant. This suggests that expansionary mergers require a 
higher level of financial flexibility, and are thus, on average, less affected by 
shareholders’ concerns about agency costs. The coefficients of the interaction effects 
with other motives are partially also positive, but are not significant. These results 
remain intact when we control for the presence of other motives (Model 15). 
5. DISCUSSION  
5.1. Findings & Implications 
In this paper we identify four merger motives: ‘strengthening existing 
operations’, ‘product diversification’, ‘geographical expansion’, and ‘cost reduction’. 
We analyze the relationship of each of these with an event study methodology, which 
considers abnormal stock returns around the merger announcement as a measure of 
performance. We also consider their interaction with the other motives in motive 
pairs, as well as with cash flow, which we use as a measure of agency and managerial 
discretion. Based on the results of the previous two sections, we can now discuss the 
key findings and implications of this study. 
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(1) Most mergers are motivated by an expansionary logic. 
We show that ‘product diversification’ is the most commonly announced 
reason to merge, with 1,999 (or 61%) of our 3,257 mergers listing it as a key merger 
motive. Some 815 (or 25%) of announcements concern ‘geographical expansion’, 
meaning that, taken together, 86% of mergers pursue ‘expansionary’ strategies. By 
contrast, we find that only 7% of mergers announced ‘cost-cutting’ measures, and that 
while cost-cutting mergers fell in popularity – from 15% of all mergers in 2000 to 5% 
in 2006 – expansionary strategies increased in their popularity in the same period. 
Furthermore, and as illustrated by Table 3, we see that product diversification and 
regional expansion are also often announced as the singular merger motive, and less 
so as part of a bundle of two or more concurrent motives. Thus, despite the 
‘diversification discount’, and a significant body of literature that document poor 
performances for expansion, it appears that, in practice, these motives are not only 
very common, but probably the primary reasons for takeover activity. In contrast, we 
find that ‘cost reduction’ is more typically announced as part of a bundle of motives, 
while ‘strengthening existing operations’ are typically announced as a secondary 
motive. 
(2) Shareholders aren’t convinced of ‘expansionary’ gains....  
We find that shareholders do not seem to be convinced of the synergies that 
expansionary motives – and in particular mergers that aim at developing new products 
and/or new regions – claim to generate. We find evidence to suggest that the two most 
expansionary motives (see above) are associated with significantly underperforming 
returns. Negative and significant results in Tables 6 and 7 suggests that expansionary 
mergers destroy value. This provides support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, and is an 
important finding for decision-makers. It suggests that, on average, shareholders put a 
‘diversification discount’ on any bundle of merger motives that includes geographic 
or product portfolio expansions. Because of their popularity (see above), this paints a 
bleak picture for mergers and acquisitions in general, and for managers seeking to 
pursue external growth in new products or regions in particular … 
 (3) ...unless financial slack enables expansionary mergers to be successful.  
The effect of acquirers’ cash flow is consistently negative and significant 
throughout our study. Thus, we support Jensen (1986), and find that slack signals 
agency costs, because the abnormal return to merger announcements of such acquirers 
is significantly lower. However, our results also show that financial slack positively 
moderates the relationship between some merger motives and performance. And that 
some expansionary motives are received favorably, if the acquirer has enough 
resources to pursue the expansion flexibly and efficiently. This is likely because 
explorative mergers, that expand the firm into new products, technologies and 
geographical regions (Dosi et al., 1990), are risky – as they ‘disrupt and destroy the 
firms existing competences’ (Abernathy and Clark, 1985) – and costly – because 
experimentation in new products and regions are prone to failure – and so require a 
significant ‘cushion of liquidity’ (Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1993; Moses, 1992). 
Explorative mergers are known to have ‘less certain outcomes, longer time horizons, 
and more diffuse effects’ (March, 1991). And so the finding that such mergers can be 
successful, with the sufficient financial leeway, suggests that Jensen’s (1986) agency 
hypothesis does not fully extend to mergers driven by reasons of geography. Rather, 
our results suggest that financial slack is a necessary condition for a positive 
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performance in such acquisitions. Overall, this result is in accordance with Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) pecking order hypothesis – which supports the accumulation of 
internal cash on the basis of transaction cost savings – and recent studies in 
organization theory, which promote a contingency perspective in understanding the 
role of organizational and financial slack (Cheng and Kesner, 1997; Tan and Peng, 
2003: Greenley and Oktemgil, 1998; Wan and Yin, 2009). In particular, it seems that 
expansionary motives, aimed at moving the firm into new regions benefit from greater 
financial flexibility. And hence we discover an important qualification for Jensen.   
 (4) Exploitative mergers do not produce significant results.  
 ‘Strengthening existing operations’ is the second most commonly announced 
merger motive: some 1,898 of the mergers in our database announce measures 
designed to capture market share (Table 2). Our test of the individual motive (Table 
6), however, means that we fail to support Hypothesis 1: moderately positive but 
insignificant results suggest that mergers motivated by the attainment of ‘increased 
market share’ are not particularly well received by the market. And the same goes for 
‘cost-cutting’ mergers. Despite the positive position adopted by the literature, on the 
benefits of cost-cutting measures, only 249 (or 7%) of the mergers in our sample 
pursue cost-cutting strategies. And, like market share motives, their announcement is 
not particualilly well-received: moderately positive but insignificant results are 
returned for the test of the individual motives, and so we fail to support Hypothesis 4. 
Logically, given that exploitative mergers are less costly and less risky than 
explorative mergers, and so do not require as significant a ‘cushion of liquidity’ 
(Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1993; Moses, 1992), these results do not change when 
the moderating effects of excess liquidity are considered (Table 8). Our results 
suggest that, irrespective of the firms cash flows, the market remains unimpressed by 
the announcement of exploitative merger.   
 (5) Mixing explorative and exploitative mergers destroys value.  
Only 375 mergers in our sample list ‘increased market share’ as a primary 
merger motive (Table 3), while 1,170 list it as a secondary motive. (Eighty-six 
mergers list ‘cost-cutting’ as a primary merger motive, compared to 98 that list it as a 
secondary measure). This suggests that ‘strengthening operations’ is typically 
announced in combination with the more expansionary motives – such as product 
diversification or geographic expansion – and so Porter’s (1980) idea of firms getting 
‘stuck in the middle’ could be used to explain the negative and statistically significant 
coefficients of the corresponding motive pairs on Table 7. Mergers which 
simultaneously attempt to ‘explore’ and ‘exploit’ the market – that is, mergers which 
attempt to ‘strengthen’ while simultaneously ‘disrput[ing] and destroy[ing]’ their core 
competencies (Abernathy and Clark, 1985) – will, it is suggested, do less well than a 
firm which adopts a more clearly focused strategy, and chooses either to explore or to 
exploit. The motive pairs for purely exploitative mergers – that is ‘strengthening 
existing operations’ and ‘cutting-costs’ – are statistically insignificant, indicating that 
exploitative motives are – in contrast to less focused mergers – not value-destroying. 
 (6) Multiple Motives better predict merger performance than isolated motives.  
When analyzed in isolation, we find that most merger motives do not predict 
performance particularly well (Table 6). This finding can easily be explained by the 
fact that the average merger in our sample was found to have more than one (1.5) 
announced merger motives. And as discussed above, the reaction to a merger that 
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solely aims to diversify into new products is, for example, likely to be quite different 
to a merger that announces such a diversification in combination with one or several 
other motives. The implications for managers, shareholders and future researchers are 
that it is necessary to take account of multiple motives when assessing the 
performance of mergers classified by motive. We find, however, that the merger 
motive of ‘geographic expansion’ is an exception to the rule: our results (Tables 6 and 
7) show that geographical expansion consistently predicts underperformance in 
mergers, whether announced in isolation, or in a bundle of motives. 
  (7) The performance effects of product diversification is contextual.  
In contrast to the motive of geographic diversification, which shows a very robust 
negative relation with acquirer returns (Hypothesis 3), the results for product 
diversification (Hypothesis 2) are found to be pointing in the same direction, but are 
less clear-cut. The effects of the individual motive ‘new product’ do not go into 
opposite directions, and as such the results are not inconclusive, but we do find some 
statistically insignificant relations. Overall, this implies that the merger motive ‘new 
product’ is more contextual than ‘new region’. Our specification-sensitive results with 
regard to product diversification are actually not very surprising given that almost half 
a century of research regarding the relationship between product diversification and 
organizational performance has not produced unambiguous evidence. Datta et al. 
(1991), for example, in a review of 18 studies published in the period 1962-1988 
reports that 3 are positive, 4 are negative, 4 are insignificant and 7 are mixed in their 
conclusions on the relationship. Later work, such as, for example, Markides (1992), 
Tallman and Li (1996), Geringer et al., (2000), and Palich et al., (2000), reveals a 
curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between diversification and performance. 
The inconclusiveness of the research on diversification is best explained by Datta et 
al., (1991) and Hill et al., (1992), each of which refer to the well-known ‘contingency 
argument’. This argument holds that the diversification-performance relationship is 
not only a function of the diversification profile per se, but is also a result of 
organizational characteristics, and industry specific conditions. For instance, the 
finding that diversification is associated with positive acquirer returns when 
diversifying into other regions (Model 11 and 12) may point towards a contingent 
effect of the regional macroeconomic environment. Similarly, the curvilinear relation 
between product diversification and performance, as revealed in the later literature 
(Palich et al., 2000; Markides, 1992), implies contingent influences. For example, 
Tallman and Li’s (1996) result suggests that the performance effect of diversification 
is positive as long as the degree of diversification stays within the scope that fits with 
the firm’s strategic resources and capabilities. If not, it is suggested that 
diversification will lower firm performance. However, this requires more detailed data 
than that available to this analysis, and goes beyond the scope of this study. 
5.2. Limitations  
An obvious limitation of our analysis is the fact that we take the officially announced 
merger purposes at face value. We readily acknowledge that not all publicly stated 
purposes reflect the true underlying motives for merging. Two factors, may serve to 
mitigate this problem. First, we explicitly analyze the moderator effects of cash flows 
(which we employ as a proxy for agency costs), and we find that none of the merger 
motives is particularly exploited as a cover-up for self-serving mergers. Second, we 
only study publicly traded U.S. acquirers, and suggest that these have more stringent 
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fiduciary duties, and are subject to more transparent shareholder information than 
either private firms in the U.S, or public firms in many other countries. Particularly 
during the years of our sample, an intensification of shareholder activism, an increase 
in institutional shareholders, and the enactment of new and unprecedented legislation 
(e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley), has intensified the pressure for even more transparency in 
corporate governance, managerial decision making, and in merger processes. Our 
sample period also stops well before the start of the credit crisis. Although this crisis 
currently leads to stricter regulation (e.g. to the ‘Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act’ or ‘Dodd-Frank Act’ in the US), this is focused on financial 
transactions in the banking sector, and not on managerial transparency in mergers. We 
therefore think that it is prudent to assume that, on average, the officially announced 
merger purposes in our sample period are closer to the underlying motives than to the 
alternative of consistent and successful deception of the shareholders (who, after all, 
have to be convinced to support the merger). 
5.3. Conclusion  
The aim of this paper was to investigate the origin of merger gains, and to 
analyze the moderating effects of financial slack on these merger motives and this 
gain. Because the factors affecting success and failure in mergers and acquisitions are 
so imperfectly understood such a purpose makes, we suggest, an important 
contribution to the literature. At the highest level, our results demonstrate the 
existence of a ‘purpose-performance relationship’, and show that mergers aimed at 
different synergies produce different gains. We thus support Andrade et al. (2001) in 
their suggestion that if mergers could be separated according to their underlying 
motive, then the origin of gains could be better described. In the process, we find that 
most mergers are explorative and expansionary in their motivation, and that mergers 
which attempt to exploit their environment are not particularly well received. We 
show that most mergers announce a number of motives, and that motive pairs 
consequently have a greater predictive power on performance. Importantly, we also 
show that excess liquidity cannot solely be interpreted as a predictor of agency. Our 
results suggest that excess liquidity, or financial slack, is a necessary condition for 
firms seeking to expand safely into new regions. Thus, for this motive, our evidence 
supports the accumulation of cash, described by Myers and Mailuf’s (1984) pecking 
order hypothesis, and demonstrates an important qualification for Jensen’s well-
regarded (1986) hypothesis on the role of FCF.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
 
“A firm with insufficient financial slack may not undertake all valuable investment opportunities.  
Thus, a firm that has too little slack increases its value by acquiring more”. 
 





CHAPTER FIVE – FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
DEEP POCKETS AND UNWAVERING ATTENTION: THE KEY TO 
UNLOCKING GAINS IN TECHNOLOGICAL ACQUISITIONS*1  
  
1. INTRODUCTION  
The acquisition of new knowledge, and increased technological capabilities, has 
long been recognized (Ahuja and Katila, 2001) to be an important merger motive.  
Technological acquisitions are said to increase the comparative advantage of the 
firm in the market for innovation, and to result in the creation of ‘dynamic’ efficiencies. 
As a result, technological acquisition should be positive events, and their announcement, 
it is suggested, should be well received by the market (Ahuja and Katila, 2001).  
The reality, however, is that more mergers fail than succeed, and that technological 
acquisitions, in particular, are found to be prone to complication and disappointment 
(Burgelman et al., 2009). Difficulties in understanding the acquired technologies, and in 
effectively integrating them with existing operations, are two oft-cited reasons for the 
finding that, post-acquisition, the performance of the firm typically drops compared to a 
benchmark of competitors (Hitt et al., 1991; Weston et al., 2004; Cefis et al., 2008). A 
large body of both empirical and conceptual research thus warns against technological 
expansions, and suggests that such acquisitions will perform poorly.  
An extensive body of literature shows, however, that a number of firm- and deal-
specific characteristics can be important moderators in the realization of gains (see e.g., 
Martynova et al., 2008; King et al., 2004). In this paper we study a selection of these, 
with the aim of clarifying the conditions under which new technologies can be a positive 
source of competitive advantage, or a negative source of value destruction.   
We focus on four moderating factors in particular. Firstly, and following the 
arguments of Chatterjee (1986), Gugler et al. (2003) and Gaughan (2007), we consider 
the role of ‘relatedness’ in the realization of technological gains. We argue that firms in 
related fields will find it easier to integrate their operations, and to realize gains, and so 
suggest that ‘relatedness’ will positively impact the performance of a technological 
acquisition. Secondly, and following the suggestions of Cyert and March (1963), Myers 
and Majluf (1984), Majumdar and Venkataraman (1993) and Moses (1992) – all of whom 
variously suggest that excess liquidity is a necessary condition for successfully exploring 
new products, markets and technologies – we explore the role of financial slack, or 
excess liquidity. We predict that higher levels of financial slack will positively moderate 
the performance of a technological acquisition. Third, and because of the existence of 
learning curve effects (Dutton, Thomas, and Butler, 1984; Lieberman, 1987), and the 
literature which shows that acquisition experience is positively related to acquisition 
performance (Hitt et al., 1993), we then explore the moderating effects of experience in 
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the integration of technological capabilities, and thus in the realization of gains. We 
predict that experience will positively impact the integration, and thus the performance, 
of the merger. Finally, and because technological acquisitions see the firm attempt to 
create new competencies, whereas other merger motives – such as, for example, cost-
cutting and product diversification – solidify the firms current position, we argue that 
‘strategic focus’ may also play a role in realizing technological gains. We predict that 
mergers with motivated by complimentary, rather than competing combinations of 
purposes will outperform those motivated by conflicting combinations of merger motives.  
To test these assertions, and using Thomson Reuter’s SDC data, we construct a 
data-set with 3,333 U.S. mergers, announced between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 
2006. We identify each merger in the data-set with one or more merger motives – such 
as, for example, technological acquisition, cost-cutting, product diversification, 
geographical expansion, and market building – and estimate the relationships between 
merger motives and acquirer returns. We then interact the 555 technologically motivated 
mergers in the sample with: (1) the levels of ‘relatedness’ between the target and 
acquirer; (2) the cash position of the firm; (3) combinations of other motives, to comment 
on the role of ‘strategic focus’; and (4) acquisition experience.  
We find: firstly, that the announcement of a technological expansion is typically 
met with skepticism. This may be, we suggest, because technological expansion is seen to 
be a costly and risky business, prone to dead-end investments and unrealizable gains. 
Considering the moderating effects of relatedness, excess liquidity, strategic focus and 
acquirer experience on the realization of these technological gains, however, we find that 
only strategic focus, and excess liquidity, predicts positive performance. This, we 
suggest, is because technological acquisitions are expensive and risky events that require 
attention if they are to made to work. Acquisition experience we find leads to value-
destruction, and suggest that this is because each technological acquisitions is specific, 
and heterogeneous, and thus requires individual attention. Efforts to achieve learning 
curve effects, we find, destroy value, and related mergers do not offer sufficient newness 
to justify their risks. As a result, we conclude that deep pockets, and unwavering attention 
are the keys to unlocking the gains to technological mergers and acquisitions.   
In doing so, this paper contributes to our understanding of which mergers work and 
why. We begin, in Section Two, with an overview of the literature, and build hypotheses 
on the acquisition of technology. Section Three introduces the data, and the methodology, 
Section Four presents the results, and Section Five discusses the implications.  
2. LITERATURE  
2.1. Technological Acquisition  
Most mergers aim to cut costs, or to expand revenues. And most cost-cutting and 
revenue-enhancing mergers are made in the interests of short-term, ‘static efficiencies’. 
Technological acquisitions, however, are made in search of long run, ‘dynamic’ gains.  
Technological acquisitions, it is suggested, are motivated by the development of 
new products, processes or technological capabilities (Katz and Shelanski, 2005). And 
the synergies that they create can be broadly interpreted as efficiencies in ‘research and 
development’ (R&D). As such, technological acquisitions increase the comparative 
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advantage of the firm, not in terms of products or regions, but in terms of the market for 
innovation (Gilbert and Sunshine, 1994)
2
.  
A number of studies show not only that there is a positive relationship between 
R&D intensity and ‘innovativeness’ (e.g. Acs and Audretsch, 1988) – which is said to 
define competitive advantage in the knowledge economy – but between technological 
investment and a number of other performance measures (see e.g., Agarwal and 
Audretsch, 2001; Duranton, 2000; Yin and Zuscovitch, 1998). A number of arguments 
have been put forward to explain why. Firstly it is argued that there are economies of 
scale to be had in most R&D activities and so, by acquiring technological, ‘knowledge 
rich’ firms acquirers can eliminate duplication (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996). Because the elimination of duplications is widely recognized to create 
value (Devos et al., 2008; Bradley et al., 1988; Mulherin and Boone, 2000), the 
announcement of a technological acquisition will be well relieved by the market. 
Secondly, and from an efficiencies perspective, it is suggested that technological 
acquisition is a necessary part of the corporate strategy of some industries. The existence 
of ‘minimum efficient scales’ in the pharmaceutical industry, for example, necessitates 
large-scale technical acquisition (Besanko et al., 2006; DiMasi et al., 1991; Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1996). Mergers in such industries should therefore be welcomed, it is 
suggested by the market. Thirdly, and from a ‘resource-based view of the firm’ 
perspective, it is suggested that a firm’s innovativeness is a function of its knowledge 
base (Griliches, 1984, 1990). The knowledge base of the firm can be grown internally, 
through investment, but M&A authors have argued that grafting a ‘knowledge rich’ target 
onto an existing base can offer a higher benefit at a lower cost (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989; Huber, 1991). These authors suggest that by acquiring ‘knowledge rich’ firms, 
acquirers not only ‘get what they buy’ – that is, the ‘explicit knowledge’ that initially 
motivated the acquisition – but also unseen, and un-quantified ‘tacit knowledge’. And 
with this the firm can recombine itself to create new syntheses, and can explore 
previously unknown and unimagined opportunities (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Henderson 
and Clark, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Schumpter, 1934). In doing so, and by actively 
developing the ‘perceptiveness’ of the firm’s internal knowledge base, the acquirer can 
enhance its ability to absorb other external knowledge, in future (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). This is the essence of the 1 + 1 > 2 synergies 
argument (Gaughan, 2008), and leads to the expectation that the announcement of a 
technological acquisition will be well received by the market (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). 
Obtaining technological capabilities, and developing technological know-how, has 
long been recognized to be an important motive for acquisition. Because technological 
acquisitions not only allow the firm to cut-costs, and to increase efficiencies, but also 
allow the firm to develop new and unforeseen combinations, we therefore expect that:  
Hypo 1A: Mergers motivated by the acquisition of new knowledge or technologies 
will be positively related with acquirer returns.  
 
A large empirical literature, however, documents below average performance for 
knowledge acquisitions
3
. And a number of explanations have been put forward for why. 
                                                
2
 We recognize that static and dynamic effciencies are not mutually exclusive, because static efficiencies 
can also lead to dynamic effciencies. We distinguish static and dynamic on the basis of immediate intent. 
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Firstly, it is suggested that, in a technologies acquisition, a target is chosen for its 
superior knowledge, technologies or capabilities and yet, in the integration stages, the 
target is usually forced to conform to the (necessarily inferior) standards of the acquirer 
(Burelman, 1986; Weston et al., 2004). Any interference by the manager in the target 
firm’s routines, or knowledge ‘production dynamic’, however, may serve to ‘kill the 
goose that lays the golden egg’, and so, in a misguided attempt to ‘fix what isn’t broken’, 
over-eager acquirers can destroying wealth, and shareholder value in the target firm.  
Secondly, and even in the absence of this managerial interference, it is suggested 
that the complexity inherent in the combination of two technological firms can be so 
severely underestimated (Ahuja and Katila 2001) that post-acquisition gains can quickly 
go negative. The integration of an acquisition, it is suggested, can so severely disrupt the 
established routines of the firm, and its target, that the aggregate activity of the two is 
reduced (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). Furthermore, and 
given that the disruption is most likely to occur in the set of routines that are closest to the 
innovation area, and the technological subsystem of the firm, technologically complex 
firms are most prone to this sort of disruption (Ahuja and Katila 2001). Research 
suggests, in fact, that integration results in far researching disruption, large transactions 
cost and significant managerial attention (Pritchett, 1985; Hitt et al., 1991, 1996; 
Hoskisson et al., 1994), and that these are often severely miscalculated. As a result, the 
costs of can quickly come to outweigh the gains, and shareholder wealth destroyed.   
Finally, it is argued that – with a strategy of technological acquisition – managers 
often substitute innovation for acquisition, decreasing their investments in R&D in favour 
of M&A. Such a policy, however, results in acquiring managers attaining technologies, 
which are new to the firm, but not necessarily new to the market (Clarke et al., 1989; Hitt 
et al., 1991). As a result, and in a misplaced effort to compete on a technological footing, 
managers can create firms that invest in the wrong assets, in the wrong way. Such firms 
lose ground to competitors, who either innovate a substitute solution, or acquire it though 
alternative means. Thus, by focusing on a strategy of growth through acquisition, the 
probability of future technological advances within the firm decline. Thus, relatively 
speaking, the suggestion is that shareholder wealth declines.  
Because technological acquisitions are complex, and may not only distract the firm, 
but are also likely to suffer from mismanagement, we formulate a hypothesis H1B:  
Hypo 1B: Mergers motivated by the acquisition of new knowledge or technologies 
will be negitively related with acquirer returns. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
3
 Technological acquisitions are notoriously hard to pull off (Burgelman et al., 2009). Hitt et al., 1991, 
show that the absolute levels of R&D increase post-acquisition, but that the absolute number of registered 
patents drops, as does the relative level when compared to competitors and adjusted for size
3
. This suggests 
quite a substantial decrease in post-acquisition R&D efficiency. Cefis et al. (2008) report a similar effect 
within the Italian manufacturing industry. They measure innovative output as the percentage of sales that is 
generated by new products, and find that firms in a group suffer from significantly lower R&D efficiency 
than their independent competitors.  
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2.2. Unlocking Technological Gains  
The evidence for technological acquisition as a source of shareholder wealth and 
merger gain is thus mixed, and the picture that emerges is anything but clear.  
An extensive body of literature, however, shows that a number of firm- and deal-
specific characteristics are related to firm performance (King et al., 2004). Moeller et al. 
(2004), for example, shows that size matters, and finds that larger acquirers 
underperform. Officer (2007) and Chang (1998) find that acquirer returns in publicly 
listed targets differ significantly from private targets, and Carline et al. (2002) finds that 
the bigger the deal the poorer the performance. Moeller et al (2005) finds that merger 
waves significantly impact average deal value, while Haunschild (1994), Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997), and Hitt and Pisano (2003) all find evidence that the payment of 
‘premiums’ predicts poor performance. And finally, Betton and Eckbo (2000) and Jensen 
and Ruback (1983) find that hostility also plays a role in predicting success.  
Previously unaccounted-for moderating factors may also, we suggest, play an 
important role in the realisation of technological gains, and may make technological 
acquisitions far more context specific events then was previously understood. 
Understanding the effects of these factors may help, therefore, clarify the confusion on 
the nature of technological gains. The levels of relatedness between the technology of the 
target and the acquirer, the strategic focus of the acquisition, the acquirers experience in 
integrating technological acquisitions, and the level of financial flexibility, in particular, 
are moderators, we suggest, which may be the key to unlocking technological 
acquisitions, and crucial in understanding the origin of technological gains. In this section 
we review the literature on each, and build hypotheses on their moderating effects.  
2.2.1. Relatedness  
Research has shown that related mergers are, in general, significantly more profitable 
than non-related diversifications (Gaughan, 2007; Chatterjee, 1986; Gugler et al., 2003).  
The market once welcomed the announcement of an unrelated diversification 
however (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Weston et al.,, 2004). Diversification was 
once thought to allow the firm to: (1) sidestep imperfections in the external capital 
markets, which could not be relied upon to allocate resources efficiently (Williamson, 
1970; Bhide, 1990; Hubbard and Palia, 1999); (2) reduce earnings variability (Lewellen, 
1971); (3) reduce the risk of bankruptcy (Higgins and Schall, 1975; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992); and (4) to allow for a higher level of leverage to be sustained.  
The conglomerate structure is, however, now recognized to be associated with a 
number of disadvantages (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). A so-called ‘diversification 
discount factor’ (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lamont and Polk, 2002) 
arises from the fact that diversification increase: (a) coordination and control costs (Jones 
and Hill, 1988); (b) information asymmetries between central and divisional managers 
(Williamson, 1967); (c) production inefficiencies, due to diseconomies of scope 
(Lancaster, 1990); and (d) management strains (Grant et al., 1988). This – and the fact 
that diversifying mergers are also more likely to be pursued by managers looking to: (a) 
reduce their personal risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981); (b) increase their levels of discretion; 
(c) entrench themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989); (d) build empires; (e) and/or add to 
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their power and prestige (Williamson 1964; Mueller, 1969; and Rhoades, 1983) – leads to 
the expectation that diversification destroys value (Hitt et a., 1990).  
We expect, however, that the ‘degree of relatedness’ between the target and 
acquirer will be a particularly relevant predictor of post-merger performance in the case 
of technological acquisitions. Higher levels of relatedness between the target and acquire 
mean that: (1) technological capabilities and know-how will flow more easily between 
the two firms; (2) the acquired technology will be more easily understood; (3) the new 
technology can be more easily implemented; and that (4) many of the necessary 
knowledge workers will already be present in the new firm, and so the realisation of gains 
will not depend on a small number of key individuals. Thus, higher levels of relatedness 
can be said to reduce some of the risk, and to eliminate many of the costs of integration. 
And this leads to the creation of significant value.  
For these reasons, we expect that not only will the announcement of a related 
merger be better received by the market, in general, but – because higher levels of 
relatedness means that technological gains can be more easily realised – we expect that 
the levels of relatedness will also positively moderate the announcement of a 
technological acquisition. Thus we expect that:  
Hypo 2: Higher levels of relatedness will positively moderate the relationship 
between technological acquisitions and acquirer retruns.  
2.2.2. Financial Slack   
There is a rich tradition of conceptual and empirical research on the role of slack in 
the theories of finance and organization (see e.g., Bougeois, 1981; Tan and Peng, 2003). 
Financial slack, or excess liquidity, according to Cyert and March (1963), is a 
‘cushion of actual or potential resources, which allows an organization to adapt 
successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in 
policy’. Higher levels of financial slack are therefore thought to be positively effect 
performance, in general (Gaughan, 2008; Cheng and Kesner, 1997; Greenley and 
Oktemgil, 1998; Tan and Peng, 2003), but specifically in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions (Bruner, 1988; Hambrick and D’Aeni, 1998; Wan and Yin, 2009).  
Mergers are risky events, which require major resources (Pablo et al., 1996). Slack 
is said to cushion the firm from the impact of the sorts of organizational changes (Wan 
and Yin, 2009) that come with mergers, and to limit the unanticipated costs that come 
with integration.Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory supports this 
conclusion, and suggests that firms should build up financial slack. The ‘pecking order 
theory’ suggests that external financing options are more costly than their internal 
alternatives, because – due to the existence of asymmetric information – external capital 
is subject to adverse selection and transaction costs. Slack, they suggest, provides the 
firm with financial flexibility, which allows it to take advantage of high value 
opportunities when they arise, and liquidity so predicts superior performance. 
Recent evidence on the role of slack, however, stresses that the effects of financial 
slack may depend on the specific nature of change (Cheng and Kesner, 1997; Greenley 
and Oktemgil, 1998; Tan and Peng, 2003; Wan and Yin, 2009). For instance, a number of 
empirical studies have shown that slack can have positive effect on innovation (Nohria 
and Gulanti, 1996; Damanpour, 1987; Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993; Singh, 1986), 
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and that it maybe crucial for firms looking to experiment safely with new products, 
technologies or markets (Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993; Moses, 1992). Innovation 
is costly, because innovation is a risky ‘quest into the unknown’ (Teece, 1996), in search 
of ‘diversity, untypicality and uncertainty’. As a result, excess liquidity can be interpreted 
as a safety-net, which can be depoloyed to protect the firm from its explorative failures. 
The market should therefore respond more favorably, it is suggested, to the 
announcement of a technological acquisition by a firm with sufficiently ‘deep pockets’ 
(Ilinitch et al., 1996) to pursue the expansion flexibly and efficiently.  
Bbecause slack provides the firm with immediate resources, and reduces the 
probability of failure, we predict that slack will positively impact performance. Thus:  
Hypo 3: Higher levels of financial slack will positively moderate the relationship 
between technological acquisitions and acquirer retruns.  
2.2.3. Strategic Focus  
Next, we suggest that strategic focus plays a role in realizing technological gains; 
complimentary strategies, and ‘on script’ behaviours, are required to produce real gains.  
Because, to survive in the short-term the firm must adopt a strategy that allows it 
to exploit its existing resources, to refine its technologies (March, 1991; Nooteboom, 
1999), and to ‘enhance the value of its existing competence’ (Abernathy & Clark, 1985). 
Mergers motivated by the elimination of duplication, and the acquisition of scale and 
scope in new products and markets, are thus to be welcomed. To succeed in the long run, 
however, it is necessary for the firm to explore new possibilities, and to develop new 
competencies (Weston et al., 2004). For this reason, explorative strategies – such as the 
acquisition of new technologies – with necessarily ‘less certain outcomes, longer time 
horizons, and more diffuse effects” (March, 1991) must also be encouraged.  
Explorative strategies see the firm attempt to create or to discover new 
opportunities in new sectors (Dosi et al., 1990; Besanko et al., 2006). Such expansions 
are, clearly, risky and costly events, however, and may, it has been suggested, require a 
significant ‘cushion of liquidity’ in order to make them successful (Majumdar and 
Venkataraman, 1993; Moses, 1992). Mergers motivated by the simultaneous desires to 
cut-costs and to experiment with new technologies are clearly therefore ill advised and, 
we suggest, may signal a lack of strategic focus on the part of the acquiring firm.  
Just as clearly, we suggest that the firm can either pursue technological 
acquisitions, and can explore the possibilities of new markets, or it can make acquisitions 
that consolidate it current market position. It cannot, however, do both. Explorative 
strategies ‘disrupt and destroy the firms existing competences’ (Abernathy & Clark, 
1985), and no firm can simultaneously build-upon and destroy its competencies. A firm 
that tries to do so – that is, to simultaneously explore and exploit its position by, for 
example, building economies of scale in the creation of new products markets, while 
exploring new technologies in its core market – will, it is suggested, get ‘stuck in the 
middle’ (Porter 1980). The result then, we suggest, will be value destruction.  
Mergers, which are motivated by combinations of naturally conflicting reasons, 
such as those described above, will therefore we suggest, underperform. Consequently, 
clear strategic focus will be key to unlocking gains in technological acquisitions. Thus:    
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Hypo 4: Complimentary combinations of merger motives will positively moderate 
the relationship between technological acquisitions and acquirer retruns.  
 
2.2.4. Experience 
Finally, we suggest that the extent to which the acquiring firm accumulates 
expertise in managing the various phases of the acquisition process will be an important 
factor in the realization of gains. Decades of research on the ‘learning curve’ 
phenomenon (Yelle, 1979; Deming, 1982; Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Epple, Argote & 
Devadas, 1991), together with theoretical insights drawn from the behavioral theory of 
the firm (March & Simon, 1958, Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993) and extensions to the 
organizational level of analysis of cognitive psychology (Cormier & Hagman, 1987; 
Healy & Bourne, 1995; Weston et al., 2004) point towards this conclusion, and the 
expectation of a positive impact of experiential learning on the performance of mergers.  
Organisations learn iteratively, it is suggested, and use ‘learning curve effects’ 
(Dutton, Thomas, and Butler, 1984; Lieberman, 1987) – arising out of past experiences 
and the inferences drawn from these when dealing with similar situations – to increase 
efficiency (Levitt and March, 1988). In general, ‘learning curve effects’ improve product 
performance, and cost-cutting exercises (Argote, Beckman and Epple, 1990; Yelle, 
1979), and a literature suggests that these effects also apply in the case of mergers and 
acquisitions (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Hitt et al. (1993), for example, shows that 
organization acquisition experience is positively related to acquisition performance in 
general, and Bruton et al. (1994) find a positive and significant relationship between 
experience and realized synergy in a study of distressed firms. Fowler and Schmidt 
(1989), looking at a sample of tender offers, find that acquisition experience – in the four 
year period preceding the offer – is positively associated with performance there too.  
Because the lessons learned in technological acquisitions are scalable – insofar as 
mistakes made once are not likely to be repeated – experience should play a significant 
role in moderating the performance of technological acquisition. Thus we suggest: 
 
Hypo 5: Experience will positively moderate the relationship between 
technological acquisitions and acquirer returns. 
  
3. DATA & METHODOLOGY  
3.1. Sample Design  
3.1.1. Basic Data 
The data employed to test these hypotheses is available through the Thomson 
Reuters SDC M&A database. We refine it to include only: (1) acquisitions announced 
between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2006; (2) acquisitions completed or 
withdrawn before January 1, 2008; (3) acquirers seeking to buy 100% of target shares at 
announcement; (4) acquirers and targets of U.S. origin; (5) acquirers which are publicly 
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listed; (6) deal greater then 10 million US$; (7) deal transaction values which are at least 
1% of the market value of the acquirer (four weeks prior to the announcement); (8) 
acquisitions which do not involve a recapitalization, repurchase of own shares, or a spin-
off to existing shareholders; (9) acquisitions where neither the acquirer nor the target is 
fully or partially owned by public authorities, such as the U.S. government; (10) where 
the acquirer and the target are not part of the same group (i.e: do not have the same 
parent); and (11) where none of the financial variables needed for our analyses (as 
specified in the following sections) are missing. In doing so, we create an initial dataset 
of 3,870 merger observations, within which the hypothesized relationships can be tested. 
3.1.2. Purpose Texts 
We include only observations with a specific merger motive for the acquirer. Since 
the end of 1999, the SDC has provided a string variable with the text of the officially 
announced motive for the merger. This contains a “[t]ext description of the purpose for 
the transaction… [which is] [u]sually… found in the press release for the announcement 
or completion of the deal”, and made available on Lexis-Nexis4. In some cases the text 
fragment not only includes the announced merger motive for the acquirer, but also for the 
target. For example: “The purpose of the divestiture was to enable the company to focus 
on its electric utility operations. The purpose of the acquisition was to enable the 
company to enter new markets.” However, there are also cases where the recorded motive 
only refers to the target. For example: “The transaction continues Invensys’ disposal 
program of non-core operations. Proceeds will be used to reduce debt.” Or: “The purpose 
of the transaction was to provide Intersil Corp with an exit from the WLAN technology 
area, while allowing the company to focus on its core high performance analog products.” 
As our analysis requires an elaboration of the acquirers’ motives we delete all 164 cases 
where only the target’s merger motives are mentioned, and 20 cases where the text 
variable does not contain any text at all. In doing so, we generate a sample of 3,686 
‘motivated’ mergers. Furthermore, we delete the 353 announcements that included a 
short, standardized phrase, from which a specific merger motive could not be discerned. 
For example: “the purpose of the transaction was to increase shareholder value”, or “to 
increase revenues”, or “to take advantage of an investment opportunity”. By doing so, we 
generated a final sample of 3,333 observations, for the testing of our hypotheses5. 
                                                
4 Thomson Reuters’ official variable definition (accessed via http://banker.thomsonib.com/). 
5 To ensure that these unspecified merger motives do not influence our results, we conducted two 
robustness checks. First, we compared the two merger sub-samples (one including the 353 unspecified 
mergers and one with only the 3333 specified motives) by conducting two-sample t-tests for possible 
differences in the dependent variable, or in the acquirer-specific independent variables. Only one variable 
had significant different averages at the 5% level of statistical significance. Not surprisingly, it seems that 
acquirers who do not specify their motives are, on average, half as small than those that announce their 
reasons in more detail. While the market capitalization of the former is, on average, U$ 2.8 billion, the size 
of the latter is U$ 5.6 billion (t=2.34; p=0.02). Second, we ran all analyses presented in this paper with the 
inclusion of the 353 unspecified mergers, and controlled for their presence with a separate dummy variable. 
None of the reported results changed qualitatively, and the dummy variable never turned out to have a 
statistically significant effect in the estimations. Ergo, and for clarity, we continue without them.  
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3.2. Independent Variables 
As independent variables we employ a dummy variable, which takes on a value of 
1 if the officially announced merger motive is technological acquisition, and 0 if 
otherwise. We utilize the SDC merger ‘purpose text variable’ to programme this variable, 
and code the each of the 3,333 observations, using simply content analysis
6
, according to 
the following four step process: First, and to ensure the accuracy of the Thomson 
variable, we randomly selected a sample of 100 ‘purpose texts’, and contrasted them with 
the original press releases published on Lexis-Nexis, or on the acquirer’s website. For 94 
of the 100 mergers selected we were able to retrieve official statements, and in all cases 
Thomson’s merger purpose variable was seen to reflect a full or partial quotation of the 
reason for the merger, as announced in the official press release. Next, we separately 
‘machine code’ for key words – such as ‘technology’, ‘technologies’, ‘research and 
development’ and ‘R&D’ – relevant to the strategy of technological acquisition. To 
optimize the discriminatory abilities of these keywords we ran several tests with different 
combinations. For example, the term ‘development’ on its own, although frequently 
mentioned in combination with new technologies is not sufficient in isolation, because it 
is often mentioned in combination with new geographic markets, or new product 
portfolios. An example of a correct machine coding is: “the purpose of the transaction 
was for Herley Industries Inc to accumulate technology that is essential in the company to 
successfully compete in the defense industry.” We then manually checked and corrected 
for ‘obvious errors’. ‘Obvious errors’ occur when an observation is incorrectly machine 
coded because a key word is present, but in the wrong context. For example, a cost-
cutting merger between ‘Kingston Technology’ and ‘Parametric Technology’ will 
produce a false ‘hit’ on the word technology, and must be recoded.  Finally, we checked 
and corrected for ‘obvious omissions’. Typical omissions occurred when phrases like to 
‘obtain significant intellectual property’ were used, or when the terms ‘research’ and 
‘development’ were separately employed in a purpose text. For example, “the purpose of 
this transaction was to complement the research on RNA expression that Merck has been 
doing since 2001.” In such cases, a manual recoding of the data was necessary.
7
 Because 
manually checking for ‘errors and omissions’ is a somewhat subjective task, both 
checked the codes independently. Inter-rater reliability was found to be 91.8%. All 
deviations were then presented to a senior colleague to finalize the coding.  
3.3. Dependent Variable 
We use performance as the dependent variable. We follow Brown and Warner’s 
(1985) event study methodology, and measure performance by computing the cumulated 
abnormal returns (CARs) to the merging firm, for the 21-day period (-20, 1) around the 
announcement. We start 20 business days before the announcement to capture pre-bid 
run-ups, which are most pronounced in this period (Schwert, 1996). Following Fuller et 
al. (2002) and Dong et al. (2006), we estimate the following market adjusted model: 
 
                                                
6
 Content analysis is “the study of recorded human communications” (Babbie, 2003), and a “technique for 
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" 
(Holsti, 1969). 
7





Here, ARi is the acquirer i’s abnormal return, winsorized (to remove outliers) 
between 1% and 99%, ri is the stock return on acquirer i and rm is the return of the S&P 
Poor 500 index. Since our sample includes frequent bidders, we do not estimate market 
parameters based on a time period before each bid because there is a high probability that 
previous takeover attempts would be included in the estimation period. This would make 
beta estimations less meaningful. 
The reliability of the merger announcement date was checked by comparing a 
random sample of 80 events against the Lexis-Nexis and original SEC filings. For the 80 
mergers we found a deviation in 5% – that is, four – of the cases. Two of these cases 
turned out to have been announced on a preceding weekend. As our event window starts 
20 business days before the announcement, such cases are always included in our 
measurement. We nevertheless correct all event dates in our sample for weekends, such 
that announcements on Saturdays and Sundays are recoded as announcements on the 
following Monday. In one case the announcement took place after trading hours on the 
day before the recorded event date. Thus, the SDC date was actually correctly coded as 
the event date for stock trading. In another case we could only find an official 
announcement on Lexis-Nexis and in the SEC files on the day after the recorded SDC 
event. As a cross-check, we retrieve daily abnormal stock returns from Thomson 
Datastream and find that the highest abnormal return was indeed on the SDC 
announcement date not on the day after. It seems that other news outlets or rumors had 
led to this run-up which, according to Schwert (1996), is a frequent phenomenon in the 
analysis of M&A, and is thus included in our performance measure. 
3.4. Other Variables 
3.4.1. Moderating Variables  
Firstly, and because horizontal mergers are found to be more profitable (Gaughan, 
2007; Chatterjee, 1986; Gugler et el., 2003), we control for merger type by computing an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the both firms share the same primary two-digit SIC code. 
Secondly, and because we suggest that financial slack is likely to be an important 
moderator variable for technological acquisitions, we control for excess liquidity. Within 
the literature, financial slack is often proxied for by free cash flow, operating cash flow or 
EBITDA
8
 (e.g., Lang et al., 1991; Schlingermann, 2004; Smith and Kim, 1994). From an 
organizational perspective, slack is more difficult to measure directly, because it can be 
accumulated and deployed in a variety of ways.
9
 Because of these conceptual and 
empirical difficulties most studies use standard financial data to determine conditions 
under which slack resources are likely to be available to an organization (Greenley and 
Oktemgil, 1998; Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993; Singh, 1986; Boureouis, 1991; 
Davis and Stout, 1992). We follow this practice, and use acquirer operating cash flow, 
                                                
8
 Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
9
 In the organization literature, there exist several notions of what constitutes slack, in particular 
organizational slack (see e.g., Bourgeois, 1981 for a comprehensive survey). 
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normalized to acquirer total assets over the last four quarters before the announcement 
(which is available in the data), and winzorised between 1% and 99%. 
Next, and because we suggest that ‘strategic’ focus is important, we control for 
the presence of other merger motives, which may be announced in conjunction with 
technological acquisition. Using the same process described above, we code for mergers 
motivated by the acquisition of: (1) cost-reduction; (2) market power gains; (3) or by an 
expansion into new products, and/or (4) new regions. These motives are identified 
because, we suggest, they likely to impact the success of a technological acquisitions. 
Finally, and as it is suggested that experience may effect performance, and might 
influence the realization of gains, we control for acquirer experience, and compute an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer has had prior acquisition experience.  
3.4.2. Control variables  
Next, and because the characteristics of the firm and the deal are related to 
performance in general, we include a list of firm- and deal-specific control variables.  
Moeller et al. (2004) shows that large acquirers often under perform. We therefore 
include the acquirer’s market value in our model, as a control variable, calculated at 4 
weeks prior to the announcement. Jensen (1986) and Hitt et al. (1998) show that debt also 
affects performance. To control for this effect we compute a leverage variable by 
dividing acquirer total debt by acquirer total assets; both of which again are made 
available in SDC. Finally, and because Officer (2007) and Chang (1998) provide 
evidence that the acquirer returns in publicly listed targets differs significantly from 
private targets, we also control for the listing of the target. Using information provided by 
the SDC, we create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is a public company. 
In the case of deal-specific performance moderators, Moeller et al. (2005) and 
Carline et al. (2002) find that deal value has a significant effect on firm performance. We 
thus control for the total consideration paid for the acquisition. Next, and because the 
percentage of payment in stock is frequently found to generate lower returns to acquirer 
shareholders (Andrade et al., 2001; Martynova et al., 2008; Weston et al., 2004), we 
control for stock payments. Hostility and the number of bids received have also been 
found to affect performance (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Gaughan, 2008), although here the 
evidence is mixed (Schwert, 2000). To control for the suggestion, however, we include 
the number of bidders in the takeover contest, and use an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the target’s board officially rejects the takeover bid. Tender offers, however, too are often 
found to be positively related with acquirer returns (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
Consequently, we include an indicator equal to 1 if the SDC reports that the acquisition 
was made by tender offer. Takeover bids that are not completed (unsuccessful bids) can 
be negatively related to acquirer announcement returns (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Chatterjee, 1992). As our sample includes a number of unsuccessful bids we identify 
these events with an indicator variable equal to 1 if SDC reports them as ‘withdrawn’.  
3.4. Model Specification 






 where: ARi,j,t = acquirer i’s abnormal return in taking over target j in year t 
 Ti,j,t = a dummy variable indicating technological acquisition 
 Fi,t-1 = a vector of firm-specific controls for acquirer i and target j 
  in year t-1 (described below) 
 Di,j,t = a vector with transaction-specific control variables for the deal  
  between acquirer i and target j in year t (described below) 
! =  a normally distributed error term. 
 
In all estimations we control for unobserved period-specific effects by including 
year dummies. Further, we correct for possible correlations within the acquirers’ 
industries by clustering at the two-digit (SIC) level, according to Froot (1989) and 
Wooldridge (2002), and adjust all reported standard errors for heteroskedasticity using 
the Huber (1967) and White (1980) sandwich estimator of variance.  
3.5. Sample Description 
Table 1 reports the frequency of all mergers in the sample, and the distribution of 
the coded merger motives. From it, we note that 555 of the 3,333 mergers in the sample 
identify the acquisition of new technological capabilities as a merger motive.  
 




A closer look at the individual motives, in Figure 1, reveals that there is relatively 
little variation in the number of announcements over time. We do note a slight reduction 
in the relative use technology motives, however, as the period progresses. 
Table 2 reports a break-down of merger purposes at the industry level. As in 
Table 1, the number of total purposes announced (5,516) is significantly higher than the 
number of mergers included in the dataset (3,333). And although the total number of 
mergers differs significantly between industries (from 1,091 in manufacturing to only 5 in 
agriculture), the average number of motives per merger is remarkably stable across 
industries: for an average merger, 1.7 different motives are announced, ranging from a 
low of 1.5 in financial services and real estate, to a high of 1.8 motives in agriculture. 
From this, and from Figure 2, we see that technological acquisition is a particularly 





Figure 1: Frequency of specific merger motives per year 
 
 
Table 2: Merger motives per industry 
 





As the first column in Table 3 shows, up to four merger purposes can be 
announced at any one time. For less than half of all mergers only one motive is recorded, 
two are announced in 44% of cases, and 11% of mergers are pursued with three or four 
concurrent motives. The last four columns of Table 3 provide a break-down of the 
relative importance of the individual motives per class of concurrent announcement, and 
show that only 5% (that is, 28) of mergers announce technological acquisition as the sole 
merger motive. More often, technological acquisition appears to be announced as 
secondary motive, in a package of merger motives.  
 
Table 3: Concurrent merger motives 
 
 
Finally, Table 4 reports the pairwise correlations for all primary variables in our 
model, as well as their means and standard deviations. And although a number of 
correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level, no coefficient is seen to exceed an 
absolute level of 0.35. We test the full base specification (as described above) for multi-
collinearity among independent variables by using the variance-inflation factor (VIF). 
None are seen to exceed a value of 2.63, with a mean of 1.61 for all independent 
variables. These values are well below the established cut-offs of 5.3 (Hair et al., 1992) 
and 10 (Belsley et al., 1980; Studenmund, 1992). We can therefore conclude that multi-
collinearity is not an issue of concern in this study. 
 
[See TABLE 4] 
4. RESULTS 
In order to test Hypotheses 1 to 5, we estimate several robust ordinary least square 
models, as described Section 3. Tables 5 to 10 report the results of the different 
econometric specifications, and these will be referred to hereafter as Models 1 to 17.
10
 
As a base regression, Model 1 only includes the set of control and moderator 
variables discussed above. The result returned support the general conclusions of the 
existing literature. Firstly, the negative significance of cash flow in this, and indeed in all 
other models, provides support for Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis; financial slack increases 
the likelihood of managerial discretion, and accurately predicts the underperforming 
mergers. Secondly, the negative significance of the variable measuring acquirer size 
supports the findings of Moeller et al (2005), and shows that bigger acquirers perform 
less well. And thirdly, the results on the public target variable support the conclusions of 
                                                
10
 As stock return series typically follow a random walk (Brealey and Myers, 1996), influenced by a 
multitude of factors, the R-squares in cross-sectional event studies are generally quite low. The level of R-
squares in this paper are comparable with other studies that use similar econometric specifications (Fuller et 
al., 2002; Dong et al., 2006). 
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Officer (2007) and Chang (1998), who provide evidence that the acquirer returns in 
publicly listed targets differs significantly from private targets. Finally, the positive 
significance of the number of bids, suggests that contested mergers perform better.  
 
[See TABLE 5] 
 
Models 2 and 3 test Hypothesis 1, on the gains to technological acquisitions. In 
Model 2, a single dummy variable is used to indicate whether a specific motive is present, 
compared with the situation that this motive is not present. Negative, albeit insignificant, 
results are returned, and this leads some support for the suggestion that the announcement 
of a technological acquisition is not well received by the market.11 The insignificance of 
the result is not surprising, however, as we have seen that the average merger has more 
than one motive. And the reaction to a merger that aims to expand into new technologies 
is, for example, likely to be quite different to a merger that announces such an expansion 
in combination with several other motives. The effect of merger combinations, and 
strategic focus, however, will be tested in relation to Hypothesis 4.  
Model 3 controls for the simultaneous presence of other motives. As in Model 1, a 
mildly negative result is returned for technological acquisitions. This suggests that the 
technological acquisitions will perform less well, and moderately supports Hypo 1B.  
The effects of relatedness, liquidity, strategic focus and experience are considered 
in Models 4 to 17, and reported on Tables 6 to 9. Models 4 and 5, presented on Table 6, 
confirm that cash continues to have a significantly negative effect when relatedness and 
experience are added to the model, and tested against the full population of (3,333) 
mergers. Against the full population, our results also show that the levels of relatedness 
do not significantly improve merger performance and, surprisingly, that merger 
experience is negatively and significantly related with merger performance, as measured 
in our model by cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
[See TABLE 6] 
 
Models 6 and 7, reported on Table 7, considers the role of relatedness in the 
specific context of (the 555) technological mergers in our sample. Confirming the results 
of Models 4 and 5, horizontal, or related mergers, are seen to not significantly effect 
performance, in general. Isolating the effects of relatedness in the context of 
technological mergers and acquisitions, however, Model 6 shows that the levels of 
relatedness are negatively and significantly related to acquirer returns. And Model 7 
confirms this result when the full spectrum of merger motives is controlled for. These 
results clearly suggest that we must reject Hypothesis 2, as we find that the levels of 
relatedness do not positively predict superior performance in technological mergers.  
 
                                                
11
 The other merger motives – that is, new products, new regions, cost-saving and increased market share – 
were also individually tested. The results (not reported) suggested a negitive and insignificant relationship 
between the announcemnt of new products merger and the firms CARs, a negitive and significant 
relationship (at the 10% level) for mergers aimed at new regions, and a positive and insignificant for both 
cost-cutting and market power mergers. These finding are broadly in line with the literautre, and thus 
provide a robustness check on our appraoch.  
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[See TABLE 7] 
 
Models 8 and 9, reported on Table 8, consider the role of excess liquidity in 
merger and acquisitions. Confirming the results of Models 4 and 5, and the literature that 
developed from Jensen’s (1986) findings, excess liquidity, or financial slack, is seen to 
have a negative and significant effect performance, in general. Isolating the effects of 
technological mergers, however, Model 6 shows that excess liquidity has a positive and 
significantly effect on performance. And Model 7 confirms this result when the full 
spectrum of merger motives is controlled for. These results clearly suggest that we must 
accept Hypothesis 3, as we find that excess liquidity positively predicts above average 
performance in technological acquisitions.  
 
[See TABLE 8] 
 
Models 10 to 15, reported on Table 9, consider the role of strategic focus in 
merger and acquisitions. Model 10 reports on the relationship between performance, in 
general, and each of the individual merger motives. Confirming prior results (Table 5), 
the results show that technological mergers, and mergers motivated by the acquisition of 
new products and regions have a negative effect on performance. By contrast, the 
attainment of cost-savings, and increased market power, are seen to have a positive, albeit 
it an insignificant effect on performance.  
 
[See TABLE 9] 
 
Because most mergers announce an average of 1.7 motives, Models 11 to 15 
consider the different combinations of merger motives. Model 11 considers the 
performance of mergers, which announce technological acquisitions and new products, 
and shows that such announcements are negatively, but insignificantly, related with 
abnormal returns. And Model 12 reports negative and significant results for mergers 
motivated by technological acquisition and new regions. Both results make sense, insofar 
as an expansion into new products and new regions are costly, explorative exercises, 
while exploitative technological acquisitions, as we have already seen, require deep-
pockets and financial resources. Model 13 supports this conclusion, and reports negitive 
and significant results for firms that announce technological acquisitions in conjunction 
with cost-cutting measures. And finally, and consistent with the story of exploration and 
exploitation, the results of Model 14 finds that purely exploitive mergers, which expand 
the technological capabilities of the firm, while exploiting the advantages of increased 
market power, are positively and significantly related with acquirer returns. In total, these 
results support Hypothesis 4, on the necessity of strategic focus in technology mergers. 
Finally, Models 16 and 17, reported on Table 10, consider the role experience in 
merger and acquisitions. Confirming the results of Models 4 and 5, the results show that 
experience has a negative and significant effect on performance, in general. Isolating the 
effects of technological mergers, however, Model 16 shows that experience may have a 
positive, albeit insignificant effect on performance. And Model 17 confirms this result 
when the other merger motives are controlled for. These results provide weak evidence in 
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support of Hypothesis 5, and suggest that merger experience predict above average 
performance in the case of technological acquisitions.  
 
[See TABLE 10] 
5. DISCUSSION 
5.1. Key Findings & Managerial Implications 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the gains to technological mergers 
and acquisitions. Because, on the one hand, the acquisition of new knowledge, and 
increased technological capabilities, is thought to be an important merger motive (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001), which should increase the comparative advantage of the firm in the 
market for innovation (Gilbert and Sunshine, 1994), and creates ‘dynamic’ efficiencies. A 
large literature suggests, however, that more mergers fail than succeed, and that 
technological acquisitions in particular, are prone to complication (Burgelman et al., 
2009). Difficulties in understanding the acquired technologies, and in effectively 
integrating them with existing operations, are two oft cited reasons for the finding that, 
post-acquisition, the performance of the firm typically drops compared to a benchmark of 
competitors (Hitt et al., 1991; Cefis et al., 2008). Using a sample of 3,333 mergers, and a 
subset of 555 ‘technological acquisitions’, we consider the existence of these gains, and 
the moderating effects of relatedness, excess liquidity, strategic focus and acquirer 
experience on the realization of these technological gains. Based on the results of the 
previous sections, we now discuss the key findings and implications of our study.  
(1) Technological acquisitions do not lead to positive abnormal returns  
Technological acquisitions, it is suggested, are made in search of long run, 
‘dynamic’ gains (Ghemawat et al., 1993), and the synergies that they create can be 
broadly interpreted as efficiencies in ‘research and development’. As such, technological 
acquisitions should increase the comparative advantage of the firm in the market for 
innovation (Gilbert and Sunshine, 1994).  
Our results show, however, that such gains are not easily realized, and that relative 
to the other merger motives, technological acquisitions are negatively (albeit 
insignificantly) related with acquirer returns. This suggests that the market remains 
skeptical of the gains behind such announcement, and provides supports for a literature 
that document below average performance for knowledge acquisitions (Burgelman et al., 
2009; Hitt et al., 1991; Cefis et al., 2008). A number of explanations might be be put 
forward to explain why. Firstly, it is suggested that, in a technologies acquisition, a target 
is chosen for its superior knowledge, technologies or capabilities and yet, in the 
integration stages, the target is usually forced to conform to the (necessarily inferior) 
standards of the acquirer (Burelman, 1986). Any interference by the manager in the target 
firm’s routines, or knowledge ‘production dynamic’, however, may serve to ‘kill the 
goose that lays the golden egg’, and destroy wealth and value. 
Secondly, it is suggested that the complexity inherent in the combination of two 
technological firms can be so severely underestimated (Ahuja and Katila 2001) that post-
acquisition gains can quickly go negative. The integration of an acquisition, it is 
 
119 
suggested, can so severely disrupt the established routines of the firm, and its target, that 
the aggregate activity of the two is reduced (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986, Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991). Furthermore, and given that the disruption is most likely to occur in the 
set of routines that are closest to the innovation area, and the technological subsystem of 
the firm, technologically complex firms are most prone to this sort of disruption (Ahuja 
and Katila 2001). Research suggests, in fact, that integration results in far-researching 
disruption, large transactions cost and significant managerial attention (Pritchett, 1985; 
Hitt et al., 1991, 1996; Hoskisson et al., 1994), and that these are often severely 
miscalculated. As a result, the costs of the deal can quickly come to outweigh the gains.  
Finally, it is suggested that – with a strategy of technological acquisition – 
managers often substitute innovation for acquisition, decreasing their investments in 
R&D in favour of M&A. Such a policy, however, results in acquiring managers attaining 
technologies that are new to the firm, but not necessarily new to the market (Clarke et al., 
1989; Hitt et al., 1991). The result is that the firm looses it competitive footing, and 
looses ground to its innovative competitors.  
(2) Technological Acquisitions between Related Mergers do less well  
Our results suggest that relatedness between firms does not predict positive 
performance. And while this finding may appear counterintuitive, our findings here 
support the literature on the optimal cognitive distance and absorptive capacity.  
On the relation between cognitive distance and innovation performance, 
Nooteboom (1992, 1999) proposed that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship. In first 
instance, as cognitive distance increases, it has a positive effect on learning by interaction 
because it yields opportunities for novel combinations of complementary resources. 
However, at a certain point cognitive distance becomes so large as to preclude sufficient 
mutual understanding needed to utilize those opportunities. Of course, a certain mutual 
understanding is needed for collaboration, and familiarity certainly breeds trust (Gulati, 
1995), which facilitates successful collaboration. However, too much familiarity, they 
suggest, takes the innovative steam from the collaboration.  
Technological acquisitions, we must remember, are made in the interests of 
acquiring new capabilities and new competencies. New technologies are costly to 
integrate, and so less similar technologies, which offer the firm access to new 
competencies, and radical innovations, are relatively cheaper than similar technologies, 
which offer, at best, incremental innovations. Technological acquisitions, it is suggested, 
must therefore be innovative, and new to the firm, and relatively unrelated to its existing 
technologies (Nooteboom et al., 2006). Only then, we find, will the market respond 
positively to the announcement of a technological acquisition.  
 (3) Deep Pockets turn Technological Acquisitions Positive  
Our results, in general, support Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, which, in 
essence, suggests that firms with a higher level of free cash are more likely to make quick 
strategic decisions, and are more likely to engage in large-scale strategic actions, with 
less analysis, than their cash-strapped peers. High levels of liquidity, it is suggested, 
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increase managerial discretion, and make it possible for managers to pursue self-serving 
acquisitions, or to choose poor acquisitions when they run out of good ones.  
In the specific case of technological acquisitions, however, our results show that 
financial slack can positively influence the realization of gains. A number of empirical 
studies support this, and show that slack can have positive effects on innovation (Nohria 
and Gulanti, 1996; Damanpour, 1987; Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993; Singh, 1986), 
and that it may even be crucial for firms looking to experiment safely with new products, 
technologies or markets (Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993; Moses, 1992). Innovation 
is costly, it is suggested, because innovation is a risky ‘quest into the unknown’ (Teece, 
1996; Little et al., 2002). And as a result, excess liquidity can be seen to be a safety-net, 
or a ‘cushion’ of liquidity (Cyert and March, 1963), that can be deployed to protect the 
firm from the costs of its explorative failures. ‘Deep pockets’ (Ilinitch et al., 1996), it is 
therefore suggested, are seen to be a necessary condition for firms looking to pursue an 
expansion in technological capabilities, flexibly and efficiently. 
Overall, this result supports Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order hypothesis 
– which supports the accumulation of cash on the basis of transaction cost savings – and 
recent studies in organization theory (Cheng and Kesner, 1997; Tan and Peng, 2003: 
Greenley and Oktemgil, 1998). Technological acquisitions benefit from financial 
flexibility, and hence we demonstrate an important qualification for Jensen (1986).   
 (4) Strategic Focus matters in the Realisation of Technological Gains  
Our results clearly suggest that complimentary strategies, ‘strategic focus’ plays 
an important role in the realization of gains in technological acquisitions.  
The literature suggests that, to survive in the short-term, the firm must adopt a 
strategy that allows it to exploit its existing resources, to refine its technologies (March, 
1991; Nooteboom, 1999), and to ‘enhance the value of its existing competence’ 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985). Mergers motivated by the elimination of duplication, and the 
acquisition of scale and scope in new products and markets, are thus to be welcomed. To 
succeed in the long run, however, the literature suggests that it is necessary for the firm to 
explore new possibilities, and to develop new competencies. And for this reason, 
explorative strategies – such as the acquisition of new technologies – with necessarily 
‘less certain outcomes, longer time horizons, and more diffuse effects” (March, 1991) 
must be encouraged, and should be welcomed by the market. 
Our results suggest, however, that the firm can either pursue technological 
acquisitions, and can explore the possibilities of new markets, or it can make acquisitions 
that consolidate it current market position: it cannot do both. Explorative strategies 
‘disrupt and destroy the firms existing competences’ (Abernathy & Clark, 1985), and no 
firm can simultaneously build-upon and destroy its competencies. And a firm that tries to 
do so – that is, to simultaneously explore and exploit its position by, for example, 
building economies of scale in the creation of new products markets, while exploring new 
technologies in its core market – will, it is suggested, get ‘stuck in the middle’ (Porter 
1980; Gaughan, 2008). The result then, we suggest, will be value destruction.  
We find that mergers that are motivated by combinations of reasons, which 
naturally conflict, will underperform. Firstly, we find that mergers that aim to expand into 
new technologies, and cut-costs, are doomed to failure. Because technological 
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acquisitions require a ‘cushion’ of liquidity, however, such a conclusion makes sense. 
Secondly, and because technological acquisitions are both risky and costly (Teece, 
1996;), we see that exploitative technological acquisitions cannot be pursued in 
conjunction with explorative purposes, such as an expansion into new products and 
regions. We find, in fact, that only those technological mergers that focus on expanding 
their technological capabilities, while strengthening their market share, have a positive 
performance expectation. This, we suggest, is an important strategic finding.   
(5) Experience does not count in making Technological Acquisitions Work  
Finally, and contrary to expectation, our results clearly suggest that acquirer 
experience does do significantly effect the performance of a technological acquisition.  
The literature suggests that experience of the acquisition process is an important 
factor in the realization of gains. And decades of research on the ‘learning curve’ effect 
(Yelle, 1979; Deming, 1982; Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Epple, Argote & Devadas, 1991), 
coupled with insights drawn from the behavioral theory of the firm (March & Simon, 
1958, Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 
1991) suggest that organisations learn, and that this increases efficiency (Levitt and 
March, 1988). Indeed, Hitt et al. (1993) shows that organization acquisition experience is 
positively related to acquisition performance in general.  
In the specific context of technological acquisitions, however, our results suggest 
that the lessons learned in mergers are not scalable, and that experience does not therefore 
play a significant role in predicting performance. This may be because technological 
acquisitions are too heterogeneous in nature for learning curves effects to be realised. 
And the negative significance of the variable might suggest that any attempts to 
implement the lessons learned in one technological merger to another destroys value 
(Martynova et al., 2008). Thus, while experience may be useful in integrating generic 
capabilities, we find that technological acquisitions must be individually managed, 
integrated, and that the lessons learned in technological mergers are non-transferable.  
5.2. Limitations  
An obvious limitation of our analysis is the fact that we take the officially 
announced merger purposes at face value. And we acknowledge that not all publicly 
stated purposes might not reflect the true underlying motives for merging. We only study 
publicly traded U.S. acquirers, however, and suggest that these have more stringent 
fiduciary duties, and are subject to more transparent shareholder information than either 
private firms in the U.S, or public firms in many other countries. This is particularly true 
of our sample period, during which an intensification of shareholder activism, an increase 
in institutional shareholders, and the enactment of new and unprecedented legislation 
(e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley), has intensified the pressure for even more transparency in 
corporate governance, managerial decision making, and in merger processes. Our sample 
period also stops well before the start of the credit crisis. Although this crisis currently 
leads to stricter regulation (e.g. to the ‘Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’ 
or ‘Dodd-Frank Act’ in the US), this is focused on financial transactions in the banking 
sector, and not on managerial transparency in mergers. We therefore think that it is 
prudent to assume that, on average, the officially announced merger purposes in our 
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sample period are sufficiently closer to the underlying motives than to the alternative of 
consistent and successful deception of the shareholders (who, after all, have to be 
convinced to support the merger). 
6. CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this paper was to investigate technological acquisitions, and to 
comment on the conditions that allow for the maximization of synergistic gains.  
We considered the suggestion that technological acquisitions increase the 
comparative advantage of the firm in the market for innovation (Gilbert and Sunshine, 
1994), and creates ‘dynamic’ efficiencies, and found that technological acquisitions are 
prone to complication and failure (Burgelman et al., 2009). In general, we found that the 
market receives the announcement of a technological acquisition with scepticism, and 
that technological acquisitions destroy value. Difficulties in understanding the acquired 
technologies, and in effectively integrating them with existing operations, are two oft 
cited reasons for the finding that, post-acquisition, the performance of a firm expanding 
its technological capabilities typically drops compared to a benchmark of competitors 
(Hitt et al., 1991; Cefis et al., 2008; King et al., 2004; Martynova et al., 2008).  
Using a sample of 3,333 mergers, and a subset of 555 ‘technological acquisitions’, 
we explored a number of situations in which technological acquisitions can increase 
performance. Considering the moderating effects of relatedness, excess liquidity, 
strategic focus and acquirer experience on the realization of these technological gains, in 
turn, we found that only strategic focus, and excess liquidity, predicts positive 
performance. Merger experience, and higher levels of relatedness between the 
acquisitions were found to negatively effect the performance. This, we suggest, is 
because technological acquisitions are expensive and risky events that require attention if 
they are to made to work. Acquisition experience, we find leads to value-destruction, 
because, we suggest, that each technological acquisitions is specific, and heterogeneous, 
and thus requires individual attention. Efforts to achieve the learning curve effects, which 
are generally thought responsible for the gains in the expression of homogenous 
synergies, will therefore destroy value. Related merger too, we find, perform less well. 
This, we suggest, is because technological acquisitions are made in the interests of 
acquiring new capabilities and new competencies. New technologies are costly to 
integrate, and so less similar technologies, which offer the firm access to new 
competencies, and radical innovations, are relatively cheaper than similar technologies, 
which offer, at best, incremental innovations. We therefore conclude that deep pockets, 
and unwavering attention, as well as dedication to the integration of that specific 
technology, are the keys to unlocking gains in technological mergers and acquisitions.  
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Table 5: Hypothesis 1 – On the Gains to Technological Acquisitions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) 
Technology  -0.005 -0.008 
                  [-0.760] [-1.059] 
New product   -0.013* 
                   [-1.995] 
New region   -0.016*** 
                   [-2.767] 
Cost saving   0.014 
                   [0.889] 
Market share   0.003 
                   [0.386] 
Dealsize 0 0 0 
                 [0.182] [0.146] [-0.094] 
Size acquirer -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
                 [-2.771] [-2.772] [-2.521] 
Cash flow -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.072*** 
                 [-3.571] [-3.562] [-3.633] 
Leverage 0.008 0.007 0.009 
                 [0.577] [0.493] [0.657] 
Public target -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.046*** 
                 [-5.697] [-5.677] [-5.455] 
Tender offer -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
                 [-0.123] [-0.105] [-0.084] 
Percent stock 0 0 0 
                 [0.937] [0.991] [0.962] 
Number bids 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 
                 [3.788] [3.790] [3.762] 
Horizontal -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
                 [-1.002] [-0.992] [-0.951] 
Hostile -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 
                 [-0.170] [-0.181] [-0.231] 
Withdrawn bid -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
                 [-1.014] [-1.017] [-0.995] 
Intercept -0.011 -0.01 0 
                 [-0.533] [-0.472] [-0.006] 
N (obs) 3333 3333 3333 
N (clusters) 65 65 65 
F 17.412 16.477 25.142 
R2 0.03 0.031 0.034 
Prob > F 0 0 0 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 [t-values in parenthesis] 
clustering at 2-digit-SIC level; year controls incl.; 
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator of variance 
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Table 6: Moderator Variables   
 Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) 
Cash flow        -0.069*** -0.070*** 
                 [-3.502] [-3.575] 
Horizontal       -0.007 -0.007 
                 [-1.224] [-1.169] 
Experience  -0.007*** -0.007*** 
                 [-3.878] [-3.737] 
New technology   -0.005 -0.007 
                 [-0.668] [-0.958] 
New product        -0.013* 
                   [-1.915] 
New region         -0.016*** 
                   [-2.750] 
Cost saving        0.014 
                   [0.886] 
Market share       0.002 
                   [0.376] 
Dealsize         0 0 
                 [0.117] [-0.119] 
Size acquirer    -0.001** -0.001** 
                 [-2.636] [-2.407] 
Leverage         0.009 0.011 
                 [0.637] [0.797] 
Public target    -0.045*** -0.046*** 
                 [-5.614] [-5.431] 
Tender offer     0 0 
                 [-0.009] [0.006] 
Percent stock    0 0 
                 [1.108] [1.069] 
Number bids      0.052*** 0.050*** 
                 [3.656] [3.628] 
Hostile          -0.005 -0.007 
                 [-0.159] [-0.208] 
Withdrawn bid    -0.022 -0.022 
                 [-1.093] [-1.069] 
_cons            0.001 0.01 
                 [0.024] [0.481] 
observations 3333 3333 
clusters 65 65 
F                15.856 23.513 
R2               0.034 0.037 




Table 7: Hypothesis 2 – On the Role of Relatedness   
  Model 6 Model 7 
Dependent AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) 
Cash flow        -0.072*** -0.073*** 
                 [-3.585] [-3.643] 
Horizontal       -0.002 -0.002 
                 [-0.350] [-0.342] 
Horiz. X New tech -0.030*** -0.028** 
                 [-2.699] [-2.643] 
Experience (aup) -0.007*** -0.007*** 
                 [-3.932] [-3.792] 
New technology     0.011 
                   [1.324] 
New product        -0.012* 
                   [-1.832] 
New region         -0.016*** 
                   [-2.743] 
Cost saving        0.014 
                   [0.877] 
Market share       0.002 
                   [0.335] 
Dealsize         0 0 
                 [0.153] [-0.085] 
Size acquirer    -0.001** -0.001** 
                 [-2.624] [-2.399] 
Leverage         0.008 0.01 
                 [0.601] [0.771] 
Public target    -0.045*** -0.046*** 
                 [-5.658] [-5.478] 
Tender offer     -0.001 0 
                 [-0.041] [-0.027] 
Percent stock    0 0 
                 [1.075] [1.039] 
Number bids      0.051*** 0.050*** 
                 [3.651] [3.624] 
Hostile          -0.006 -0.007 
                 [-0.168] [-0.217] 
Withdrawn bid    -0.022 -0.022 
                 [-1.064] [-1.043] 
_cons            -0.002 0.007 
                 [-0.078] [0.380] 
observations 3333 3333 
number of clusters 65 65 
F                23.228 35.211 
R2               0.035 0.038 
prob > F         0 0 
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Table 8: Hypothesis 3 – On the Role of Excess Liquidity   
 Model 8 Model 9 
Dependent AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) 
Cash flow        -0.095*** -0.096*** 
                 [-3.137] [-3.191] 
CF x New tech    0.101*** 0.102*** 
                 [2.675] [2.734] 
Horizontal        -0.006 
                  [-1.065] 
Experience   -0.007*** 
                  [-3.755] 
New technology    -0.014 
                  [-1.565] 
New product       -0.012* 
                  [-1.890] 
New region        -0.015*** 
                  [-2.710] 
Cost saving       0.015 
                  [0.948] 
Market share      0.003 
                  [0.405] 
Dealsize         0 0 
                 [0.188] [-0.057] 
Size acquirer    -0.001** -0.001** 
                 [-2.652] [-2.425] 
Leverage         0.008 0.01 
                 [0.559] [0.711] 
Public target    -0.045*** -0.046*** 
                 [-5.657] [-5.460] 
Tender offer     0 0 
                 [0.012] [0.026] 
Percent stock    0 0 
                 [0.995] [0.955] 
Number bids      0.051*** 0.050*** 
                 [3.656] [3.628] 
Hostile          -0.005 -0.007 
                 [-0.159] [-0.208] 
Withdrawn bid    -0.022 -0.021 
                 [-1.063] [-1.042] 
observations 3333 3333 
number of clusters 65 65 
F                15.961 27.998 
R2               0.036 0.039 
prob > F         0 0 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
Table 9: Hypothesis 4 – On Strategic Focus as a Moderator 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Dependent AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) 
New technology &              
New product   -0.005 [-0.379]       -0.012 [-0.868] 
New region     -0.031* [-1.710]     -0.043** [-2.234] 
Cost saving       -0.079** [-2.132]   -0.081** [-2.197] 
Market share         0.028** [2.492] 0.026** [2.320] 
New technology -0.008 [-1.059] -0.004 [-0.370] -0.007 [-0.859] -0.003 [-0.431] -0.023** [-2.115] -0.009 [-0.708] 
New product -0.013* [-1.995] -0.012 [-1.402] -0.013* [-1.966] -0.013* [-1.926] -0.014** [-2.124] -0.011 [-1.303] 
New region -0.016*** [-2.767] -0.015** [-2.456] -0.015** [-2.620] -0.015** [-2.613] -0.017*** [-2.963] -0.014** [-2.210] 
Cost saving 0.014 [0.889] 0.015 [0.926] 0.015 [0.897] 0.024 [1.282] 0.014 [0.835] 0.024 [1.327] 
Market share 0.003 [0.386] 0.003 [0.403] 0.003 [0.414] 0.003 [0.415] -0.002 [-0.396] -0.001 [-0.196] 
Dealsize 0 [-0.094] 0 [-0.088] 0 [-0.099] 0 [-0.051] 0 [-0.096] 0 [-0.045] 
Size acquirer -0.001** [-2.521] -0.001** [-2.554] -0.001** [-2.493] -0.001** [-2.513] -0.001** [-2.472] -0.001** [-2.478] 
Cash flow -0.072*** [-3.633] -0.072*** [-3.651] -0.072*** [-3.594] -0.073*** [-3.590] -0.072*** [-3.635] -0.073*** [-3.574] 
Leverage 0.009 [0.657] 0.009 [0.663] 0.009 [0.654] 0.009 [0.667] 0.008 [0.642] 0.009 [0.659] 
Public target -0.046*** [-5.455] -0.046*** [-5.345] -0.046*** [-5.449] -0.046*** [-5.564] -0.047*** [-5.427] -0.046*** [-5.416] 
Tender offer -0.001 [-0.084] -0.001 [-0.092] -0.001 [-0.061] -0.002 [-0.123] -0.002 [-0.117] -0.002 [-0.143] 
Percent stock 0 [0.962] 0 [0.963] 0 [0.966] 0 [0.962] 0 [0.960] 0 [0.964] 
Number bids 0.051*** [3.762] 0.051*** [3.753] 0.051*** [3.755] 0.050*** [3.692] 0.051*** [3.741] 0.050*** [3.638] 
Horizontal -0.005 [-0.951] -0.005 [-0.924] -0.005 [-0.949] -0.006 [-0.992] -0.005 [-0.916] -0.005 [-0.920] 
Hostile -0.008 [-0.231] -0.008 [-0.228] -0.008 [-0.241] -0.007 [-0.198] -0.007 [-0.213] -0.006 [-0.187] 
Withdrawn bid -0.021 [-0.995] -0.021 [-1.001] -0.02 [-0.952] -0.022 [-1.076] -0.021 [-0.993] -0.021 [-1.025] 
Intercept 0 [-0.006] -0.001 [-0.056] 0 [-0.016] -0.001 [-0.040] 0.003 [0.159] 0 [-0.008] 
N (obs) 3333  3333  3333  3333  3333  3333   
N (clusters) 65  65  65  65  65  65   
F 25.142  25.698  23.626  30.659  34.559  32.615   
R2 0.034  0.034  0.034  0.035  0.035  0.037   
Prob > F 0   0   0   0   0   0   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 [t-values in parenthesis] 
clustering at 2-digit-SIC level; year controls incl.; heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator of variance 
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Table 10: Hypothesis 5 – On the Role of Experience   
 Model 16 Model 17 
Dependent AR(-20,+1) AR(-20,+1) 
Cash flow        -0.069*** -0.070*** 
                 [-3.501] [-3.572] 
Horizontal       -0.007 -0.007 
                 [-1.224] [-1.169] 
Experience  -0.008*** -0.007*** 
                 [-3.587] [-3.435] 
Exp. X New tech -0.002 -0.001 
                 [0.484] [0.350] 
New technology   -0.008 -0.009 
                 [-0.867] [-0.998] 
New product        -0.013* 
                   [-1.918] 
New region         -0.016*** 
                   [-2.751] 
Cost saving        0.014 
                   [0.884] 
Market share       0.002 
                   [0.371] 
Dealsize         0 0 
                 [0.111] [-0.123] 
Size acquirer    -0.001** -0.001** 
                 [-2.639] [-2.410] 
Leverage         0.009 0.01 
                 [0.637] [0.797] 
Public target    -0.045*** -0.046*** 
                 [-5.620] [-5.434] 
Tender offer     0 0 
                 [-0.011] [0.004] 
Percent stock    0 0 
                 [1.124] [1.079] 
Number bids      0.052*** 0.050*** 
                 [3.677] [3.647] 
Hostile          -0.006 -0.007 
                 [-0.167] [-0.215] 
Withdrawn bid    -0.023 -0.022 
                 [-1.105] [-1.079] 
_cons            0.001 0.01 
                 [0.044] [0.495] 
number of observations 3333 3333 
number of clusters 65 65 
F                16.101 22.73 
R2               0.034 0.037 
prob > F         0 0 
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CHAPTER SIX – MANAGERIAL POWER 
‘POWER, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF VALUE  
IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS *1 
  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Between 1995 and 1999 nine thousand billion dollars was spent by North 
American and Western European firms on mergers and acquisitions (M&A); a near 
incomprehensible figure which, by way of comparison, was about seven times the 
UK’s GDP, and more then twenty times that of the Netherlands (Schenk, 2003) in the 
same period. So large was the expenditure that, as a percentage of US GDP, mergers 
and acquisitions soared from 1.6% in the 1960, to 3.4% in the 1980s, to a staggering 
15.4% of at the height of the ‘fifth merger wave’ in 1999 (Mergerstat, 2006). And as 
the ‘sixth merger wave’ unfolded (2003-2008), records were again broken, when “the 
value of M&A averaged $10 billion a day” (The Economist, April 8, 2006).  
Positive as this may at first appear, the fact that the impact of M&A activity on 
the performance of the firm is, at best, “inconclusive” (Roll, 1988; Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991; Sirower, 1997), and at worst “systematic[ally] detrimental” 
(Dickerson et al., 1997), is nothing short of troubling. Some studies have reported that 
the combined average returns (CAR) – that is, the average net change in value, 
accrued to the shareholders of both the acquiring and target company and caused by a 
merger – are positive but small (Campa & Hernando, 2004). And others still 
occasionally find no significant effects on performance (Stulz et al., 1990). The 
“overwhelming majority”, however, find that “M&A activity does not positively 
contribute to the acquiring firm’s performance” (King et al. 2004), or its profitability, 
as variously measured (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; B!hner, 1991; Simon et al., 
1996; Berger & Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1998). A consensus of estimates places 
the M&A failure rate somewhere in the range of 65 to 85% (Puranam & Singh, 1999), 
a figure which Moeller et al (2005) translate into annual losses of $60 billion.  
The paradox is that mergers should, however, create value. Because – according 
to efficiency theory – mergers are an alteration to the boundaries of the firm, which 
occur either because the manager attempts to cut costs – by internalising those 
transactions that had previously been negotiated on the market – or to expand 
revenues – by seeking out scale economies in new products and markets (Besanko et 
al., 2006). And they will only be concluded when the shareholders of both the target 
and acquirer possess a symmetric expectation of a realisable gain (Weston et al., 
2004). The scale of the destruction thus creates important questions about the 
effectiveness with which the firm’s boundaries can be altered by the manager.   
A number of firm- and deal-specific explanations have been put forward to 
explain why mergers fail. Chatterjee (1986) and Gugler et al. (2003), for example, 
show that the ‘degree of relatedness’ between the target and the acquirer is a 
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significant explanatory variable in predicting post-merger performance. Moeller et al. 
(2004) and, more recently, Weitzel and McCarthy (2010), show that size matters, and 
find that larger acquirers underperform their smaller rivals, while Officer (2007) and 
Chang (1998) provide evidence that acquirer returns in publicly listed targets differ 
significantly from private targets. Jensen (1986; 2003) shows that the presence of 
‘free cash’ (or excess liquidity) affects performance, because it liberates the firm from 
the so-called ‘discipline of debt’; a conclusion confirmed by Hitt et al. (1998) from 
the perspective of leverage. Carline et al. (2002) finds significance in deal values, 
suggesting that the bigger the deal the poorer the performance, and Moeller et al 
(2005) finds that merger waves significantly impact average deal value. Haunschild 
(1994), Hayward & Hambrick (1997), and Hitt & Pisano (2003) all find evidence that 
the payment of ‘premiums’ – that is, the payment of a sum on top of the firms market 
value – predicts poor performance, while Betton & Eckbo (2000) and Jensen & 
Ruback (1983) find that hostility also plays an important role in merger success.  
In this paper we introduce the managers’ ‘experience of power’ as an 
explanation for the observed destruction of merger value. We argue that the extant 
literature adopts a predominately finance- orientated perspective in attempting to 
understand success and failure – within which it is assumed that mergers and 
acquisitions are a ‘closed system’– with little room for human influence or 
interference. We suggest, however, that managers have unique opportunities to create 
or destroy value in the conclusion of a merger, owing to their position of power. And 
adopt a multidisciplinary approach to understanding and predicting success and 
failure, by synthesizing new research on the impact of power on judgment and 
decision making with existing research on mergers and the merger process. 
We begin, in Section Two, with a review of the merger process, within which 
we consider the explanations – both financial and psychological – for why mergers 
destroy value. In Section Three, we examine ‘managerial power’ – a psychological 
factor known to affect key aspects of judgment and decision-making – as an important 
and yet unexplored element of value creation (and destruction) and, in Section Four, 
we then build a conceptual model, which systematically describes how power effects 
value. In Section Four we identify the limitations of our analysis, and suggest some 
practical implications of our theoretical model in light of these limitations, and in 
Section Five, we conclude with a discussion of our future research directions.  
2. UNDERSTANDING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
2.1 The Merger Process 
The various stages of the merger process can be describes as the: “pre-merger” 
(planning), “during-the-merger” (realization), or “post-merger” (integration) stages 
(Appelbaum et al., 2000; Cartwright & Cooper, 2000; Jansen & Pohlmann, 2000). To 
understand the scope of managerial power, it is necessary to understand each stage.  
The ‘pre-merger’ stage consists of a number of ‘planning’ and ‘positioning’ 
decisions (see Figure 1). The decision to merge is made by a few top executives – if 
not a single CEO or Chairman – who makes a decision either to cut costs, by 
internalising operations that had previously been negotiated on the market, or to 
expand revenues, through the attainment of scale economies. ‘Searching’ and 
‘screening’ (that is, the ‘due-diligence process’) come next, as target companies are 
considered on the basis of their projected earning potential and strategic fit (be it in 
products, markets, location, and resources). And based on the (legal and financial) 




The contract is signed in the “during-the-merger” phase. During this phase 
‘integration planning’ also occurs (Burgelman and Grove, 2007), redundancies are 
defined, and the merger announcement is planned and then executed. 
In the ‘post-merger’ phase strategic capabilities are integrated, in an effort to 
realize synergies, and thereby create value. This stage involves strategic interactions 
between the managers of different hierarchical levels, and between colleagues of 
partner organizations. Effective communication, an understanding of and respect for 
each other’s organizational structure and culture are essential for the transfer and 
integration of capabilities, and the creation of value (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
 
Figure 1: The M&A Process   
 
 
2.2 Merger Motives & the Destruction of Value 
Synergistic savings and economies in scale and scope – and thus the creation 
of value – are amongst the most commonly cited merger motives (Gaughan, 2007).  
A merger of two firms is thought to result in: (a) cost synergies, as labour forces 
are reduced, and administration and production costs are streamlined (Carey, 2000); 
(b) market power gains, as a reduction in the level of competition allows for wealth to 
be transferred from the firms customers and suppliers to its shareholders (Chatterjee, 
1986); (c) financial gains, as a merger produces a company with a reduced tax profile 
(Devos et al., 2008); (d) scale and scope economies, as firm exploits the opportunity 
to expand and diversify into new products and regions (Besanko et al., 2006).  
There are, however, also subtle psychological reasons for mergers, that are 
widely unacknowledged but implicitly understood (Cartwright & Cooper, 1990). 
Fear of obsolescence, personal interest, and the desire for power, prestige and 
empire are examples of such psychological motives (Schleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
Each is connected to the managers’ egocentric needs to increase or maintain personal 
power; indeed several scholars and independent consulting firms have recognized that 
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M&As are often born out of the ‘personal whims’ of egotistical CEOs, looking for 
excitement, a feeling of control or influence over the direction of the company, the 
need to gain collective influence, to entrench themselves in an irreplaceable position 
within the firm, or simply following an urge for empire-building (Cartwright & 
Cooper, 1990; Haloern & Western, 1983; McKinsey & Associates, 1988). 
It is perhaps not surprising that mergers motivated by economic considerations 
– that is, by the attainment of ‘synergies’ – are generally more successful than those 
motivated by ego-protection or agency (Weitzel & McCarthy, 2010). But studies 
suggest that even these often fail to produce non-negative returns (Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008; Appelbaum et al., 2000; Cartwright & Cooper, 1993).  
There are several reasons for why mergers might fail (Trautwein, 1990). 
Understandably, many of these have to do with failures in the strategic, financial and 
economic decision-making processes. For example, an under-privileged due-diligence 
analyses, poor selection decisions, a lack of pre-planning, a strategic and financial 
mismatch, a failure to correctly estimate the value of the target, and unpredicted 
changes in market conditions can all contribute to poor performance (Cartwright & 
Cooper, 1990; Fairburn & Geroski, 1989; Rockness et al., 2001). And a number of 
firm- and deal-specific characteristics – such as size, relatedness, and ownership 
structure, the levels of hostility, liquidity and methods of payment – have been found 
to play an important role in moderating the probability of success and failure. 
Human factors, however, and the psychology of the manager, are a much-
neglected explanation for the destruction of value, because it is assumed that mergers 
are a ‘closed system’, with little room for human influence or interference. Estimates 
suggest, however, that the manager may be responsible for between one third to one 
half of all merger failures (Cartwright & Cooper, 1990; Dannemiller Tyson, 2000).  
2.3 The Psychology of the Manager 
 The manager can influence and undermine the M&A process at both the pre- 
and post-merger stages (see Weitzel and McCarthy, 2010 for an overview).  
 Managerial influence on pre-merger processes. A number of theories explain 
value-destruction at the pre-merger stage. The theory of managerial hubris (Roll, 
1986) for example, suggests that managers may have good intentions in initiating 
mergers, and that they may aim to increase the value of the firm. The theory suggests, 
however, that being over-confident, managers typically over-estimate their abilities to 
create synergies. Over-confidence leads to overpaying (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Malmendier and Tate, 2008), which in turn dramatically increases the 
probability of failure (Dong et al., 2006). By contrast, Jensen’s (1986) theory of 
managerial discretion claims that it is not managerial over-confidence that drives 
unproductive acquisitions, but rather the over-confidence of shareholders in 
managers. Jensen suggests that this allows them to make quick strategic decisions, 
and to engage in large-scale strategic actions with little analysis or accountability 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The managerial theories of the firm (Marris, 
1964) are, however, less kind. They suggest that managers may intentionally act as 
value-destroyers, because they pursue self-serving acquisitions. The theory of 
managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), for example, claims that 
unsuccessful mergers occur because managers make investments that minimize the 
risk of replacement, or allow for increases in wealth, power, reputation and fame. 
Managerial influence on post-merger processes. Irrespectively of their initial 
motivation, the goal of the post-merger processes is to integrate the two 
organizational structures and cultures. And here the potential for value-destruction is 
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immense (Burgelman and Grove, 2007). Critical to the success of this stage is the 
managers’ capacity to effectively communicate organizational goals across 
hierarchical levels, and between organizations. And an understanding and respect for 
the organizational structure and culture of both the target and acquirer are essential for 
an effective transfer and integration of capabilities (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). It 
is perhaps no surprise, therefore, that failures at this stage have been attributed to the 
absence of emotionally intelligent leadership (Cartwright & Cooper, 2000). 
2.4 A Gap in the Literature 
Clearly, the manager occupies a position of power, and can influence both the 
organisational strategy of the firm, and group decision processes, to destroy value. 
And yet little is known about the manner in which the manager affects value in 
mergers and acquisitions, beyond the fact that hubris, or motives for self-protection 
(entrenchment) or self-enhancement (empire-building) destroy value. There is 
therefore an important gap in our understanding of the psychology of the manager. 
The goal of the present research is to correct this, and to investigate ‘power’ – a 
psychological factor known to affect key aspects of judgment and decision-making – 
as an important and yet unexplored element in the creation and destruction of value. 
3. THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL POWER ON THE M&A PROCESS  
It has been empirically demonstrated that individuals in a position of power 
have a unique capacity to affect the thoughts, feelings, and even behaviours of others.2 
More recent research reveals that the ‘experience of power’ itself has the capacity to 
influence the thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of powerful individuals themselves, 
often to destructive ends. Put another way, individuals in a position of power are 
influenced by it to think and act in ways that they would not otherwise. In this section, 
we consider the nature of managerial power, and explore how this can affect judgment 
and decision making processes, that are critical to M&A processes. 
3.1 Power Affects Thought and Behavior 
Power is ‘experienced’ when individuals have asymmetric responsibility for and 
control over valued resources in social relations (Fiske, 1993). Managers, responsible 
for the division of a firm’s resources to a greater extent than other organizational 
members, are thus in a position associated with the experience of power. 
 The potential for power to influence managerial judgment and decision 
making processes stems from the fact that power fundamentally alters individuals’ 
psychological states. The most influential and empirically-supported theoretical 
framework for understanding the psychological effects of power is known as the 
‘power approach theory’ (Keltner, Gruendfeld & Anderson, 2003). This theory posits 
that elevated power activates what social psychologists refer to as the ‘behavioral 
approach system’ – which increases ones sensitivity to rewards – while powerlessness 
activates the so-called ‘behavioral inhibition system’ – which triggers a sensitivity to 
threats. Although at first both are probably unfamiliar, we suggest that both will have 
been experienced by the reader: in response to positive environmental feedback 
                                                
2
 Take for instance, Milgram’s classic study (1963) in which participants obediently delivered what 
they thought were 440-volt shocks to anonymous strangers at the insistence of an experimenter – a 
person in a position of relative power. People in a position of power, it was shown, are capable of 
influencing the decisions and behaviors of others, to destructive ends. 
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(receiving praise, for example), one feels motivated to approach, or to take action 
towards the achievement of our goals; in response to negative environmental feedback 
(receiving criticism, for example), one becomes more inhibited, and proceeds with 
caution and consideration. Thus the activation of behavioral systems will vary from 
situation to situation. However, people in a position of power, it is suggested, will 
more often than not find themselves in an approach-state rather than inhibition-state.  
 The power-induced activation of the behavioral approach system has 
important cognitive and behavioral consequences. In the following, we will discuss 
how the experience of power: (1) increases the individual’s attention to rewards and 
opportunities, and decreases his attention to threats; and (2) reduces social 
attentiveness. These effects are particularly important in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions, where vigilant decision-making, and behavioral caution, reduces the 
potential for errors in the pre-merger planning and post-merger integration stages. 
3.1.1 Attention to opportunities and rewards 
A host of research – directly flowing from this power-approach theory (Keltner 
et al., 2003) – has shown that the powerful appear to be optimistic, action-oriented 
individuals, prone to overconfidence, risk-taking, and illusions of control.   
 Power Increases Optimism and Risk-Taking. Research has shown that power 
induces a general sense of optimism. Powerful individuals, it has been shown, tend to 
believe that their future holds both more positive and less negative events in store for 
them (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). These optimistic views of the world increases the 
attraction of the powerful to risk, both in terms of exhibiting greater risk preferences 
as well as in making riskier choices (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Maner, Gailliot, 
Butz, & Peruche, 2007). The risky decision-making and behavior of the powerful is 
also facilitated by their tendency to focus their attention on the potential rewards, 
rather than the potential threats in their environment. When presented with a selection 
of alternatives, therefore, they are more likely to see the potential gains associated 
with each option, and to become blind to the potential losses.  
 Power Increases Illusions of Control. Power not only transforms individuals 
into optimists and risk-takers, it also increases their general sense of control. Even in 
situations where this control is illusory. In other words, powerful people are more 
optimistic, and take more assertive action, because they experience a heightened sense 
of control. This sense of control can, however, result in both positive and negative 
downstream consequences. For instance, illusion of control allows the powerful to 
achieve seemingly unreachable goals, by pursuing low probability alternatives and 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988). But as pointed out by Galinsky et al. (2010), the relationship 
between power and illusory control might also contribute to an escalation of 
commitment, leading themselves and others down disastrous paths of entrapment. 
3.1.2 Social attentiveness 
 Perhaps because they are less reliant on others for access to valued resources, 
people in a position of power are less attentive to the thoughts and feelings of others 
(e.g. Galinsky, McGee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), and are less concerned with social 
norms. Unless, of course, these others are seen by the powerful to be instrumental to 
the achievement of self-interested goals, in which case they show increased 
attentiveness to the thoughts and feelings of others (Overbeck & Park, 2006). 
 Power reduces perspective-taking and compassion. The powerful are 
notoriously poor perspective-takers. Galinsky et al (2006), for example, found that the 
 
145 
powerful are less able to take the visual perspective of others, to take others’ 
background knowledge into account, and to correctly identify others’ emotional 
expressions. This lack of understanding of others’ point of view and feelings impairs 
communication.3 Research has shown that power also impairs compassion, however, 
and blinds people to the feelings of others. The powerful are less accurate, it has been 
shown, in comprehending others’ emotional states (Galinsky et al, 2006), and show 
diminished reciprocal emotional responses to another person’s suffering (feeling 
distress, for example, at another person’s distress). Van Kleef et al (2008) found that 
the powerfuls’ emotional disengagement from others was driven by power-related 
differences in the motivation to affiliate with and connect with others. 
 There is, however, one caveat to this: power makes people more inclined to 
view others in an instrumental manner, as a tool toward the achievement of their own 
goals. For example, a series of studies by Overbeck and Park (2006) showed that 
when the powerful are pursuing “people-centered” goals they individuate their targets 
by paying increased attention to and remembering more unique information about 
them. Similarly, Gruenfeld and colleagues (2008) found that power increases 
objectification, which they define as relating to social targets, based on their utility for 
achieving self-relevant goals. As we discuss below, this tendency for powerful 
individuals to view others in an instrumental manner can have both positive and 
negative consequences for the realization of value in the M&A process.  
 The powerful think abstractly. Finally, Smith and Trope (2006) found that the 
powerful engaged in more abstract thinking than the powerless, who demonstrate 
more concrete thinking. Abstract thinking is used to identify the relationship between 
the individual parts and the whole – it is the ability to see the big picture, or the forest 
for the trees. Concrete thinking, on the other hand, is detail-oriented. Thus, Smith and 
Trope (2006) found that the powerful are better able to recognize patterns in the 
environment and capture the gist of large amounts of information efficiently and 
effectively. But are often less capable of effectively operationalizing their plans. 
3.1.3 On the effects of Power on Thought and Behaviour 
In sum, we suggest that the manager’s ‘experience of power’ activates the 
behavioral approach system, which: (1) increases his attention to rewards and 
opportunities, promoting overconfidence, risk-taking, and an illusion of control; and 
(2) reduces his social attentiveness, which impairs perspective-taking, compassion, 
but increases divergent and abstract thinking. We now turn to the implications of 
these cognitive and behavioral consequences of power for the management of the 
M&A process, in an effort to better understand the creation and destruction of value.  
3.2 Managerial Power in the Merger Process 
3.2.1 Power in the Pre-Merger Stage 
As outlined in Figure 1, the pre-merger stage involves planning an acquisition, 
searching, and screening, and results in the selection of a firm with which to merge. 
Contact is then made, and negotiation are held between top managers on the terms of 
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 Galinsky et al (2006) presented participants with a scenario in which a individual responded to a very 
bad restaurant experience by remarking that it was a “marvellous experience. Just marvellous”. The 
powerful inaccurately predicted that others would see the world as they saw it (i.e., that the message 




the merger or acquisition, followed by integration planning, and closing.  
Several of these steps may be critically affected by the psychology of the 
manager, who is in a position of power and therefore may be prone to power-related 
biases (opportunity-seeking and social inattentiveness). We have also established that 
the manager’s psychological state is largely affected by his or her experience of 
power, which increases attention to opportunities and rewards.  This attentional bias 
towards rewards rather than threats may lead to overconfidence (hubris), which 
motivates managers to enter into mergers and make acquisitions that are high-risk. 
Indeed, power is also associated with optimism and high-risk decision-making, as 
managers in a position of power experience an illusion of control over the outcomes 
of their decisions. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find strong evidence of hubris in 
US takeovers, and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find the same in a European 
context. The latter estimate that about one third of the large takeovers in the 1990s 
suffered from some form of hubris. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that overly 
optimistic managers, who voluntarily retain in-the-money stock options in their own 
firms, more frequently engage in less profitable diversifying mergers. And Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) find that hubris is more likely to be seen amongst low book-to-
market ratio firms – that is, amongst the so-called ‘glamour firms’ where managerial 
discretion is greater – than amongst high book-to-market ratio ‘value firms’. Thus, we 
suggest that power may motivate managers to enter into mergers that have a high risk 
of failure, thereby increasing the potential for value-destruction from the outset. 
Whatever the motive, once a merger or acquisition has been planned, managers 
search and screen potential candidates for the merger. Optimally, this process is 
systematic and detail-oriented. Power interferes with concrete thinking, however, and 
detail-oriented processing, and hence may impair the managers’ attention to detail in 
the search and screening process. The rise of management theory, and the idea that 
‘good managers can manage anything’ (Weston and Mansinghka, 1971; Gaughan, 
2007), it is generally agreed, further diminished the managers attention to detail in the 
1960s, and inspired the third merger way (ca. 1960 to 1969) to diversify. In this case, 
and in any subsequent case where the manager does not pay adequate attention, the 
suggestion is that power increases the potential for value-destruction, by undermining 
the process by which the manager chooses a firm with whom to merge or acquire. 
After the target has been selected, and – typically informal4 – first contact with 
the chosen firm has been made, the negotiation process begins – in which a buying 
price is settled – begins. Research by van Kleef et al (2006) demonstrates that in the 
realm of negotiation, power has the potential to facilitate the creation of value. As 
mentioned above, power reduces social attentiveness; the powerful are better able to 
turn a blind eye to the suffering of others. Consequently, power protects negotiators 
from being swayed by the strategic displays of emotions that are designed to induce 
concessions. Thus, high-power negotiators are less likely to concede to an angry 
opponent compared to low-power negotiators (Van Kleef et al., 2006). Similarly, in a 
bargaining context, high-power negotiators are more likely to make a first offer 
compared to their less powerful partners (Magee et al., 2007). These studies showed 
that by making the first offer, the powerful garnered a distinct financial advantage. 
Thus, in the negotiation phase of the M&A process, the power bestowed upon the 
manager may, we suggest, impart a distinct organizational advantage. 
Finally, and as argued by Cartwright & Cooper (2000), many mergers and 
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 Burgelman and Meza (2004), in describing the merger between Compaq and HP, report (p.5) that: 
“…Compaq’s CEO, Michael Capellas, called HP’s CEO, Carly Fiorina, to discuss a joint research and 
development (R&D) deal, but the conversation turned to acquisition”. 
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acquisitions fail due to poor integration planning. Organizational and cultural clashes, 
duplication, and a failure to streamline the operation of the firm can all result in the 
destruction of significant value (Weston et al., 2004). Given that power reduces social 
attentiveness, and in particular leads to poor perspective-taking and a tendency to 
view others in an instrumental manner, it is likely that managers experiencing power 
may be pay less attention to this aspect of the M&A process than necessary for a 
smooth post-merger integration. Thus, value can again be destroyed in this stage too .  
3.2.2 Power in the Post-Merger Stage 
 In the post-merger stage, the manager oversees the integration of skills and 
resources necessary for the achievement of synergies, and the creation of value.  
The integration stage involves retrenchment and re-allocation of employees, as 
well as hiring of new middle managers. As discussed earlier, the success of this stage 
depends on the effective communication of organizational goals within and across 
organizations. Managerial communication is potentially impaired, however, by the 
experience of power, which leads individuals to focus on ‘the gist’, and to address 
problems at a higher level of abstraction, which can lead to communication distortions 
between high and low power individuals, who tend to think more concretely.  
We have seen, however, that managers with enhanced abstract thinking capacity 
have the ability to see the big picture. Coupled with optimism, this can be used to 
generate and successfully communicate ‘grand visions for the future’, and thereby 
motivate subordinates to pursue a common goal. Hence, while power is, in general, an 
obstacle to communication, it may also facilitate motivational leadership. 
As demonstrated by Galinsky et al (2008), however, we have suggested that the 
powerful have a reduced capacity for perspective-taking which results in a tendency 
to assume that others have access to private knowledge. In a merger process, this 
would inevitably impair the communication of details that are essential to employees’ 
understanding of the situations and problems that arise amidst organizational change.  
Destructive as it may be in terms of communication, it is possible that the 
experience of power can have positive consequences for the merger, in terms of hiring 
decisions. Gruenfeld et al. (2008) create a hiring situation, in which some job 
candidates were better fits for specific positions (e.g., a salesperson needed to be 
extroverted). In this situation high-power individuals were better able to select the 
candidate whose attributes best matched the hiring criterion. In addition, managers 
may be better able to make difficult restructuring decisions (i.e. laying off 
employees), because of their instrumental view of organizational members. In support 
of this, Lammers and Stapel (2009) found that in a medical simulation, high power 
senior surgeons’ more object-like view on patients helped them to administer a 
painful but effective medical treatment. Low power nurses and junior surgeons were 
hindered from doing so, because they focused too much on the pain and suffering 
caused by it. Thus, while the relationship between power and objectification might be 
dysfunctional for social relationships and communication with lower-level managers 
and employees, it may be functional for the attainment of organizational goals.  
Finally, we suggest that managerial power is most likely to affect the evaluation 
of merger success, and re-evaluation of integration plans, by biasing managers 
towards the perception of opportunities and rewards and hindering attention to threats 
and obstacles. Paired with an illusion of control, the powerful may see real threats as 
mere ‘setbacks’, influencing their willingness to re-evaluate pre-merger integration 
plans. This promotion- rather than prevention-focused interpretational bias 
maximizes, rather than minimizes, we suggest, the potential for value-destruction. 
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3.2.3 On the Effect of Power on the Merger Process 
 In summary, we suggest that managerial power may influence the M&A 
process by: introducing overconfidence to the merger motives (value-destruction); 
reducing the rigor of the search and screening process (value-destruction); facilitating 
negotiations and bargaining (value-creation); reducing motivation to invest in 
integration planning (value-destruction); impairing the communication of 
organizational strategies (value-destruction); enhancing the communication of 
organizational goals (value-creation); aiding the objectivity with which restructuring 
(hiring and firing) decisions are made (value-creation); and placing a positive-bias on 
the evaluation of post-merger processes (value-destruction). These, and the potential, 
practical, consequences of them on the merger, are documented in Table 1.  
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 Thus, while power clearly provides managers with key competencies in the 
negotiation of the merger, the communication of organizational goals, and strategic 
restructuring, there are several phases of the M&A process that may be undermined 
by managerial power, if that power is allowed to lead organizational policy 
unchecked. In the next section, we discuss strategies for utilizing managerial power in 
mergers, and strategies for managing the influence of the powerful in the M&A 
process. Firstly, however, it is important to address the limitations of our analysis for 
understanding the impact of managerial power on mergers and acquisitions. 
4. DISCUSSION 
4.1 Theoretical Limitations 
 Our preceding discussion of the effects of manager power on M&A success 
suggests that it can increase the probability of value-destruction in many ways due to 
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the fact that power increases attention to rewards or opportunities and decreases social 
attentiveness. An important caveat to this perspective, however, is that while power 
has these effects, in general, there are certain individuals that will be immune to these 
effects of power. Indeed, there are certain groups of individuals for whom power only 
serves to increase attention to threats and attention to social relationships.  
4.2 Individual differences in manager psychology 
Recent research lends credence to Lincoln’s intuition that “nearly all men can 
stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character, give him power”.  
Research indicates that power increases the correspondence between individual 
traits and behavior (Galinsky et al., 2008), with their personalities being better 
predictors of their thoughts and behaviors than are the personalities of the powerless. 
The implication of this is two-fold: (a) the effects of power should be attenuated by 
the possession of personality traits that are inconsistent with the general effects of 
power on people; and (b) the effects of power should differ across cultures that vary 
in their conceptualizations of the self in relation to others (Zhong et al., 2009).  
A number of recent studies have provided support for the idea that power 
reveals the person’s true personality. Chen et al. (2001) found that so called 
‘communally-oriented people’ act more selflessly, and ‘exchange-oriented people’ act 
more selfishly, when allowed to experience power. The authors argued that power 
activated social responsibility goals in ‘communals’, and self-interest goals in 
‘exchangers’, thus leading to different behavioral outcomes. Similarly, Galinsky et al. 
(2008) found that in a negotiation task, high power participants’ social value 
orientations were better predictors of their interest in trusting and building a 
relationship with their negotiation partner than their partners’ reputations. In contrast, 
baseline participants’ interest in relationship building was more a function of their 
partner’s reputation than of their social value orientations.  In sum, the behaviors of 
the powerful will be in line with their personality when these personality traits 
conflict with the expressions of power exhibited by the general population.  
Individuals differences that are rooted in culture have also been shown to 
moderate the effects of power on cognition and behavior. Zhong et al (2009) shows 
that the effects of power on attention to rewards are culturally bound: whereas 
Western cultures automatically associate power with freedom and reward, Eastern 
cultures automatically associate power with restraint and responsibility. The 
implications of this is that Western managers in a position of power show an 
attentional bias towards rewards, while Eastern managers may show attention to 
responsibilities and potential threats to organizational performance. Furthermore, 
members of Western and Eastern cultures differ in their construal of the “self”; 
Western cultures stress the autonomy and separateness of the self, whereas East Asian 
cultures tend to have interdependent self-construals, that emphasize the importance of 
social connectedness and of being embedded in larger groups. Thus, Galinsky et al. 
(2003) finds that among Westerners power increases self-interested claiming in a 
commons dilemma. In contrast, Zhong et al. (2009) showed that among East Asians, 
power led to reduced claiming from a commonly shared resource pool.  
In sum, while there are consistent and predictable effects of power on cognition 
and behavior observable amongst the general population, there are certain individuals, 
and groups, that will tend to reveal power differently. As discussed below, the 
moderating role of personality and culture on the effects of power are important to 
keep in mind when considering the management of power in the M&A process. 
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4.2 Practical Implications 
With a new-found understanding of the potential for power to influence 
managers’ thoughts and behaviors in destructive ways at specific stages of the M&A 
process, it is clear that management need to be managed during the M&A process. In 
particular, based on our forgoing review and synthesis of research on power and 
merger processes, we can identify four key phases of the M&A process in which the 
negative effects of power on managerial decision making can be curbed.  
 
1. The acquisition plan should be checked for signs of overconfidence or hubris. 
Our results show that powerful managers are likely to be overly optimistic in 
their decision to merge, taking on ‘hopeless cases’, or paying ‘premiums’5, 
even when ‘premiums’ drastically increases the pressure on the acquiring firm 
to create returns (Haunschild, 1994; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), and are 
thought to be per se excessive (Hitt & Pisano, 2003; Kirshnan et al., 2007),  
 
2. The search and screening process should be carried out by less-powerful 
organizational members. Our results show that powerful individuals rely more 
on abstract thinking, and are less detail orientated, both of which undermines 
the process by which a manager chooses a firm with whom to merge or 
acquire. Coupled with the out-dated idea that a ‘good manager can manage 
anything’ (Weston and Mansinghka, 1971), this can lead to a merger of poor 
strategic fit, and may be used as an explanation for why mergers by ‘glamour 
acquirers’ – planned by liberated, independent and empowered managers – 
typically perform less well than ‘value firms’ – concluded by managers clearly 
supervised by the firms other stakeholders (Rau & Vermaelen, 1998).  
 
3. Integration planning and post-merger integration management should be 
drafted by a HR manager or external organizational consultant, who 
understands the importance of cultural integration and communication of 
organizational goals, and is at the same time sufficiently independent from the 
employees to guard against sympathetic rather than efficient restructuring. 
Our results show that powerful managers are good at communicating the 
‘bigger picture’, but not the methods by which this might be attained. 
Powerful managers are good at cutting costs – possibly explaining why 
workforces are often so ruthlessly cut in mergers (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2007) – 
but poor at perspective taking, paying little attention to the ‘human side’ of 
integration planning. A HR manager, we suggest, would bridge the gap 
between the “big picture” of the manager and the concrete perspective of the 
employees, taking into account both the culture of the acquirer and the 
acquire. As the failure to do so is a chief reason for merger to go sour.  
 
4. Post-merger evaluation process should be undertaken by the manager, in 
cooperation with lower-level managers, and a third-party consultant, in order 
to objectively check the reliability of the evaluations. Our results show that 
egotism and optimism are likely to lead the manager to judge his failures with 
bias, and to consider real threats to the long-run sustainability of the firm as 
                                                
5
 A ‘premium’ is a proportion of the expected synergy gain from the combined firm, which is paid to 
the target and offered in excess of the firm’s stand-alone valuation (DePamphilis, 2005). 
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little more than short-term setbacks. This is an obvious threat to the firm, as 
‘those who do not learn from their mistakes are destined to repeat them’.  
 
The ideal approach to the management of power in the M&A process would be 
to recruit a manager with a personality profile that would capture the value of power 
at the negotiation and integration (restructuring) phases, without compromising value 
at the planning, searching and screening, integrating (communication), and evaluation 
stages. Identifying the selfish, the harassing, and the volatile is critical for creating 
value efficiently and effectively in mergers and acquisitions.  Managers of the M&A 
process cannot, we suggest, simply be technical experts or analytically skilled, but 
must also be individuals who take their group members’ perspectives, who value their 
relationship with their peers and subordinates, and who derive self-esteem by 
enhancing the well-being of others, rather than relying on self-enhancing strategies 
such as empire building for self-esteem and a sense of personal security.  
Another possibility, however, would be to heighten the risk-perception and 
social attentiveness of the powerful. One possible way to increase perspective-taking 
would be to hold the powerful accountable (Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). 
Powerful individuals who know that they will have to justify their actions are more 
likely to consider the social consequences of their decisions and to take others’ 
interests into account (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992). For example, US 
Presidents exhibit greater cognitive complexity after having been elected, when they 
become accountable to a variety of constituents, than before election (Tetlock, 1981).   
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Mergers and acquisitions are big business: 29,312 firms were merged or 
acquired in 2008, at a cost of $2.56 trillion to the shareholder (Wilmerhale, 2009).  
Mergers should allow the firm to cut-costs, and/or expand revenues (Besanko et 
al., 2006), and as such are critical for the firm seeking to increase its global reach and 
competitiveness (Lasserre, 2006). The “overwhelming majority” of studies, however, 
find that they “do not positively contribute to […] performance” (King et al. 2004). 
And estimates suggest that as many as 65 to 85% fail (Puranam & Singh, 1999).  
The extant literature adopts a predominately finance-orientated perspective in 
attempting to understand success and failure, and assumes that mergers and 
acquisitions are a ‘closed system’, with little room for human interference; in spite of 
the fact that estimates suggest that the manager may be responsible for between one 
third to one half of all merger failures (Cartwright & Cooper, 1990; Dannemiller 
Tyson, 2000). In this research we suggest that managerial power is thus a long 
neglected moderator of merger performance, because managers have a unique 
opportunity to create or destroy value in the merger process. Consequently, we adopt 
a multidisciplinary perspective, which puts the manager under the microscope.   
In the process, we show that the managers ‘experience of power’ causes 
overconfidence, results in risk-taking behavior, and may lead the manager to believe 
the old – and defunct – adage that a ‘good manager can manage anything’. At the pre-
merger stages, this results in value-destruction, because mergers may be unnecessarily 
pursued, and targets sought out and approved, on the basis of fuzzy and subjective 
concepts, such as ‘instinct’ and ‘gut feeling’, rather than rigorous economic analysis.  
Right or wrong, our findings suggest that the manager’s experience of power 
may facilitate the negotiation and bargaining processes during which the merger is 
agreed, and may increase the probability that value will be created. Powerful 
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managers, we suggest, are also better able to communicate the grander goals of the 
merger, and their lack of emotional empathy will aid in the objectivity with which 
they restructure the organization, and ‘cut the dead wood’ to realize synergies.    
We suggest, however, that a general disinterest in the detail, and an inability to 
communicate the day-to-day details of the integration plan, will typically result in 
value-destruction. Powerful managers, we suggest, will simply not invest in the ‘nitty-
gritty’ of integration planning, and will prefer instead to take a ‘hands on approach’. 
Furthermore, and in the evaluation stage, we suggest that powerful managers are less 
likely to be harsh on themselves, and will consider ‘failures’ as mere ‘set-backs’.  
To ensure that value is created, we thus argue that an awareness of the role of 
managerial power is necessary. And claim that to manage the M&A process, the 
managers – that is, the person in a position of power – needs to be managed. We 
suggest that by understanding the systematic effects of power on the thought 
processes and behaviors of managers, the constructive forces bestowed upon the 
manager by power – in negotiations and restructuring, for example – can be 
harnessed, while it’s more dysfunctional effects on performance can be mitigated. In 
doing so, we hope to contribute both to scholars and practitioners in the field. And 
demonstrate that the boundaries of the firm can be altered, but only with due care.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN – FIRM SIZE 
  
“The directors of [large] companies, being the managers […] of other people's money,  
cannot be expected to should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance  
with which the partners in a private [company] watch over their own” 
 






CHAPTER SEVEN – FIRM SIZE 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  




1. INTRODUCTION  
There is a long tradition of academic research on mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) within finance, business and economics. 2 Since the very beginning, this has 
considered questions relating to performance evaluation (One of the first, Livermore 
1935, considered performance amongst industrial mergers), and has been concerned, 
primarily, with issues relating, for example, to what sort of returns mergers generate, 
and for whom (for an excellent survey, see Andrade et al., 2001). 
The focus of this research, however, has been on the role of the larger M&A 
events, and precious little attention has been devoted to the question of small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Probably the most prominent reason for this is 
because most SMEs are not publicly quoted - a fact which makes it difficult to obtain 
reliable data on their general activity, let alone to evaluate their performance3.  
And yet size does matter in mergers and acquisitions (see e.g., Moeller et al., 2004; 
2005) and SMEs are anything but insignificant. In the European context, SMEs are 
thought to represent about 99% of all firms, to employ between them about 65 million 
people, and to drive innovation and competition. At a global level, SMEs may even be 
responsible for between 40% to 50% of world GDP (European Commission, 2005) 
In this paper we attempt to include this important but long ignored sector of the 
economy, by explicitly considering the activity of the SME M&As. We present direct 
and indirect evidence which suggests not only that the behaviour and financial 
success of mergers by SMEs may significantly differ from larger public firms, but 
also that the underlying merger theories which motivate these ventures might need to 
be revisited to account for this discrepancy. The existing evidence on mergers and 
acquisitions has been almost exclusively developed on the basis of large public firms 
(Moeller et al., 2004) and this, we suggest, needs to be corrected. 
This paper makes a modest attempt at rectifying this long held bias. It does so by: 
(1) studying and selecting the relevant merger theories; (2) by translating these into a 
number of testable hypotheses on SME M&As; and (3) by empirically considering 
and commenting on the applicability of these theories to the case of SME M&As.  
In doing so, we find that, compared to large firms, acquiring SMEs are: (1) more 
likely to rely on mergers and acquisitions as an external growth option; (2) more 
likely withdraw from a deal, a finding which, we suggest, implies that SMEs are more 
flexible, and better able to avoid deals that turn sour; and finally (3) that SME M&As 
                                                
1
* By Utz Weitzel and Killian J McCarthy (March 2009), and published in the International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management’, Special Issue on “Entrepreneurial Finance 
2
 Although technically inaccurate, it is common practice within the literature to use the terms ‘merger’, 
‘acquisition’, ‘takeover’ and ‘M&A’ synonymously. 
3
 The vast majority of performance studies employ event study methodologies that rely on abnormal 
returns of publicly traded stock prices, and without an initial public offering, most small to medium 
sized, privately held entrepreneurial firms (especially in their early stages or when they simply are too 
small to be of any interest for public equity) are automatically excluded from these studies. 
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are more likely to be financed with equity over debt, indicating that Myers & Mailuf’s 
(1984) important pecking order theory is of less relevance to SMEs. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section Two begins by over viewing the 
literature on mergers, and by developing a number of hypotheses on how these might 
relate to SMEs.4 Section Three introduces the data and methodology, which we 
employ for testing, and Section Four discusses the results and major implications of 
our research. Section Five concludes by drawing implications, and by suggesting 
some potential avenues for future research on SME mergers and acquisitions.  
2. LITERATURE  
To understand the role of the SME within the M&A industry we explore a number 
of questions. We begin by asking ‘who’ are the small and medium sized 
entrepreneurial firms of interest to our research? Secondly, we ask ‘why’ these SMEs 
merge, and ‘why’ we should expect them to perform differently to larger firms? Next, 
we consider ‘how’ we expect them to perform, and finally, we explore through ‘what’ 
mechanisms we expect SMEs to finance their mergers and acquisitions.  
2.1. Who are the SMEs?  
At present there is no consensus on the threshold at which enterprises are 
considered ‘small’, ‘medium’ or ‘large’. As illustrated by Table 1, current European 
definitions, for example, categorise companies with fewer than 10 employees as being 
‘micro’ enterprises, those with fewer than 50 as being “small”, and those with fewer 
than 250 as “medium” (EU Commission, 2005). The US, by contrast, defines “small” 
as having fewer than 100 employees, and medium as having fewer than 500.  
 
Table 1: European Commission SME Definitions 
 
 
The distinction of entrepreneurial firms is at least equally debated (Johnson, 2007), 
and the existing merger data does not distinguish them along a predetermined 
working definition. At present, entrepreneurial firms are variously distinguished in 
terms of ownership profiles, innovativeness and risk attitudes, with the effect that 
markedly different sets of firms can be studied within the field entrepreneurship.  
Based on the data available to us, however, and the focus of both the relevant 
empirical studies on mergers, and on the economic role of entrepreneurial firms, we 
believe that it is reasonable to suggest that the (single) set of SMEs will overlap 
significantly with the set of entrepreneurial firms. We assume that, in general, 
entrepreneurial firms, and in particular nascent ventures, will be smaller firms, and 
                                                
4
 Note that we focus on theories that explain individual mergers and not mergers waves. Several 
approaches attempt to explain a commonly observed wave-like pattern of mergers. See Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008 for an excellent review. 
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also that they will have more private than public equity than the average of the total 
population of firms (Johnson, 2007). We fully appreciate that such a definition is 
imperfect, but suggest that, in the presence of large data limitations, the overlap 
between the two will be sufficiently large to provide us with some useful results.  
2.2. Why do SMEs Merge?  
The question of ‘why’ – ‘why’ do SMEs merge, and ‘why’ should we expect them 
to perform differently to large firms – is not so easily addressed. To answer these 
sorts of questions we must consider the applicability of the various merger theories, 
and must overview the literature which has been put forward to explain mergers in 
general. Due to the existence of some empirical findings, which suggest that mergers 
under-perform the market, this literature has been divided into two broad schools – 
the value-increasing, efficient market school, and value-decreasing agency schools – 
and in our analysis we adopt this method. 
2.2.1 The Value-Increaseing Theories 
According to the value increasing school, mergers occur, broadly, because mergers 
generate ‘synergies’ between the acquirer and the target, and synergies, in turn, 
increases the value of the firm (Hitt et al., 2001).  
The theory of efficiency suggests, in fact, that mergers will only occur when they 
are expected to generate enough realisable synergies to make the deal beneficial to 
both parties; it is the symmetric expectations of gains which results in a ‘friendly’ 
merger being proposed and accepted. If the gain in value to the target was not 
positive, it is suggested, the target firm’s owners would not sell or submit to the 
acquisition, and if the gains were negative to the bidders’ owners, the bidder would 
not complete the deal. Hence, if we observe a merger deal, efficiency theory predicts 
value creation with positive returns to both the acquirer and the target. Banerjee and 
Eckard (1998) and Klein (2001) evidence this suggestion.  
Following Chatterjee (1986), we must, however, distinguish between ‘operative 
synergies’ – or ‘efficiency gains’ achieved through economies of scale and scope – 
and ‘allocative synergies’ – or ‘collusive synergies’ resultant from increased market 
power and an improved ability to extract consumer surplus – when commenting on 
value creation in mergers and acquisitions. Most of the more recent literature 
concludes that operating synergies are the more significant source of gain (Devos et 
al., 2008; Houston et al., 2001; Mukherjee et al., 2004)5, although it does also suggest 
that market power theory remains a valid merger motive. Increased ‘allocative’ 
synergies is said to offer the firm positive and significant private benefits (Feinberg, 
1985) because, ceteris paribus, firms with greater market power charge higher prices 
and earn greater margins through the appropriation of consumer surplus. Indeed, a 
number of studies find increased profits and decreased sales after many mergers 
(Prager, 1992; Chatterjee, 1986; Kim and Singal, 1993; Sapienza, 2002; Cefis et al., 
2008) - a finding which has been interpreted by many as evidence of increasing 
market power and allocative synergy gains (Gugler et al., 2003). From a dynamic 
point of view too, market power is said to allow for the deterrence of potential future 
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 Mukherjee et al. (2004) find that 90% of managers identify operative motives as a reason to merge, 




entrants (Motta, 2004; Besanko, 2006; Gugler et al., 2003), which can again afford 
the firm a significant premium, and so offer another long-term source of gain6.   
In an efficient merger market the theory of corporate control provides a third 
justification, beyond simply synergistic gains, for why mergers must create value. It 
suggests that there is always another firm or management team willing to acquire an 
underperforming firm, to remove those managers who have failed to capitalise on the 
opportunities to create synergies, and thus to improve the performance of its assets 
(Weston et al., 2004). Managers who offer the highest value to the owners, it 
suggests, will take over the right to manage the firm until they themselves are 
replaced by another team that discovers an even higher value for its assets. Hence, 
inefficient managers will supply the ‘market for corporate control’ (Manne, 1965), 
and managers that do not maximise profits will not survive, even if the competitive 
forces on their product and input markets fails to eliminate them. ‘Hostile’ takeovers 
should, as a result, be observed amongst poorly performing firms, and amongst those 
whose internal corporate governance mechanisms have failed to discipline their 
managers. Once again the empirical evidence again seems to support this conclusion 
(see e.g., Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
From the bidder’s perspective, the theory of corporate control is partially based on 
efficiency theory, although there are two important differences. First, it does not 
assume the existence of synergies between the corporate assets of both firms, but 
rather between the bidder’s managerial capabilities and the targets assets. Hence, 
corporate control predicts managerial efficiencies from the re-allocation of under-
utilized assets. Second, it implies that the target’s management team is likely to resist 
takeover attempts, as the team itself and its managerial inefficiency is the main 
obstacle to an improved utilization of assets. Typical bidders are either private 
investors – ‘corporate raiders’ – who attempt to raise value by bringing in more 
competent management teams, or more efficient firms with better growth prospects.  
2.2.2 The Value-Destroying Theories  
The impact of mergers on the performance of the acquiring firm remains, however, 
at best, “inconclusive” (Dickerson et al., 1997). Mergers fail to create value – with 
somewhere between 60-80% classified as ‘failures’ (Puranam & Singh, 1999) – and a 
number of value destroying theories have been put forward in explanation.   
Generally speaking, these value-destroying theories can be divided into two 
groups: the first assumes that the bidder’s management is ‘boundedly rational’, and 
thus makes mistakes and incurs losses due to informational constraints despite what 
are generally value-increasing intentions. The second assumes rational but self-
serving managers, who maximise a private utility function, which at least fails to 
positively affect firm value. 
Within the first category, the theory of managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) suggests 
that managers may have good intentions in increasing their firm’s value but, being 
over-confident, they over-estimate their abilities to create synergies. Over-confidence 
increases the probability of overpaying (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008), and may leave the winning bidder in the situation of a winner's-
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 Few bidders, of course, openly announce the goal of increased market power as an explicit merger 
motivation, but the fact that horizontal mergers – that is, mergers between competitors – dominant the 
M&A industry (Gugler et al., 2003) is surely indicative of just how popular it is as a merger motive.  
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curse7, which dramatically increases the chances of failure (Dong et al., 2006). 
Empirically speaking, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find strong evidence of 
hubris in US takeovers, and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find the same in a 
European context. The latter estimate that about one third of the large takeovers in the 
1990s suffered from some form of hubris. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that 
overly optimistic managers, who voluntarily retain in-the-money stock options in their 
own firms, more frequently engage in less profitable diversifying mergers, and Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) find that hubris is more likely to be seen amongst low book-to-
market ratio firms – that is, amongst the so-called ‘glamour firms’ – than amongst 
high book-to-market ratio ‘value firms’.  
Jensen’s (1986) theory of managerial discretion claims that it is not over-
confidence that drives unproductive acquisitions, but rather the presence of excess 
liquidity, or free cash flow (FCF). Firms whose internal funds are in excess of the 
investments required to fund positive net present value projects, it is suggested, are 
more likely to make quick strategic decisions, and are more likely to engage in large-
scale strategic actions with less analysis than their cash-strapped peers. High levels of 
liquidity increase managerial discretion, making it increasingly possible for managers 
to choose poor acquisitions when they run out of good ones (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). Indeed, several empirical studies demonstrate that the abnormal 
share price reaction to takeover announcements by cash-rich bidders is negative and 
decreasing in the amount of FCF held by the bidder (see e.g., Harford, 1999). 
Moreover, it is suggested that the other stakeholders in the firm will be more likely to 
give management the benefit of the doubt in such situations, and to approve 
acquisition plans on the basis of fuzzy and subjective concepts such as managerial 
‘instincts’, ‘gut feelings’ and ‘intuition’, based on high past and current cash flows 
(Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Thus, like the hubris theory before it, the theory of FCF 
suggests that otherwise well-intentioned mangers are enabled by to make bad 
decisions, not out of malice, but simply because the quality of their decisions are less 
challenged than they would be in the absence of excess liquidity.  
Of course, as the degree of managerial discretion increases in FCF, or in high 
market valuations (as in the case of ‘glamour firms’ above), or in other proxies, so, 
too, does the opportunity for self-interested managers to pursue self-serving 
acquisitions (Jensen, 2005). It is generally agreed that managerial self-interest does 
play a role in M&A; research has shown that bidder returns are, for example, 
generally higher when the manager of the acquiring firm is a large shareholder 
(Lewellen et al., 1985), and lower when management is not (Lang et al., 1991; 
Harford 1999). This suggests that managers pay more attention to an acquisition when 
they themselves are financially concerned. Further, it supports the notion of ‘agency 
cost’ and the ‘managerial theories’ of the firm’ (Berle and Means, 1932; Marris, 
1963), which broadly suggest that managers pursue self-serving acquisitions, and it is 
this fact that leads to value-destruction.  
The theory of managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), for example, 
claims that unsuccessful mergers occur because managers primarily make investments 
that minimise the risk of replacement. It suggests that managers pursue projects not in 
an effort to maximise enterprise value, but in an effort to entrench themselves by 
increasing their individual value to the firm. Entrenching managers will, accordingly, 
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make manager-specific investments that make it more costly for shareholders to 
replace them,  and value will be reduced because free resources are invested in 
manager-specific assets rather than in a shareholder value-maximising alternative. 
Amihud and Lev (1981) empirically support this notion, and suggest that managers 
pursue diversifying mergers in order to decrease earnings volatility which, in turn, 
enhances corporate survival and protects their positions.8 
Of course, entrenchment is not only pursued for job security itself, but also 
because entrenched managers may be able to extract more wealth, power, reputation 
and fame. While entrenchment theory primarily explains the process of how managers 
position themselves to achieve these objectives, the theory of empire-building and 
other related, well-tested theories provide both the motivations and evidence behind 
these objectives (Marris, 1963; 1964; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Rhoades, 1983; 
Black, 1989). According to empire theory, managers are explicitly motivated to invest 
in the growth of their firm’s revenues (sales) or asset base, subject to a minimum 
profit requirement (Marris, 1963).9  
2.2.3 Modifying and Applying Merger Theories to SMEs  
The merger theories described above has evolved from the analysis of relatively 
large-scale deals by public acquirers, with little effort being explicitly made to 
understanding the role of SMEs. However, we suggest that SMEs are, different to 
their larger rivals, for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, we suggest that because the manager is often the owner in the case of an 
SME, many of the value-destroying theories discussed above will simply not apply. 
Most of the value-destroying theories we considered arose out of agency problems – 
that is, problems of competing and not overlapping objective functions – which occur 
with the separation of ownership and control. In the case of owner-mangers, however, 
principle-agent costs are removed, and so the theories of entrenchment and empire-
building are unlikely to play a part in SME M&As.   
Secondly, and even in the case of a principle-agent structure, we suggest that the 
information asymmetries, which facilitate self-interested behaviour, will be reduced in 
the case of SMEs. Larger firms, we suggest, have deeper hierarchies, more dispersed 
responsibilities and more complex systems of accountability then their smaller peers, 
and this obstructs transparency and information symmetries. The level of asymmetry 
suffered by the firm is inversely related to its size, and that smaller firms will allow 
self-interested managers fewer opportunities to act in a self-interested way. Thus the 
likelihood that agency motives will play a role in SMEs is significantly reduced.  
By refining the set of merger motives to exclude the agency motives (Table 2), we 
can clearly see that SME M&As will more often be made in the interests of the 
owners. Only hubris and the problems of over-valuation remain as potential sources 
of value destruction, but according to Moeller et al., (2004) these too should be less of 
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 Shleifer and Vishny (1991) suggest that during the third merger wave risk diversification played a 
large role in M&A policy – as prior to the 1980s managers had insufficient incentive to focus on 
shareholder concerns – and it has been suggested that the rise of the conglomerate may be an 
outgrowth of this principle-agent problem (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
9
 Mueller (1969) introduced mergers as a vehicle for growth maximization (not profit maximization), 
and Williamson (1964) complements this by introducing company cars, excess staff or prestigious 
investments as complementary motives. Rhoades (1983) analyses the third merger wave, and shows 
that managerial power serves as an explanation of firm growth through M&A, and concludes that the 
power motive replaced the profit motive as the driving force behind large companies' behaviour.  
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a problem in SMEs. Moeller et al., (2004) examines a sample of 12,023 mergers over 
the period 1980 to 2001 and finds that large firms are more likely to complete a deal 
then small firms because, they suggest, hubris is more of a problem for larger firms. 
Managers in smaller firms, they suggested, are as likely to make the same mistakes as 
their colleagues in larger firms, but because the interests of managers in small firms 
are more closely aligned with the owners, the managers in small firms are more likely 
to withdraw from a deal once they realise their mistakes (for instance, in a due 
diligence prior to consummation). Evidence that the number of value-destroying 
mistakes is reduced in the case of SMEs should thus be found by looking at the 
number of withdrawn bids, and so we operationalise our intuition that value-
destroying motives are less likely to play a role with SME M&As with Hypothesis 1:  
Hypo 1: SMEs are more likely to withdraw from (arguably value-destroying) 
mergers than large enterprises 
Table 2: Refining the set of Applicable Merger Motives 
Outcome Benefits How? Theory  Link SMEs? 
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2.3. How do SMEs perform in M&As?  
From the preceding discussion we can assume that SME M&As face a higher 
probability of successful mergers than their larger rivals. They face lower agency 
costs, and are more likely to be withdrawn when motivated, we suggest, by mistakes 
and misevaluations. Because of this we believe that SME M&A will, on average, 
demonstrate superior performance. Precious little attention has been paid, however, to 
the role of the SME performance within the M&A industry. The near standard 
methodology in most M&A research is, in fact, to place a lower limit on deal value – 
typically in the range of $10 to $50 million – with the deliberate intention of 
excluding smaller firms with smaller deals (e.g., Schlingemann, 2004).  
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Research has shown, however, that size matters when it comes to performance, and 
that the two are inversely related. Carline et al. (2002), for example, shows that larger 
deal values predict poorer performance, and this has lead to the suggestion that 
smaller firms, making smaller deals, may make better acquirers. Moeller et al (2004, 
2005) empirically confirm this suggestion. Defining small firms as those firms whose 
capitalisation falls below the 25th percentile of NYSE, Moeller et al (2004) show that 
small acquisitions made by small firms are typically profitable, whereas large firms 
making large acquisitions often result in large dollar losses. In their sample they find 
that shareholders from small firms earned roughly $9 billion from their acquisitions 
during the period 1980-2001, whereas shareholders from large firms made significant 
losses over the period of about $312 billion. Defining ‘large loss deals’ as acquisitions 
with shareholder wealth losses in excess of $1 billion, Moeller et al (2005) find, in 
fact, that while such mega-loss deals represent only 2.1% of all M&A events which 
occurred in the period 1998-2001, they account for 43.4% of the money spent on 
acquisitions. By doing so, they show that relatively few large loss-making deals 
contribute disproportionally to the low average performance of mergers, and provide 
some solid evidence that small firms may perform above average.   
Consequently, the literature suggests that smaller firms, on average, will make for 
better acquirers, and because furthermore the M&As that they pursue will be more 
likely to create value, we believe that M&A is likely to be an important growth 
strategy for SME. We predict that SME managers will be aware of this, and 
consequently that SMEs will make up a sizable proportion of the M&A population.  
Hypo 2: SMEs that pursue external growth and engage in M&A activities, do so 
with the same or even greater intensity than large enterprises. 
2.4. How do SMEs finance M&As? 
Mergers and acquisitions are big business - average deal size (based on disclosed 
prices) was $198.2 million in 2006 (Wilmerhale, 2007) - and this raises the question 
as to how SMEs go about raising M&A finance.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that different funds come at different costs for 
different firms. For public firms, they suggest, external financing options are more 
costly than internal financing options, because external capital is subject to adverse 
selection and transaction costs caused by the existence of asymmetric information 
between the firms managers and its investors. Internally generated cash – in the form 
of free cash and retained earnings – is not subject to these costs, and so is the cheapest 
form of capital10. Several studies have shown that cash-financed deals are, 
consequently, more beneficial (or at least less detrimental) to bidding shareholders 
(e.g., Carow et al., 2004; Huang and Walking, 1987).  
With externally sourced options, debt is cheaper than equity because convincing 
one bank to invest, it is suggested, incurs less costs than convincing a group of 
own/old acquirer shareholders to vote for an M&A deal, and to dilute their stock, 
before then convincing a group of target/new shareholders to accept this new stock 
                                                
10 Indeed a number of studies suggest that firms with internal cash reserves are better able to adapt to a 
changing business environment (see e.g., Bruner, 1988, Wan and Yin, 2009), and excess liquidity and 
financial slack is an important feature for innovative firms (see e.g., Nohria and Gulanti, 1996, 
Damanpour, 1987, Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993, Singh, 1986) experimenting with new 
products, technologies or markets (e.g., Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993, Moses, 1992).  
 
167 
(Carpenter, 1995). Thus, Myers and Mailuf (1984) propose a financial ‘pecking order 
hypothesis’ in the form: internal cash, then debt and then equity.  
We suggest that, for the special case of SME financing, the theory does not fully 
apply. Internal cash reserves will, we argue, remain the preferred source of capital for 
SMEs but, because of their special features, the relative costs and benefits of using 
debt and equity will differ. We have already argued that many SMEs are owner-
managed, and so if the holdings of old shareholders are diluted – for example, by the 
issue of new stocks for the target shareholders to finance the deal with a stock-for-
stock exchange – then this will be done, we suggest, by managers who are also 
incumbent shareholders, and thus free from information asymmetries. Bae et al. 
(2002) find some supportive evidence for this conclusion.  
Using the same argument, we suggest that the costs involved in convincing the 
target shareholders to accept the stock of the acquirer will also be lower for SMEs. 
SMEs, it is argued, buy smaller targets, which are also more often owner-managed. If 
these target managers, sitting on the other side of the table, go through all the 
negotiations and all the due diligence reports with the owner-managers of the 
acquirer, then the information symmetry faced by them, as receivers of the newly 
issued shares, will also be reduced. Furthermore, it is suggested that even if some of 
firms are publicly quoted, SMEs typically will have more concentrated block-holders 
than larger firms with more atomistic ownership, which makes it easier to approach 
and easier to convince.  Because these shareholders will also have a seat in the board, 
they will again face relatively less information asymmetries to their larger rivals.  
In contrast, going to a bank, remains a relatively costly option. Next to the costs of 
negotiating with the acquirer – which in the case above, would be sufficient to arrange 
a stock-for-stock exchange – a third party, the banks, is required in the case of debt, 
and these too have to be convinced to finance the deal. Smaller companies tend to be 
less transparent than larger companies, and this creates difficulties for banks, and 
raises costs. Thus, the pecking order for SMEs is cash, then stock and then debt. If the 
deal is too large to be financed with internal cash/retained earnings, stock-for-stock-
exchange is, we argue, the next best means of financing.  
For SMEs, financing with internal cash is an unlikely scenario. SMEs are unlikely 
to have the necessary liquid resources to cover the cost of an acquisition, and 
cognisant of the importance of retaining a ‘cushion of liquidity’ (Cyert and March, 
1963), they are unlikely to over-utilise their internal options. Cash in SME 
transactions will more likely come from external debt sources, and because we have 
argued that these represent the more costly option, we expect that the consideration 
paid to the target will be comprised of more stock and less cash than the average large 
deal. This leads us to postulate a third and final hypothesis on SMEs and M&As:  
Hypo 3: SMEs use more stock and less cash than large enterprises. 
3. DATA & METHODOLOGY   
3.1 Sample Design 
To test our hypotheses on M&As between SMEs we employ data from Thomson 
Reuters’ well-known SDC merger database, and analyse all acquisitions that satisfy 
the following conditions. (1) the acquisition is announced between January 1, 1996 
and December 31, 2007; (2) the acquisition is either completed or withdrawn, but not 
 
168 
pending or rumoured; (3) the acquirer is located either in the US, or Europe11; (4) the 
target is located in the same country as the acquirer; (5) the acquisition does not 
involve a recapitalisation, self-tender, repurchase of shares, privatization, or spin-off 
to existing shareholders; (6) the acquirer is not operating in the financial sector (SIC 
6000-6999), in public administration (two-digit-SIC 91-99), or in an unknown 
industry (SIC 0000); (7) the acquirer and the target are not owned by the same 
ultimate parent; (8) the acquirer seeks full ownership of the target; and (9) the 
variables needed to run our analyses (next section) are not missing. This produces a 
sample of 17,137 observations. We classify acquirers according to the latest European 
Commission definitions on SMEs (see Table 2), as derived by Johnson (2007). 
3.2 Variable Description 
As dependent variables we use: (1) deal value per merger and deal frequency per 
acquirer normalised with (that is, divided by) total assets, total sales, and number of 
employees of acquirer; (2) the percentage of stock, cash, other in consideration; and 
(3) a dummy for completed merger (=1, 0=withdrawn). As independent variables we 
use: (1) a dummy for micro firms, small firms, medium firms, large firms, each; and 
(2) a dummy for SMEs (non-large firms=1, large firms=0). Furthermore, and as an 
extensive body of literature shows that a number of firm- and deal-specific 
characteristics affect M&A behaviour (see King, et al., 2004), we include a number of 
control variables in our model to account for unobserved effects. We include: 
 
Public versus Private: Officer (2007), Chang (1998) and Bargeron et al (2007) 
each provide evidence that returns in publicly listed firms differs significantly from 
private targets, and so we control for: (1) the acquirer and (2) the target by status 
(using a dummy in each case) 
 
Hostility: The hostility of the takeover has been shown to impact returns, although 
here the evidence is somewhat mixed (Schwert, 2000). To account for this 
possibility, however, we include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target’s 
board officially rejects the bid. 
 
Size: As Moeller et al. (2004, 2005) shows, large deals often under perform, and 
therefore we include the log of the deal value (not used in regressions in M&A 
intensity – dependent variables (1) above – as then deal value would be on the left 
and right hand side of estimation) 
 
Consideration: It has been shown that stock payments are more frequently 
associated with lower returns to acquirer shareholders (see e.g., Andrade et al., 
2001). To control for this, we include the percentage of consideration paid in cash 
and stock (but not in the case of H3 testing, as it is dependent variable there). 
 
Time, Type, Trends & Location: Furthermore, we dummy for (1) the location of 
acquirer (in US=1, 0 if otherwise); (2) time, so as to control for the possibility of 
year-specific effects; and (3) industries, on the basis of SIC 1 level codes, so as to 
capture industry-specific effects. Finally, we employ a trend variable to capture 
any other trending effects (constructed simply the year as a count variable) 
                                                
11
 As defined in the database, including Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Faroe Islands, 
Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Guernsey, Vatican City, Iceland, Isle of Man, 
Italy, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of 
Ireland, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
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4. RESULTS  
4.1. Descriptives  
Table 3 reports the number of M&A deals per year, industry, location and by type, 
according to the European Commissions definitions of micro, small, medium and 
large enterprises, as well as the total number of deals.  
 




From it we can make a number of observations:  
Firstly, we can clearly see that, as Moeller et al (2005) suggest, small M&As are 
overwhelmed in the average statistics by large M&A: 214 micro-enterprise M&As 
versus 13,387 large firm deals. Despite this we see that SMEs account for about 20% 
of the total deals over the period; with a high in 2000, when SMEs accounted for 
30%, and a low in 1998 at a level of 15.9%. This are, we suggest, sizable numbers.  
Secondly, and looking at the industry level, we see that SME M&As are more 
often observed in services and manufacturing, and least often in transportation and 
utilities. As the latter are the most likely to be subject to minimum efficient scale 
considerations, this result is an intuitive one.  
Thirdly, we see that, in absolute terms, the lions share of the SME M&As is in the 
US (2581 versus 1169), but that relatively speaking, proportionally more SME M&As 
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occurred in Europe. During the period January 1996 to December 2007, 28.9% of all 
European M&As were SME orientated, as opposed to 19.7% of all American M&As.  
Finally, we see that – in all three of our SME categories, and in comparison to 
larger firms too – private targets are much more common than public targets in our 
sample. This provides some suggestive evidence in favour of our third hypothesis.  
 
Table 4: Pairwise Correlations   
 
 
Table 4 reports the pairwise correlation for a number of variables. We also check 
for multicollinearity which does not appear to be a serious issue in this study. 
4.2. Hypothesis One: On Withdrawn and Completed Mergers 
We suggest that M&As amongst SMEs are more likely to be motivated by value-
enhancing objectives in general, and less likely than larger firms to complete a value-
destroying deal made subject to bounded rationality. SME M&As, we suggest, are 
less likely to be completed when driven by overvaluations, mistakes or 
miscalculations, and so SMEs are more likely than larger firms to be withdrawn. We 
test this hypothesis by looking at the percentage of withdrawn and completed deals.  
 
Table 5: The Percentage of Completed Deals by Firm Size  
 
Table 5 reports the results of this investigation on a univariate basis. From this we 
can clearly see some evidence in support of our hypothesis that the increasing size of 
the firm and the proportion of the deals that they complete are positively related. 
Small and micro-firms, we see, complete less deals than medium sized firms, who in 
turn complete less deals than larger firm. 
Table 6 investigates the relationship further, and presents the results of a logit 
maximum likelihood estimation, which uses a dummy for completed mergers as the 
dependent variable. From the results we can see that the relationship between 
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increasing firm size and the increasing probability of a withdrawal is robust: each of 
the disaggregated size categories (micro, small and medium) for the acquiring firm, as 
well as the aggregated SME variable, are significant at the 1% level. The same is true 
of the target firm size and, interestingly, our results also show that the greater the 
percentage of stock offered in the deal the greater the probability that the deal will be 
withdrawn. Following Moeller et al., (2004), we interpret an increased probability of 
withdrawal to signal a reduction in the proportion of value-destruction, and so infer 
that SME M&As are less likely to be pursued for value-destroying reasons. 
 
Table 6: Logit maximum likelihood estimation 
 
4.3. Hypothesis Two: On M&A Popularity  
Our second hypothesis suggest that, because SME M&As are more likely to be 
pursued for value-increasing motives, SMEs will pursue external growth 
opportunities through mergers, and will engage in M&A activity with the same – if 
not greater – intensity than large enterprises. We test this by looking at the frequency 
of deals and the deal size, normalised over total assets, number of employees, and 
total sales. Table 7 presents the results of results of univariate results of our 
investigation. From this already we can clearly see that SMEs which merge at least 
once in the observed period (i.e. enter the sample) rely significantly more heavily on 




Table 7: M&As amongst SMEs 
 
 




Table 8 presents the results of an OLS regression which further explores this 
finding, and employs a number of different measures of merger intensity as the 
dependent variable. Again we find that SMEs which merge during the observed 
period rely more heavily on external growth than large firms in all three of our 
measurements, and that this result is robust whether we identify micro, small or 
medium independently or aggregate them as one (SME dummy).   
 
4.4. Hypothesis Three: On Merger Finance and the Pecking Order 
Finally, and in looking at our third hypothesis, which suggests that SMEs will use 
more stock and less cash as means of payment than large enterprises, we consider 
whether SMEs have a higher/lower stock/cash percentage in their consideration than 
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larger companies. Table 9 presents the result of our investigation, again first on a 
univariate basis. From this we can clearly see that the probability that a firm pays with 
stock decreases quite significantly as the size of the firm grows, while the probability 
that it pays with cash increases, without exception.  
 
Table 9: Cash and Stock as a Means of Payment 
 





Figure 1 shows how this developed over time. From it we can see that stock 
payments decreased in relative importance during the course of the last merger wave 
– when the cost of credit was low – but that the order of preference for stock in SME 
and large firm M&As holds steady in almost all years. Micro firms use the most in 
their dealings, small less than that, medium even less, and large firms the least. 
To ensure the robustness of this conclusion, and before we accept our hypothesis 
on the source and nature of SME M&A financing, we conduct OLS regressions using 
percentage of stock, cash and other means of payment – e.g. acquirer debt directly 
issued to target shareholders. Table 10 presents the results of this, and provides clear 
support for Hypothesis 3. 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we noted that the existing M&A literature is dominated by the 
analysis of larger firms making large deals, and suggested that SMEs may differ from 
these in their acquisition behaviour.  
We presented direct and indirect evidence to illustrate this point, and showed that 
the conduct and financial success of mergers, by entrepreneurial firms, is indeed 
significantly different to large public firms. To account for this, we considered the 
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applicability of the dominant motivating theories – the theories of efficiency, market 
power and corporate control, managerial hubris, discretion, and entrenchments, Q-
theory, raider theory and empire building – as well as the pecking-order theory of 
merger finance. We made a number of modifications to the theory of mergers and 
acquisitions, by adapting and translating the literature on large M&As to the special 
situation of SMEs. In the process we came to a number of conclusions:  
 
(1) There are proportionally more SME M&As in Europe than in the US. Our 
results show that about 30% of Western European M&A were by SMEs. As much 
of the European merger regulation focuses on large M&As, our findings indicate a 
possible need for more differentiated policies with respect to SMEs M&As. 
 




(2) Smaller firms are more likely to withdraw from M&A agreement, and seem to 
be more flexible in walking away from value-destroying mergers. Our results 
support the conclusion that larger firms perform less well in M&As, and the 
suggestion that the large losses made by the few may blot out the small successes 
made the many, when analysed in average terms.  
 
(3) Merger theory needs to be modified for SME M&As. Our results indicate that 
agency costs are significantly reduced for SMEs, and that boundedly rational 
value-destroying actions are less likely to be seen through to their conclusion. 
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Accordingly, we suggest that merger theory needs to be updated for the special 
case of SME M&A.  
 
(4) M&As are a more popular growth strategy for SMEs. Our results show that 
M&As are popular options for SMEs, and even more so than for large firms. This 
again stresses the importance of more differentiated M&A policies. 
 
(5) Smaller firms finance M&A primarily with stock. Our results show that the 
pecking order hypothesis only partially applies to SMEs, and that this too needs to 
be updated for the special case of SMEs. 
 
In doing so, this paper provides both direct and indirect evidence, which suggests 
that small firms behave and perform differently in their mergers and acquisitions. Our 
paper thus contributes to a better understanding of SME M&As and why these are so 
different to the large public acquirers typically studied within the wider literature.  
Data limitations loom large in the study of SME M&As, however and we suggest 
that much work still needs to be done to better understand these special firms. Clearly 
subject definitions need to be agreed upon, and an exploration of appropriate 
performance measures for SME M&As would make for a valuable contribution. 
REFERENCES 
Agrawal, A., & Walkling, R. A (1994) Executive careers and compensation surrounding 
takeover bids. Journal of Finance, 49: 985-1014. 
Amihud, Y., and Lev, B. (1981), Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate 
Mergers, Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617. 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., Stafford, E. (2001) New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(2), 103-120. 
Atkinson, J., Meagre, N. (1994) Running to a Stand Still: The Small Business in the Labour 
Market, in Atkinson, J. and D. Storey (eds), Employment, the Small Firm and the Labour 
Market, Routledge, London. 
Bae, K.H., J.K. Kang and J.M. Kim (2002) Tunneling or value added? Evidence from 
mergers by Korean business groups, Journal of Finance, 57: 2695-2740 
Banerjee, A., & Eckard, E.W (1998) Are mega-mergers anticompetitive? Evidence from the 
first great merger wave. Rand Journal of Economics, 29: 803-827. 
Bargeron, L.L., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M., Zutter, C.J. (2008) Why do private acquirers 
pay so little compared to public acquirers?, Journal of Financial Economics 89, 375-390. 
Berkovitch, E., Narayanan, M.P. (1993) Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 76(1), 347-362. 
Berle Jr., A.A., Means, G.C. (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
MacMillan, New York. 
Black, B. (1989), Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, Stanford Law Review Vol. 41, No. 3, 
597-660. Feb., 1989. 
Bruner, R. F. (1988) The use of excess cash and debt capacity as a motive for merger. Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 23: 199-217. 
Carline N, Linn S, Yadav P. (2002) The Impact of Firm-Specific and Deal-Specific Factors 
on the Real Gains in Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Analysis. 
University of Oklahoma Working Paper  
Carpenter, R. E., (1995) Finance Constraints or Free Cash Flow? A New Look at the Life 
Cycle Model of the Firm, Empirica 22: 185-209 
Carow, K., R. Heron, and T. Saxton, (2004) Do early birds get the returns? An empirical 




Cefis, E., Rosenkranz, S., Weitzel, U. (2008) Effects of coordinated strategies on product and 
process R&D, Journal of Economics, DOI 10.1007/s00712-008-0041-z 
Chang S. (1998) Takeovers of privately held targets, methods of payment, and bidder returns. 
Journal of Finance 53: 773-784. 
Chatterjee, S. (1986) Types of Synergy and Economic Value: The Impact of Acquisitions on 
Merging and Rival Firms, Strategic Management Journal 7, 119-139. 
Cyert RM, March JG (1963) A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-
Hall:NJ. 
Damanpour F. (1987) The adoption of technological, administrative, and ancillary 
innovations: Impact of organizational factors. Journal of Management 13: 675-688. 
Deakins, D., Freel, M. (2006) Entrepreneurship and Small Firms, MacGraw Hill, London 
Devos, E., Kadapakkam, P.R., Krishnamurthy, S. (2008) How Do Mergers Create Value? A 
Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations for 
Synergies, Review of Financial Studies, doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn019. 
Dickerson, A., Gibson, A.H., Tsakalotos, E. (1997) The Impact of Acquisitions on Company 
Performance: Evidence from a Large Panel of UK Firms, Oxford Economic Papers 49 (3), 
344-361. 
Dong, M., Hirschleifer, D., Richardson, S., Teoh, S.H. (2006) Does Investor Misevaluation 
Drive the Takeover Market? Journal of Finance 61(2), 725-762. 
European Commission, (2005) The New SME Definition: User Guide and Model Declaration, 
DG Enterprise and Industry Publications.  
Feinberg, R.M. (1985) Sales at Risk: A Test of the Mutual Forbearance theory of 
Conglomerate Behaviour, Journal of Business 58, 225-241. 
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L. (2004) Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and 
Cross-Border Takeover Bids, European Financial Management 10(1), 9-45. 
Gugler K., Mueller, D.C., Yurtoglu, B.B., Zulehner, C. (2003) The effects of mergers: an 
international comparison, International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 625-653. 
Harford, J. (1999) Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions, Journal of Finance 54 (6), 
1969-1997. 
Hasbrouck, J. (1985) The Characteristics of Takeover Targets: Q and Other Measures, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 9, 351-362. 
Hayward, M. L. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (1997) Explaining the premiums paid for large 
acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 103-127. 
Hitt, M.A., Harrison, J.S., Ireland, R.D. (2001) Mergers and Acquisitions: A Guide to 
Creating Value for Stakeholders, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Houston JF, James CM, Ryngaert MD. (2001) Where Do Merger Gains Come From? Bank 
Mergers from the Perspective of Insiders and Outsiders. Journal of Financial Economics 
60: 285-331. 
Huang, Y. S., and R. A. Walkling, (1987) Target abnormal returns associated with acquisition 
announcements—Payment, acquisition form, and managerial resistance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 19: 329-349 
Jensen, M.C. (1986) Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 
American Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
Jensen, M.C. (2005) Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, Financial Management 34(1). 
Johnson, P. (2007) The Economics of Small Firms, Routledge, London. 
Jovanovic, B., Rousseau, P. (2002) The Q-Theory Of Mergers, American Economic Review 
92 (2), 198-204. 
Kim, E. H., & Singal, V. (1993) Mergers and market power: Evidence from the airline 
industry. American Economic Review, 83: 549-569. 
King, D. R., Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., & Covin, J. G. (2004) Meta-analyses of post-
acquisition performance: Indications of unidentified moderators. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25: 187-200. 
Klein, P. G. (2001) Were the acquisitive conglomerates inefficient? Rand Journal of 
Economics, 32: 745-761 
 
177 
Lang, L., Stulz, R., Walkling, R. (1991) A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case 
of Bidder Returns, Journal of Financial Economics 29(2), 315-335. 
Lewellen, W., Loderer, C., Rosenfeld, A. (1985) Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership 
in Acquiring Firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 209-231. 
Livermore, S. (1935) The Success of Industrial Mergers, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
50(1), 68-96. 
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008) Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the 
market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics, 89: 20-43. 
Malmendier, U., Tate, G. (2005) CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, Journal of 
Finance 60(6), 2661-2700. 
Manne, H.G. (1965) Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Political 
Economy 73, 110-120. 
Marris, R.L., (1964), The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, MacMillan, London 
Marris, R.L. (1963) A Model of ‘Managerial’ Enterprise, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
77(2), 185-209 
Martynova, M., Renneboog, L. (2008) A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We 
Learned and Where Do We Stand? Journal of Banking and Finance 32(10), 2148-2177. 
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M. (2004) Firm size and the gains from 
acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201-228. 
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M. (2005) Wealth Destruction on a Massive 
Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, Journal of 
Finance 60(2), 757-782. 
Moses DO. (1992) Organizational slack and risk-taking behavior: Tests of product pricing 
strategy. Journal of Organizational Change Management 5: 38-54. 
Motta, M. (2004) Competition Policy Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Mueller, D.C. (1969) A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
83, 643-659. 
Mukherjee TK, Kiymaz H, Baker HK. (2004) Merger Motives and Target Valuation: A 
Survey of Evidence from CFO’s. Journal of Applied Finance 14: 7-24. 
Myers S, Majluf N. (1984) Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have 
Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-221.  
Nohria N, Gulanti R. (1996) Is slack good or bad for innovation? Academy of Management 
Journal 39: 1245-1264 
Officer M.S. (2007) The Price of Corporate Liquidity: Acquisition Discounts for Unlisted 
Targets. Journal of Financial Economics 83: 571-598. 
Palepu, K.G. (1986) Predicting Takeover Targets: A Methodological and Empirical Analysis, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 8, 3-35. 
Prager, R. A. (1992) The effects of horizontal mergers on competition: The case of the 
Northern Securities Company. Rand Journal of Economics, 23: 123-133. 
Puranam P and Singh H (1999) “Rethinking M&A for the high technology sector”, Wharton 
School Working Paper, Presented at AOM 2000 meetings. 
Rau, P.R., Vermaelen, T. (1998) Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition Performance of 
Acquiring Firms, Journal of Financial Economics 49, 101-116. 
Ravenscraft DJ, Scherer FM. (1987) Mergers, Sell-offs and Economic Efficiency. The 
Brookings Institution: Washington,DC. 
Rhoades, S.A. (1983) Power, Empire Building and Mergers, D.C Heath & Co, Lexington 
MA. 
Roll, R. (1986) The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, Journal of Business 59, 197-
216. 
Sapienza P. (2002) The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts. The Journal of 
Finance LVII: 329-367. 




Schlingemann F. (2004) Financing Decisions and Bidder Gains. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 10: 683-701. 
Schwert, G. (1996) Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial 
Economics 41, 153-192. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1989) Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-specific 
Investments, Journal of Financial Economics 25(1), 123-139. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1991) Takeovers in the '60s and the '80s: Evidence and 
Implications, Strategic Management Journal 12, 51-59. 
Singh J.V. (1986) Performance, slack and risk-taking in organizational decision making. 
Academy of Management Journal 29`: 562-585 
Storey, D. (1994) Understanding the Small Firm Sector, Routledge, London. 
Wan WP, Yin DW. (2009) From crisis to opportunity: environmental jolt, corporate 
acquisitions, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal DOI:10.1002/smj.744: 
Weitzel, U., Berns, S. (2006) Cross-border takeovers, corruption, and related aspects of 
governance, Journal of International Business Studies 37, 786-806. 
Weston, F.J., Mitchell, M.L., Mulherin, H.J. (2004) Takeovers, Restructuring and Corporate 
Governance, Pearson Prentice Hall, Upple Saddle River, New Jersey. 
Williamson, O.E. (1964) The Economics of Discretionary Behavior, Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs NJ. 


































UNDERSTANDING SUCCESS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
SECTION FOUR – CONCLUSIONS
 
 CHAPTER EIGHT – CONCLUSIONS 
 
“The results documented here suggest that merger  
synergies […] arise as a result of more efficient  
deployment of economic resources”.  
 






CHAPTER EIGHT – CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research was to put mergers and acquisitions under the 
microscope, to attempt to profile the successful merger, and to understand 
performance as a factor of time, location, and purpose, as moderated by liquidity, 
size, and managerial influence. We asked: (1) if there are realizable gains to mergers 
and acquisitions; (2) what (firm- and deal-specific) factors affect the levels and 
direction of these gains; and thus (3) what characteristics, from a business and policy 
point of view, best predict a successful merger (or warn against a likely failure).  
We began in Section Two, with an introduction of the ‘sixth wave’ (2003-2008).  
We profile the period of the sixth wave, first by comparing it to mergers in the fifth 
wave (1992-2001), and then by contrasting it with the inter-wave lull in merger 
activity. In doing so, we describe some important trends within the industry over a 
near twenty-year period (1992-2010), and set the scene for our study of M&A. 
In Section Three we then moved to consider a number of specific factors which 
we believed to moderate, or otherwise significantly explain the M&A success rate. 
Much research has already been done in this area, however, and a number of 
firm- and deal-specific explanations have been put forward to explain why mergers 
fail. Chatterjee (1986) and Gugler et al. (2003), for example, show that the ‘degree of 
relatedness’ between the target and the acquirer is a significant explanatory variable 
in predicting post-merger performance. Moeller et al. (2004) shows that size matters, 
and finds that larger acquirers underperform, while Officer (2007) and Chang (1998) 
provide evidence that acquirer returns in publicly listed targets differ significantly 
from private targets. Jensen (1986; 2003) shows that the presence of ‘free cash’ (or 
excess liquidity) affects performance, because it liberates the firm from the so-called 
‘discipline of debt’; a conclusion confirmed by Hitt et al. (1998) from the perspective 
of leverage. Carline et al. (2002) finds significance in deal values, suggesting that the 
bigger the deal the poorer the performance, and Moeller et al (2005) finds that merger 
waves significantly impact average deal value. Haunschild (1994), Hayward & 
Hambrick (1997), and Hitt & Pisano (2003) all find evidence that the payment of 
‘premiums’ – that is, the payment of a sum on top of the firm’s market value – 
predicts poor performance. And finally, Betton & Eckbo (2000), and Jensen & 
Ruback (1983), find that hostility also plays an important role in predicting success.  
We suggest that the list of explanatory variables currently considered by the 
literature is, however, far from complete. It is illustrative of the high quality of 
research that typifies this field but, given the complex nature of the complex and 
dynamic M&A industry, it is widely recognised that much work still needs to be 
done. King et al. (2004), for example, suggests that the current models are still “too 
nebulous”. And Andrade et al. (2001) has suggested that only when the data is fully 
disaggregated can performance moderating merger gains be properly understood.   
In Section Three, we answer these calls by: first, disaggregating mergers on the 
basis of (a) time (b) geographical region, and (c) purpose; and second, by extending 
and applying the list of firm- and deal-specific moderators studied in each. 
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In the first paper in Section Three – ‘On Concentration, Competition and the 
Regulation of Mergers’ – we take advantage of the natural experiment presented to us 
by the deregulation of the US banking industry in the 1990s, and employ data made 
available by US Federal Reserve, which includes the details of some 1,144 banks, 
over the ten year period Jan 1992 to Dec 2001, to test the effects of market structure 
on the levels of competition and concentration. And we show that, despite the 
incentives, operative synergies, and not collusive gains, motivate most mergers.  
In the second and third papers of Section Three we deepen the discussion on 
merger purpose. And, in contrast to the first study, both of these papers employ an 
‘event study’ methodology – which estimates the economic value of a strategic move 
by considering the markets response to its announcement – to evaluate the 
performance of the merger. In both we employed previously untapped – Thompson 
Reuter – data on the officially announced merger motive, and a content coding 
methodology which identifies each merger with a specific list of merger purposes.  
In the second paper, we investigated the relationship between ‘Merger Motives 
and Acquirer Returns’, and contrast the gains to mergers aimed at expanding the firms 
operations into new regions, diversifying into new products, cutting costs, or 
consolidating markets. Centrally, we claimed that the gains to these will differ, and 
argue that mergers motivated by the acquisition of new products, or new markets, are 
not comparable to those aiming to cut-cost. Using a dataset of 3,333 US mergers, 
announced in the period Jan 1, 2000 to Dec 31, 2008, we show that the market does 
not receive expansionary mergers with much enthusiasm, that mergers which aim to 
consolidate market share are typically preferred, and that cost-cutting exercisers are 
the only mergers are the only mergers guaranteed to produce gains.  
In the third paper we extend this discussion, moving from the static to the 
dynamic, and introduce technological acquisitions as a dynamic merger motive. Using 
the same combination of content-coding and event-study methodologies, we showed 
that the market reacts with caution to the announcement of such an acquisition, but 
contrary to the suggestions of Jensen (1986), we find that financial slack, or excess 
liquidity, can have a positive effect on the realisation of gains. Financial slack, we 
find, is interpreted as a safety net within which experimentation can occur, and is can 
be a necessary condition for the successful realisation of technological gains In doing 
so, we uncover an important extensions to Jensen’s (1986) FCF hypothesis.  
In the fourth paper – ‘Power and the Destruction of Value in Mergers and 
Acquisitions’ – we present a conceptual, and inter-disciplinary piece, which 
introduces the manager as an imperfect actor in the equation for value 
creation/destruction. In it we argue that the extant literature adopts what is a 
predominately finance- orientated perspective in attempting to understand success and 
failure in mergers and acquisitions, which assumes that mergers and acquisitions are a 
‘closed system’, with little room for human influence or interference. Alternatively, 
we suggest that managers have a number of unique opportunities to create or destroy 
value in the conclusion of a merger, owing to their position of power, and we 
developed a model to understanding and predicting the financial and organizational 
outcomes of mergers, by synthesizing new research on the impact of power on 
judgment and decision making with existing research on mergers and acquisitions.  
Finally, and in the last paper – ‘on the significance of size’ – we hypothesise 
that smaller mergers – typically ignored by the literature, despite accounting for 99% 
of all firms and between 40-50% of world GDP (European Commission, 2005) – 
perform better. We employed data from the Thomson Reuters’ SDC merger database 
to test the hypothesis, and exploit a range of econometric tools – including logit and 
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probit modeling, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis – to study 
17,137 US and European SME M&As, and present evidence which suggests not only 
that the behaviour and financial success of mergers by SMEs may significantly differ 
from larger firms, but also that the underlying merger theories which are thought to 
motivate these ventures might need to be revisited to account for this discrepancy.  
2. CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter Two, and in our study of the Sixth Merger wave, find that mergers 
and acquisitions account for a significant part of the global economy, but that while 
the sixth wave was a global wave, which impacted North America, Europe and Asia, 
there were a number of differences in the strategies adopted at the local level.  
Using data on 12,840 mergers, we find that while certain characteristics run 
common across regions – such as the preferred method of payment – different regions 
experienced the wave differently. North American mergers, for example, were driven 
by large and friendly acquirers, using externally sourced cash to domestically 
diversify. European mergers were about integration, and were financed with internally 
generated cash. Just as Asian mergers used the sixth wave to focus on core 
competence building, and were increasingly hostile and increasingly expensive. The 
rise of both hostility and premiums paid in Asia runs contrary to the experience of 
Europe and North America, just as the rising popularity of a diversification strategy in 
North America runs contrary to the strategies employed in Europe and Asia.  
In Chapter 3, and in our exploration of concentration, competition and the role 
of regulation on mergers and acquisitions, we find that, given the chance, merger and 
merger waves can be motivated by the attainment of increased operating efficiencies.  
In a study of 1,144 US banks, we find that the deregulatory experiments of the 
1990s significantly impacted the scale of the US banking industry, and caused a 36% 
decrease in the number of competitors. We find, however, that the consolidation was 
not led by the larger players, but was a ‘bottom up’ wave, with most mergers 
occurring between the smaller players in the market. Furthermore, and despite the 
finding that the levels of concentration significantly impacts the performance of firm 
– which we interpret as evidence for the existence of market power – we find that 
little evidence to suggest that these mergers were motivated by the attainment of 
increased market power. Because, despite the consolidation, the levels of competition 
did not significantly change. We interpret this to mean that the period was one of the 
strong acquiring the weak, in an effort to efficiently deploy resources, rather than 
corner markets. The justification for this is supported by our finding that while a 1% 
increase in market power performance offers gains of 7.53% to the average bank, a 
1% improvement in the cost efficiency of the firm offers that same bank a 28.66% 
increase in performance, as measured by the firms return on assets (ROA) invested.  
In Chapter 4, however, and in an exploration of a number of (static) merger 
motives in a more general – non-deregulation-inspired-merger wave – setting, we 
observed that most mergers do not achieve superior performance, but destroy value.  
In a study of 3,257 mergers, we find that most mergers are motivated by 
expansionary motives, which attempt to grow the firm into new products and regions. 
Our results show that ‘product diversification’ and ‘geographic expansion’ are not 
only two of the most commonly announced merger motives, but also that they are 
most likely to be the only announced reason for a takeover. In contrast, we find that 
‘cost reduction’ is more typically announced as part of a bundle of motives, while 
‘market share’ motives are typically announced as a secondary purpose. We find, 
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however, that shareholders are not convinced of the synergies that these expansionary 
motives claim to generate. In fact, we find strong evidence that ‘product 
diversification’ and ‘geographic expansion’ are each associated with significantly 
lower announcement returns. We find support for agency effects in general, but 
qualify Jensen’s (1986) FCF hypothesis, by providing evidence for positive moderator 
effects of slack; the scale of the losses associated with the expansionary merger 
motives, we find, can be ameliorated in the presence of cash. We therefore conclude 
that agency cost are not to be blamed for the losses in mergers and acquisitions, but 
rather a failure on behalf of management to correctly weigh-up the costs and benefits 
of an expansion. This is important conclusion, with important implications.  
In Chapter 5 we present a study of technological acquisitions, and move from a 
consideration of the static to the dynamic merger motives, and sources of gains.  
In a study of 3,333 mergers, and 555 technological acquisitions, we find that the 
announcement of a technological expansion is typically met with skepticism. This 
may be, we suggest, because shareholders understand the problems managers have in 
estimating gains, and the hubris they bring to the calculation. Technological 
acquisitions, we find, are seen to be a costly and risky business, prone to dead-end 
investments and unrealizable gains. Considering the moderating effects of relatedness, 
excess liquidity, strategic focus and acquirer experience on the realization of these 
technological gains, however, we find that strategic focus, and excess liquidity, 
predicts positive performance. This, we suggest, is because technological acquisitions 
are expensive and risky events that require attention if they are to made to work. 
Acquisition experience we find leads to value-destruction, and suggest that this is 
because each technological acquisitions is specific, and heterogeneous, and requires 
individual attention. Thus, we find that efforts to achieve ‘learning curve effects’, and 
implement less-attention intensive generic solutions, serve only to destroy value.  
In sum, we find that give the opportunity – created as it was in Chapter 3 by the 
deregulation of an industry – managers will pursue value-creating solutions. In the 
absence of the opportunity, however, we show in Chapters 4 and 5 that managers will 
still pursue growth through mergers and acquisitions, but that in these cases hubris, 
and the over-estimation of synergies, will trump rational decision-making. Given the 
important role of the manager in the realization of gains, we move therefore in 
Chapter 6 to explicitly consider the effects of the manager on the merger process. 
In a multidisciplinary, and conceptual piece, which draws upon the social 
psychology literature, we suggest that the manager’s ‘experience of power’ increases 
his attention to rewards and opportunities, which promotes overconfidence, risk-
taking, and an illusion of control, while simultaneously reducing his social 
attentiveness, which impairs perspective-taking, compassion, but increases divergent 
and abstract thinking. In the context of a merger, overconfidence sees mergers 
initiated for the wrong reasons, reduces the rigor of the search and screening process, 
reduced the managers motivation to invest in integration planning, impairs his ability 
to communicate organizational strategies, and placing a positive-bias on his 
evaluation of post-merger processes. At each stage, managerial influence, and human 
factors, we suggest, serves to destroy value. We find too, however, that managerial 
confidence facilitates the negotiating and bargaining process, enhances the managers 
ability to communicate organizational goals, and aides in integration, but adding 
objectivity to the restructuring process. These attributes can create value, and so if the 
manager is properly managed, and his actions constrained in the stages where 
managerial hubris is most likely to destroy value, the manager, can we suggest, 
become a positive force. And we suggest a number of ways to achieve this.  
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In Chapter 7 we move to empirically test the significance of the manager, and 
present a study of mergers and acquisitions by small and medium sized enterprises.  
In a study of 17,137 mergers we find that, compared to large firms, not only are 
SMEs are more likely to rely on mergers and acquisitions as an external growth 
option, but that they are more likely to withdraw from a deal; a finding which, we 
suggest, implies that SMEs are more flexible, and thus better able to avoid deals that 
turn sour. SMEs, we suggest have flatter management structures, and these not only 
reduces the traditional principle-agent costs, but tempers the problems created by the 
managers ‘experience of power’, as introduced in Chapter 6. Because of this, SMEs 
we find, are associated with significantly higher returns than the firms which are 
typically studied by the literature on mergers and acquisitions, and so on the basis of 
our findings, we revise the literature on the theory of mergers 
3. IMPLICATIONS 
Having put mergers under the microscope, the conclusion of this research is that 
successful mergers are rational and economically driven, while unsuccessful mergers 
can be blamed on hubris, and poor decision-making. We thus place the responsibility 
for failure squarely on the shoulders of the manager. In a collection of papers that 
study the factors affecting performance, we show that:  
 
(1) Given the opportunity, managers will choose to pursue synergy creating 
mergers. We show this in terms of incentives, and outcomes, and show that 
the deregulation of the US banking industry in the 1990s allowed for an 
efficient transfer of assets, from the failing to the thriving. Deregulation, we 
suggest, provided managers with the opportunity to pick up ‘big bills’ from 
an ‘Olsonian’ (1996) sidewalk, and these mergers are to be welcomed. 
 
(2) In the absence of theses sorts of exogenous shocks, however – shocks that 
create sudden opportunity – managers, will still pursue external growth 
through mergers and acquisitions. In the absence of obvious and immediate 
opportunities to gain, however, our results show that managers will look to 
acquisitions that expand their operations into new products, and geographical 
markets, but that here they typically over-estimate the potential synergies 
that these acquisitions offer. The announcement of expansionary motives is 
therefore received with scepticism by the shareholders.  
 
(3) Liquidity, experience, and strategic focus moderate the performance of 
expansionary mergers, and show that shareholders will support managers in 
their ambitions if and only if they believe managers to have the necessary 
resources, and necessary dedication, to achieve the expected synergies. Our 
results show any attempt to cut corners, or to achieve ‘learning curve 
effects’, and implement less-attention intensive generic solutions in the 
acquisition of technological acquisitions, will serve only to destroy value.  
 
(4) That, owing to their unique position of power, managers have the potential 
to create and destroy value a number of important merger stages. We find 
that the managers experience of power encourages the sorts of hubristic 
behaviour which over-estimates synergies, and results in the wrong 




(5) And finally, and because overconfident managers destroy value, we find that 
smaller mergers, conducted by owner-managers, and typically ignored by 
the literature, perform better. This, we suggest, is an important finding for 
the theory of mergers, and for the significance of active corporate 
governance. Because of it, we suggest, SME M&As must be welcomed into 
the fold of academic research, and must be included in future research 
projects aiming to better understand performance, and its moderation.  
 
 
In sum, that the purpose of this research was to attempt to profile the successful 
merger, and to understand performance as a factor of time, location, and purpose, as 
moderated by liquidity, size, and managerial influence. And from it, our conclusions 
become obvious: (1) there are realizable gains to mergers and acquisitions; (2) that the 
manager and the mergers he chooses, as well as the resources he has available to him 
affect the levels and direction of these gains; and thus (3) that a strong corporate 
governance regime, and a well-managed manager who makes rational investments 
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